

**THE TEST
OF
TRUTH AND ERROR
IN
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY**

**BY
DR. M. SREENIVASULU**

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FOREWORD

The present work grew out of years of hard research the author carried out in the Department of Philosophy, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati.

The mute question is : Is *PRAMANYA SVATAH OR PRATAH*? This is not about the nature of truth or falsity of knowledge. Admitting that knowledge depends upon certain specific conditions for its origin, we have to consider the following problems as to its truth and falsity: How is the truth or falsity of knowledge constituted? And how is its truth or falsity ascertained by us? The first refers to the conditions of origin (*UTPATTI*), which the second to the conditions of ascertainment (*JNAPTI*) of validity and invalidity of knowledge.

According to *PARATAH PRAMANYA VADA*, knowledge has nothing in itself to claim truth or falsity but some thing must be added to it to convert it into truth or falsity. To this category belongs *NYAYA* in respect of both truth and falsity, Buddhism in respect of truth only and Mimamsa and Vedanata in respect of falsity only.

According to *SVATAH PRAMANYA VADA* the truth or falsity of knowledge is self-certified and never depends for constitution or its ascertainment upon any thing extraneous to the various conditions of knowledge which rendered its possibility. It maintains that the conditions that render

knowledge possible shine by their own light. The basic principle of *SVATAH PRAMANYA VADA* is thus constituted by intrinsic validity or invalidity of the conditions of our knowledge.

The theory is regarded by Samkhya as a test in respect of both truth and falsity, by Purva mimamsa in respect of truth only and by Buddhism in respect of falsity only. This is the framework of the present publication.

The author addresses himself to the task of expounding these alternative stand points of the systems of Indian Philosophy in the simplest language possible with an eye first to clarify the nature of the issues round which the theories center and second to examine the nature of the arguments advocated by the systems in offence of their respective contentions.

It is true that the present problem is one of the most difficult topics of Indian Philosophy. But the treatment of the problem in the way in which the author did is bound to create immense interest in the students of Indian Philosophy at the post graduate as well as research levels.

I wish the author's work a great success.

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The present work as indicated in the title *THE TEST OF TRUTH AND ERROR IN THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHY* is the outcome of my thesis submitted for P.h.D degree to Sri Venkateswara University. It is primarily devoted to the study of Truth and Error in Indian Philosophy. It is a critical evaluation of Pramanya theories in Indian Philosophy. What is proposed is to clarify the nature of the Question, is Pramanya Svatah or Paratah? It also is intended to examine and study the theories centred around and arguments that have been advanced by different schools in support of their contentions.

In the completion of this work I also received inspired scholarly guidance, unstinted cooperation and unfailing help from my research supervisor Prof. M. Veeraiah, M A , Ph.D. without his cooperation and help. I could not have seen the work in the present shape. He has been of great help in having brought it in the book form-I am indeed to very grateful to him.

I can't adequately state how deeply grateful I am to, Prof. C. Ramaiah. Professor of Philosophy, former Dean. of Academic Affairs, S.V. University for his untainted cooperation and encouragement throughout my research career. He has evinced keen interest in my work and offered me

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INTRODUCTION

This book is aimed at to have a critical and comparative understanding and evaluation of the *Pramanya* - theories in Indian Philosophy. It is certainly a difficult task for any researcher to seek clarify at least to some extent the amazingly complicated tangle of discussions that have grownup throughout the ages around what appears to be a simple question, is *Pramanya*, *Svatah* or *Paratah*? This is one of those questions to which every system of Indian Philosophy came forward with an official answer. Arguments and counter arguments were produced in never-ending stream. What is therefore proposed in view of vast mass of material at our disposal, is in the first place to clarify the nature of this issue round which the theories centre and then to examine the nature of the arguments that have been advanced by the different schools in support of their contentions. The word '*Pramanya*' is derived from '*Pramanya*'.¹ The *taddhita* suffix '*syant*', which is generally used to denote abstract sense, is added to it. The word *Pramanya* can convey three different meanings - (i) *Prama* (valid cognition), (ii) *Prama-karana* (means of valid cognition), and (iii) *Pramata*

(cognizer).² The word *Pramanya* is related to its first meaning i.e., valid cognition and it denotes the validity of cognition.³ *Apramanya* is just opposite to it and conveys the absence of validity of cognition.⁴ Hence the theory, which deals with the problems regarding validity and invalidity of cognitions, is called *Pramanyavada* or the theory of validity of cognition.

In the beginning the problem of validity was related to the *Vaidika* injunctions only. There were two chief contending parties - one comprising the Jainas and the Buddhists who were the advocates of the invalidity of *Vaidika* injunctions and the other the *Naiyayikas*, the *Mimamsakas* and so on, who were the proponents of the validity of the vedas, although on different grounds.⁵ The theistic *Naiyayikas* established the validity of Vedas on the ground of their divine origin, while the *Mimamsakas* who did not accept the existence of God,⁶ held that the *Vaidika* injunctions, being eternal and impersonal (*Apauru-seya*) are self valid (*Svatah Pramanya*) and that they do not require any personal agency for their validity.⁷ For this very reason the *Mimamsakas* have also refuted the Buddhistic conception of omniscient being (*Sarvajna*) with vehement arguments.⁸

It is thus evident that originally the question of validity was related only to the *Vaidika* testimony, but gradually its scope was extended to all kinds of cognitions. While discussing the problem of *Vaidika* testimony, Kumarila has pointed out that the question of validity should be examined with regard to all kinds of cognitions.⁹

Certain fairly well known distinctions may be mentioned at the very beginning.

a) *Two kinds of Pramāṇya :*

The Vedantists who form a major group of participants in the controversy prefer to distinguish between two kinds of truth¹⁰ - metaphysical truth (*Tattvika pramāṇya*) and empirical truth (*Vyavaharika pramāṇya*). A knowledge is metaphysically true if it can never be falsified at any time, past, present or future. Metaphysical truth then consists in *Traika-
lika abadhittatva*. The truth which the *Advaitists* take to be *Svataḥ* (in the sense or senses to be explained below) is not this metaphysical truth, but empirical truth,¹¹ whose nature is yet to be made precise. It is this empirical truth which according to the Mimamsaka, is the cause of unwavering activity (*Niskampa Pravr̥tti*).¹² This shows that although the Advaita metaphysics has the conception of an eternal truth, this does not lead the Advaitists to the utter scepticism of regarding all other knowledge falling short of the knowledge of *Brahman* false. The *Svataḥ* and the *Parataḥ* theories are concerned with the empirical truth of the knowledge of finite human beings, and are not concerned with any other more perfect kind of knowledge, be it knowledge belonging to a God or be it the knowledge of *Brahman*.

b) *The Theory of Pramāṇya and the Theory of Prakāśa :*

The theory of *Pramāṇya* should be distinguished from a connected but quite different theory namely the theory of *Prakāśa*. The latter is concerned with the apprehension not of truth but of the

knowledge itself whose truth or falsity may at any time be under consideration. The *Pramanya* theory asks, how does a knowledge become true? And, how is its truth ascertained? The theory of *Prakasa* on the other hand asks the question, how is the knowledge itself known?

c) *How do I know that I know?*

The theory of *Prakasa* is in fact logically prior to the theory of *Pramanya*. The question about the apprehension of a knowledge is logically prior to, and independent of the question about the origin and the apprehension of the truth of that knowledge. For unless the knowledge itself is known, no question can even be raised about its truth. The theory of *Prakasa* is also wider in scope as much as it pertains to all states of consciousness and not merely to knowledge.

d) *Svatah and Paratah :*

The Vedanta-Mimamsa theory is known as the theory that truth is *Svatah* whereas falsity is *Paratah*. As opposed to this we have the Nyaya theory that both truth and falsity are *Paratah*. The key terms in this controversy are '*Svatah*', and '*Paratah*' literally meaning 'from within' and 'from without' respectively. We would use the English words 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' more for reasons of convenience than for their accuracy in rendering two Sanskrit terms.

When the Vedanta-Mimamsa theory holds that truth is intrinsic to knowledge, it means either or both of two things. It may mean on the one hand

at the originating conditions of the truth of knowledge are precisely the same as the originating conditions of the knowledge itself. On the other hand, the theory also holds that the knowledge and its truth are apprehended together. Thus, intrinsic means both intrinsic with regard to origin and intrinsic with regard to apprehension, both *utpattitah* and *jñaptitah*.

Similarly, when the Nyaya holds that truth is intrinsic to knowledge it means both of things. On the one hand, it holds that the generating conditions of the truth of the knowledge are more than the generating conditions of the knowledge itself. It also holds that the apprehension of a knowledge does not always amount to the apprehension of its truth. Thus, extrinsic means both extrinsic with regard to origin and apprehension. *utpattitah* and *jñaptitah*.

With regard to origin, it should be borne in mind that the Nyaya does not hold that the truth of knowledge is produced after the knowledge itself has come into being. The Nyaya rather holds (or, at least the majority of the Naiyayikas do) that though knowledge and its truth are produced together, their generating conditions are yet not quite the same nor are they apprehended as a rule together.

Parthasarathi Misra in his *Nyayaratnamala*¹³ mentions two meanings of the word '*Svatah*', which may mean either 'what is related to one self' or simply 'from one self'. Raghunatha Siromani in his *Didhiti* on Gangesa's *Pramanyavada* also distinguishes between two meanings of '*Svatah*': from 'one self'

(*Svasmat*)¹⁴ and 'from what is one's own' (*Svakiyat*),¹⁵ This distinction however does not introduce anything new and so may be overlooked for our purpose.

It goes to Gangesa's credit who has shown that the words '*Sva*' and '*para*' are relative terms, so that what is '*Sva*' in one context may be regarded as '*para*' in another. Gangesa, therefore, formulates his thesis independent of these terms though it means a more circuitous mode of speech.

II

The problem before us is not about the nature of truth but the test or the criterion which makes for the truth - claim of knowledge. In other words, it may be asked 'whether the causes which produce knowledge also produce at the same time its reliability or is knowledge produced one way and its reliability established by a subsequent operation of the mind'. That is, the question seeks to ascertain whether the test of criterion of truth means anything additional to the nature of truth itself, so that it must be introduced from outside into the truth - situation to establish its claim, or it is either identical with or an integral part of it, so that nothing extraneous to truth itself is necessary for its evaluation. In fact, in the theories of truth that have been proposed under the different schools of philosophy, we notice that the test or criterion in some cases is hardly separable from the nature of truth itself, though it is in some other cases distinguished from it.

To answer this basic question as to what is the criterion of truth by which we may be able to convince ourselves of the validity of the judgement, the Western philosophers have come out with a few main theories of the test of the truth of knowledge, such as correspondence, coherence, pragmatism and self evidence. In Indian Philosophy the genesis of truth and the criterion of knowing the validity or invalidity of cognition figure under the names of *Paratah pramanya* and *Svatah pramanya*. According to the former, we have to resort to outside test for the verification of the validity or invalidity of our judgement. But according to the latter the very conditions that bring forth valid or invalid cognitions make known, as the case may be, the validity of or invalidity of that judgement.

In the case of Western Philosophy excepting in the pragmatic and the hard and fast correspondence theory of truth, the test or criterion is either coincident with the nature of truth or is an integral part of truth. Truth requires for its very being a form of perceptual experience in which we must be aware of a form of correspondence as its minimum condition. But this correspondence cannot be one between ideas and facts which have no community or mutual determination between them. Ideas are at least in the case of knowledge of an adult mind, already determined by facts in so far as they are representations of such facts, and facts are facts for ideas and they are already determined by ideas. Now this mutual determination of ideas and facts in any knowledge-situation is only incipient or implicit, but becomes articulate in a judgement in which truth -

claim appears. Correspondence or contact between ideas and facts does not occur as a subsequent result and therefore as a criterion added extraneously to the situation of truth to vindicate its claim. Correspondence studied in this context is made as a necessary fitness of facts to become idealised in every situation of truth. In this sense, therefore, correspondence may be conceded to as a condition necessary for truth though it is not itself truth. But the traditional correspondence theory of truth starts with a rigid dualism between ideas and facts making us believe as if ideas have no element of actuality in themselves as they have no reference to facts, and facts are brute enough to be devoid of all ideality in them; and truth emerges from correspondence between ideas and facts, which are originally undetermined by each other. According to this hard and fast correspondence theory, not only the nature of truth but its test depends on correspondence considered as contact between ideas and facts without incipient mutual determination. In this hard and fast correspondence truth seems to happen to ideas and its test becomes an additional element to be tackled on to it externally.

In the pragmatic theory of truth ideas or judgments have nothing in themselves of a truth - claim but something must be added on to them by way of satisfaction to convert them into truth. James himself admits that ideas and judgments are not valid in themselves but they are validated by the satisfaction of purpose of the agent that follows upon them. Truth happens to ideas and judgments and not that ideas and judgments have any claim to truth by

themselves. According to pragmatists there is no finished reality with which truth is to correspond. Reality is shaped in accordance with the purpose of the individual. Intellect is not the only decisive factor in the construction of truth. Intellect as we know can offer alternative solutions to the same problem and all these alternative solutions may be equally plausible. If we are guided purely by intellect, we are found to be in a perplexity to determine which of the alternatives is to be accepted. At this moment of indecision comes to our rescue and determines our choice of an alternative that affords is greatest satisfaction. Thus, conative satisfaction or utility becomes the criterion of truth for the pragmatist. In the hard and fast form of the correspondence theory of truth also test or criterion is regarded as an extraneous condition which when fulfilled will give rise to truth - claim for knowledge. The theories of coherence and self-evidence will be found to require no test or criterion as a feature distinct from the nature of truth, so that in these two theories of truth, nature and criterion will coincide. In coherence theory of truth ideas and facts and their correspondence in the sense of accordance fall as elements within experience as a system. In the objective idealist theory truth is coherence amongst our experiences or systems of experiences. Any physical centre facing the universe cannot be aware of an object without implication of other objects with which it makes up a system, and within that system even the physical centre itself falls as an element. This implication which every object bears in regard to every other object is the basis of agreement or

harmony or coherence as a system. For all experiences are the elements of a coherent system which is already self-realised.

Concerning the coherence of Truth, here we shall confine ourselves to the question as to what constitutes the test of truth as coherence. The coherence theory of truth assumes that reality is a system such that it includes within its bosom all possible experiences which stand in a relation of agreement with one another. These experiences are but so many aspects of experience as a whole. The subject and the predicate, the idea and the fact, have all reciprocal implication without which they cannot be what they are as elements of this whole of experience. Any one of these elements considered in isolation involves contradiction and therefore error. Now such being the underlying principle of coherence it determines the nature of truth as that in which we are to understand that every experience is in harmony with the rest in an ideal coherence which is experience of reality. To guard against the view that coherence may be a case of formal consistency as has been taken by Russell and others, Bradley has reminded us that ideal or perfect coherence includes comprehensiveness which goes beyond formal consistency of ideas and judgments to consistency with reality which is a whole. Now we venture to think that without supposing, like Dr. Ewing, that the coherence view of reality can only logically follow from the assumption that our universe is a casually determined system, the theory of coherence can be maintained in the light of Bradley and Joachim that reality is a rational system and possesses self-coherence in proportion as every constituent element of it

logically involves and is involved by every other; and in so far as the reciprocal implications of the constituent elements, or rather the constituent elements in their reciprocal implications, constitute alone and completely the significance of the system.¹⁷ It appears to us more consistent to take the principle of ground and consequent as the principle of explanation of the relation between the elements or 'Appearances' and 'Reality' in preference to that of cause and effect. The principle of causality no doubt has its application in the sphere of appearances as they are conceived by our thought. But the ultimate sphere which is the sphere of the absolute is beyond the spatio-temporal and causal determinations. When we speak of the principle of ground and consequent, it must not be interpreted in the light of spinozistic philosophy where the consequents are taken to be ground on the very nature of substance from which the consequents follow as a matter of necessity. In Bradley, Reality is all - complete and self-realised, while Spinoza is never tired of reminding us that consequents must necessarily follow from the ground of substance, just as the equality of three angles of a triangle to two right angles must necessarily follow from the very nature of a triangle. Bradley confesses his ignorance on this point and the question why there should be appearances remains an 'ultimate doubt' to him. The Reality is complete and perfect without the 'appearances' but still why the appearances are there in Reality remains an enigma to him. Having thus seen that Bradley's system is through and through logical, we can say that truth can only be complete coherence amongst experiences, not without reference to, but always including coherence

with the whole of experience, which is comprehensiveness. It does not stand in need of any extraneous condition for itself, for test of truth is here coincident with its nature. The same remark holds good also of relative truths only that in their cases coherence amongst experiences, as also comprehensiveness is more or less complete.

As applied to truth the term 'self-evidence' admits of more than one interpretation which we undertake to analyse. The common element in all these interpretations seems to be the immediateness of knowledge of what is regarded as self-evident, so that intuition may be very near approach to what is called self-evidence though it may not be exactly identical with it. For the knowledge of a self-evident datum may be due to intuition as opposed to intellect in some cases, but in other cases it may be forced upon our intellect. But immediateness of knowledge is the common character of all self-evident data. Thus, the term self-evidence involves immediate cognition either by intellect or by intuition.

According to self-evidence as test of truth, the truth of a judgment is self-certified and never depends for its certainty upon anything extraneous to the elements of the judgment.' It maintains that ideas and concepts involved in judgment shine by their own light. The basic principle of self-evidence is therefore constituted by intrinsic validity of the data of our knowledge. In modern European Philosophy, Descartes is the exponent of the self-evidence theory of truth and his guiding principle is, never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know

to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt.¹⁸

If we are to pass a true judgment we must affirm or deny only that content which we clearly and distinctly apprehended. Affirmation or denial which every act of judgment involves depends upon the free choice of our will. But the datum which we affirm or deny is presented to the intellect as a passive recipient to which its truth is immediately given, and it remains for the active will freely to affirm or deny. The contents of judgments whether affirmative or negative are always self-evident to the intellect, so that they may be equally true. But error will result from the intervention of the will which of its own initiative, will regard as clear and distinct what is not really so. Intellect operating by itself will comprehend truth and nothing but truth unless interfered with by will. The perceptual judgment, this piece of paper is red, contains the ideas of 'piece', 'paper' and 'red', each of which is so clear and distinct to the intellect that it does not require any other evidence for the truth of the judgment composed of these ideas. Mathematical propositions, axioms and postulates are true because they are self-evident, knowledge of the self, causality and God, is also true because these ideas are all innate. The basic principle of truth in all these different cases is immediacy of cognition or intuition we may say, therefore, that self-evidence which leads truth-claim to these different kinds of knowledge,

perceptual and innate is based upon distinctness and clearness of the data presented to the intellect. And to say this is to say that true ideas must be clear and distinct in order that they may manifest that they are free from self-contradiction. We may also put it in the way that self-evidence is another name for absence of self-contradiction in the ideal. We have already stated that immediacy of cognition is entailed with all that is self-evident. Descartes is of opinion that true knowledge must be immediately cognised as the eternal and necessary truth or at least must be deducible from such truth by a formally or mathematically conclusive process. We may say then that the philosophy of Descartes is guided by the principle of non-contradiction. In this respect Descartes differs from Leibniz who points out that all truths cannot be tested by the principle of non-contradictions, that is, there are some truths where non-contradiction or the absence of self-contradiction need not be self-evident. The perceptual truth, 'the piece of paper is red' for instance, may be perfectly true without being reducible to self-evidence, as Descartes supposes. Leibniz, therefore, feels the necessity of distinguishing between necessary and contingent truths. Truths that are necessary are certainly grounded directly in the eternal nature of things, but contingent or perceptual truths demand for their certainty not self-evidence or absence of self-contradiction, but rather what he calls sufficient reason why they should be so and not otherwise.

This is an account of Descartes' criterion of truth so far as it is gathered from the general trend of his methods, mediations and principles of philosophy. And the traditional view that descartes in


an advocate of self-evidence as the criterion of truth seems to be based on these two works. After having introduced the main views of the test of truth and error in Western Philosophy we now turn to introduce the way in which the problem is presented in Indian Epistemology and the solutions offered by the different schools of thought.

III

Admitting that knowledge depends on certain specific conditions for its origin, how are we to explain its truth or falsehood? How again are we to know its truth or falsehood as the case may be? In other words, the questions that may be asked are : How is the validity or invalidity of knowledge constituted? And, how is its validity or invalidity known by us? The first question refers to conditions of origin (*utpatti*) while the second question to the ascertainment (*jnapri*) of truth and falsity.

When validity of cognition, for its origin (*utpatti*) does not require any extraneous cause, other than the cause of the origin of its cognition, it is called intrinsic, validity in origin (*utpattro svatastvam*).¹⁹ Similarly when the validity, for its origin achievement (*jnapri*) does not require any external cause other than the causes, required for the apprehension of its cognition, it is called intrinsic validity in ascertainment (*jnapter svatastram*). Contrary to it, the view that the validity of knowledge, in respect of its origin and ascertainment both, depends upon the fulfilment of an extra condition, and it is known as *paratah pramanya* or the theory of validity from outside ²¹

VALIDITY OF COGNITION



From the point of view of intrinsicity (svatastvam) and extrinsicity (paratastvam) of validity and invalidity of cognition, there are various views in Indian Philosophy.

Discussing the problem, Kumarila says, it is to be considered whether the validity and invalidity of cognitions are intrinsic or extrinsic.²² Elucidating Kumarila's view point, Parthasarathi mentions four different views, which are as follows: 1) validity and invalidity both are intrinsic, 2) both of them are extrinsic, caused by the merits and demerits of the source of cognition, 3) invalidity intrinsic and validity extrinsic, and 4) validity intrinsic and invalidity extrinsic.²³

Neither Kumarila nor his commentators have mentioned the names of the upholders of these theories, but it is evident from the statements of the later thinkers like Madvacarya that the four views belong to the Samkhyas, the Naiyayikas, the Buddhists and the vedavadins (*Mimamsakas* and *Vedantins*) respectively.²⁴

1) *Validity and Invalidity Intrinsic* :

Some people hold that both validity and invalidity of cognition are intrinsic, because the thing, which by itself is non-existent (*asat*), cannot be produced by any means.²⁵ As mentioned, this view belongs to the Samkhya system. It is also in agreement with its theory of *Satkaryavada*, according to which "an effect pre-exists in its cause".²⁶ That which is absolutely non-existing, e.g. hare's horn, cannot be produced. Therefore, that which is

produced must have pre-existence. There is observed a fixed relation between material cause, e.g. clay, and its effect, e.g. a pot, whoever wishes to have a pot can have it out of clay alone. A pot cannot be produced from yarns and a cloth cannot be produced from clay. If a pot were absolutely non-existent prior to its production we could bring it about from yarn as well, because in that case there would be no difference between clay and yarn. Hence, it must be accepted that a pot exists in a latent form in clay alone and the operation of an agent consists in actualising or manifesting this form. What is generally called production (*utpatti*) is a variety of manifestation (*abhivyakta*). When a pot existing in its full form is hidden by darkness, it is said to be manifested by the action of light which removes the veil of darkness.

When a pot existing in a potential form is hidden by another form of clay it is said to be produced by the action of an agent who removes that form of clay which veils the form of the pot. There is no essential difference between the two actions, as both remove an obstruction. Therefore, an effect already exists in its material cause and that which does not exist can never be accomplished. Thus, truth and error are inherent in knowledge. They cannot be brought about by any extraneous means. Truth and error depend on the same causes which produce knowledge and not on any additional factor, e.g. merit or demerit, and they are revealed by knowledge itself, we need not go beyond knowledge for the ascertainment of its truth and falsehood.²⁷ If validity or invalidity does not exist intrinsically in the

cognition, it can never be produced or ascertained by any extraneous means as no body is able to get smell from fire or oil from sand.²⁸

2) *Validity and Invalidity Extrinsic :*

Some others hold that both validity and invalidity are extrinsic (*paratah*). Validity and invalidity of knowledge are not known by valid knowledge itself or by invalid knowledge itself. Validity of knowledge is inferred from its capacity to produce successful activity (*pravrttisamarthya*) and invalidity of knowledge, from its capacity to produce successful activity (*pravrttivisamvada*). Truth leads to successful action, and error, to unsuccessful action. Practical efficiency and practical inefficiency are the tests of truth and error by which they are known (*pramanyagraha*). Correspondence is the content of truth, but work ability is its criterion. Non-correspondence is the content of error, but unwork ability is its criterion.²⁹

Evidently this view belongs to the Naiyayikas.³⁰ Vatsyayana clearly says that the object having been cognised through the means of knowledge, the cognition can be established as valid on the basis of subsequent efficient action.³¹

Truth and falsehood are specific qualities of cognitions. A cognition is the manifestation of some object, which depends on certain causal conditions, e.g. the operation of sense-organs. Now while object manifestation is produced by certain general conditions, truth and falsehood, which are specific features of object manifestation, must be produced by some specific features of the general conditions.

The specific features responsible for the production of truth and falsehood are the merits (*Guna*) and demerits (*Dosa*) of the conditions of knowledge respectively. Merits and demerits are additional features in the cause of cognition which add the qualifications of truth and falsehood respectively in cognition. Hence, truth and falsehood are not intrinsic or natural but extrinsic or adventitious. Merits and demerits are positive features. Merit is not merely an absence of demerit, nor is demerit a mere absence of merit. It is easy to know from the science of medicine what the merits and demerits of sense-organs are. Even a man with healthy sense organs acquires certain excellences in them by the use of certain medicines and these excellences are their merits. Diseases, e.g. jaundice are the demerits of sense organs. It is said that effects depend on their cause for their birth but they produce their effects independently of their causes, and hence a cognition depends for its birth on the operation of the senses but it produces effect, viz., the manifestation of its object, independently. But what, it may be asked, is intended by this independence? So far as the conditions of a cognition are concerned their independence in producing the latter is accepted, but it does not have that truth independent of any condition and so natural, because it has been shown as depending on the excellences of senses. And so far as cognition is concerned the question of its dependence or independence in producing its effect does not arise, because it has no effect. Manifestation of objects is not an effect of cognition, but is identical with cognition itself. And if activity in relation to the object revealed to the cogniser is supposed to be an effect of his cognition,

then it obviously depends on such additional conditions as the desire of the cogniser etc.

The ascertainment of truth depends on some extraneous consideration just as its production depends on some extraneous factors. At the time of the origination of a cognition there is no knowledge of its truth or falsehood. When the cognition of a blue object arises, the object is known to be blue, but the truth of the cognition is not known at that time, and subsequently when it is known it is not known independently because such knowledge depends on fruitful activity. Fruitful activity is the test of truth and fruitless activity is the test of falsehood. But how can, it may be asked, any activity ensue on the cognition of an object unless the cognition is already known as true? The upholder of the intrinsicity of truth says that if the knowledge of truth is supposed to depend on the knowledge of successful action there will be mutual dependence, as successful action will then depend on the knowledge of truth on successful action, and again the knowledge of truth will become needless because the object of cognition has already been attained.

This theory has been repudiated by Kumarila on the ground that in that case the cognition would prove to be devoid of any character.⁸² He has further argued there would occur regresses and infinitum, its validity is accepted as extrinsic. If one cognition requires other cognition for the ascertainment of its validity, the other would require still other and so on. Hence, there would be no end of series of cognition and no ascertainment of the validity of

cognition.³³ This argument has been adduced by Kumarila in refutation of the view of extrinsic validity. It is applicable to the Buddhism as well as to the Naiyayikas.

3) *Invalidity Intrinsic and Validity Extrinsic* :³⁴

The Buddhism holds a different view. According to it, cognition is intrinsically invalid (*Apramana*) and is proved as valid by some extraneous means.³⁵ On the basis of available texts of Buddhist logic, it seems that Dharmakirti was first among the Buddhists to discuss the problem of validity of cognition.³⁶ But as Kumarila, an earlier contemporary of Dharmakirti had discussed the Buddhist view point in detail³⁷ It seems probably that some Buddhist logician before Kumarila - either Dinnaga or some one else - had thrown light on the problem, but in the absence of any convincing evidence, nothing can be said authentically.

In the later period the theory was discussed at length by Santarakshta,³⁹ Manorathanandin⁴⁰ and Prajnakara Gupta⁴¹ in their respective treatises. The Tattva-Samgraha and the Panjika are regarded as the most authentic sources of Buddhism on the validity of cognition.

i) *Invalidity is Intrinsic (Svatah)* :

The Buddhism as presented by Kumarila maintains that invalidity should be accepted as natural features of cognition; because invalidity, being a non-entity, cannot be originated from the discrepancies of the cause. Elucidating the intrinsicity (*Svatastvam*) of invalidity, he asserts that sense

organs and their merits are the causes of validity and the absence of that (i.e. invalidity) can happen in two ways - either when there is some defect in the sense organs or when there is absence of any one of them.⁴⁴ That is, when the sense organs are affected by some diseases like partial blindness etc., (*tinizadiolosaid*), there would occur absence of merits and then invalidity would come *per se*. Besides, when there is an absence either of sense organs themselves (as in the case of dreams - cognition), or of merits in the sense organs as in the cognition of two moons etc., there would be no origination of validity and hence invalidity being a negation, come by itself.⁴⁵

Raising an objection against the Mimamsaka, the Buddhist argues : it is an error on the part of the Mimamsakas of to assume that invalid cognition is caused by the demerits. In fact, there is an invariable concomitance (*vyapti*) between the demerits and the absence of merits. Whenever the demerits are present in the cause, absence of merits comes in its wake and invalidity becomes inevitable.⁴⁶ Demerits are not active in producing invalidity. Their function is merely to remove merits, when the merits are removed, invalidity comes *per se* in the cognition.

ii) *Validity is Extrinsic (paratah) :*

According to Buddhism, validity of cognition should be accepted as extrinsic.⁴⁷ The argument adduced by it is : "Validity, being a positive entity, is originated in the cognition by the merits (of the cause)"⁴⁸ which may also be called as "purity of cause" (*karana suddhatva*).⁴⁹ It is also indicated by some refutative verses of the *Sloka vartika* that

corroboration (*samgati* or *samvada*)⁵⁰ is admitted by Buddhism as the cause for ascertainment of validity.⁵¹ Corroboration can be of two kinds : homogeneous (*sajatiya*) and heterogeneous (*vijatiya*). If the cognition produced by one sense is confirmed as valid by another cognition produced by the same sense, it would be a case of homogeneous introduction corroboration. On the other hand, if cognition produced by one sense is established as valid by the cognition of other sense, it would be a case of heterogeneous corroboration. For example, if one, passing through a forest, hears the sound of a lute, goes ahead and finds some one playing on lute, it will be a case of heterogeneous corroboration (*vijatiya samvada*) as the auditory cognition can be established through visual which has been elucidated in detail by Santarakshita and Kamalasila.⁵²

On the basis of aforesaid discussion it can be concluded that the Buddhistic logicians before Kumārila had accepted merits (*gunah*) and purity of cause (*karana suddhatva*) as the productive cause (*utpatti karana*) and corroboration (*samgati* or *samvada*) as the ascertaining cause (*jñapti karana*) of the validity of cognition. They had also admitted that validity of auditory cognition could be ascertained through heterogeneous conformity.

So far the Buddhistic sources are concerned, Dharmakīrti, the great exponent of Dinnaga, asserts that validity can be ascertained through experience, i.e. cognition of an efficient action (*artha-kriya-jñana*) as explained by Manorathanandin.⁵³ Besides, while defining valid knowledge (*pramana*), Dharmakīrti

says : "valid knowledge is that which is uncontradictory (*ansamvadana*) which means conformity of cognition with the real state of things⁵⁴. From this definition of *pramana*, it can be inferred that Dharmakirti has indirectly accepted corroboration (*arisamvada* or *samvada*) as the source of ascertaining validity. It has, however, not been traced in the available text of Dharmakirti as to what views he holds about the origin of validity in the cognition.

In the later period, Santaraksita, at one place, expresses that validity of cognition can be established either through the cognition of efficient action or through some one else (*anyadva*).⁵⁵ The term 'some one else' has been experienced by Kamalasila as the cognition 'the cognition of purity of cause (*hetu-suddhi-jnana*).⁵⁶ At another place, Santaraksita as well as Kamalasila accept purity of cause (*Karanasuddhi*) and corroboration (*samvada*) as the means of ascertaining validity.⁵⁷ Besides, Santaraksita has also used the term *Samvada* in association with some other words like *artha*, *karya*, *vastu* etc.,⁵⁸ from which it appears that *Samvada* is a general term, and *arthasamvada*, *karyasamvada*, *vastusamvada* etc., are its particular terms. So it seems that according to Santaraksita and Kamalasila, there are only two means of ascertaining validity, viz., cognition of purity of cause (*hetu suddhi jnana*) and corroboration (*Samvada*); cognition of efficient action (*artha kriya jnana*) is in fact a kind of corroboration (*samvada*) itself.⁵⁹

It is thus, evident from this account that according to Buddhism, validity of cognition is

extrinsic (*paratah*). However, their views regarding the means of validity of cognition have changed from time to time. In the beginning validity was regarded as having been caused by merits or purity of cause, as presented by Kumarila. It was regarded to be ascertained by corroboration (*Samgati* or *Samada* or *Arthakriya jnana*) as referred to by Kumarila and mentioned by Dharmakirti.⁶⁰ But in the later period, the number of means of ascertaining validity increased to two or three, as is evident from the expositions of Santaraksita, Kamalasila and Parthasaradhi Misra.

4) *Validity Intrinsic and Invalidity Extrinsic :*

The Mimamsakas and the Vedantins maintain that all our experiences are intrinsically true, but some times they are rendered illusory or erroneous by some extraneous causes.⁶¹ Kumarila while establishing his own theory of self-validity, says, "you must understand that validity is inherent in all types of cognitions, for a faculty by itself non-existing, cannot possibly be brought into existence by any other agency."⁶² Invalidity appears in it only in two exceptional cases : i) when it is repudiated by a subsequent strong cognition, as in the case of the illusion of snake, which is proved false by the subsequent knowledge of rope; ii) when its origin is proved deficient such as in the a person perceives white conch shell as yellow owing to bile in his eyes.⁶³

Similarly, the Vedantins also assert that validity of all types of cognition is produced as well as ascertained by itself, but invalidity is always born and ascertained by something else.⁶⁴

It was most probably the Mimamsakas who started thinking seriously about the question. How do we apprehend the truth pertaining to a cognition which may arise from various sources and come to us through various means and media? The question was quite pertinent to the early Mimamsa system, which sought to establish the indebatable validity and authority of the Vedic scriptures. Scriptural statements (forms of speech). It was held that cognitions derived from such statements should be intrinsically true. Thus, it was claimed by the Mimamsa that speech (or *sabda*) has the unique power of generating cognitions which present objects of the past, present and future, gross and subtle, remote and near. Other *pramanas* such as perception do not enjoy this unique power which *sabda* (speech) possesses.⁶⁵ To maintain the absolute validity of the Vedas it was further claimed that cognitions arising from speech are to be accepted as true as long as there is no defect (physical or intellectual) of the speaker concerned or as long as there is no contradiction (*badha*). Thus, falsity of a cognition arising from a statement is always found to be due to some defect of the person making such statements.⁶⁶ Now, if there can be any impersonal statement, or a series of statements, which does not belong to any person or human being, we can say that cognitions arising there from will be necessarily true. The Vedic texts are revealed texts. According to the Mimamsakas, they are *aparuseya*, that is, they do not come from any person. Hence, the early Mimamsakas claimed that the Vedas are eternal, and cognitions derived from Vedic statements must be intrinsically true. This philosophical position was

later developed in the following manner. On the question of validity of knowledge, the *Nyaya-Vaisesika* theory of knowledge as such being neither valid nor Invalid is primarily pitted against the purva Mimamsa theory that knowledge as such is always valid. The Mimamsaka tenaciously maintains in the last resort, the authority of scripture (VEDA). The scripture not being the work of any individual person, there can be no defect in it to vitiate its validity. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika even the validity of the Veda is not self-established; it should be proved only on rational grounds. The theory of the self-validity of knowledge and its acceptance by Mimamsakas is ridiculed by the Nyaya-Vaisesika writers. Vacaspatimisra criticises the Kumarila's School, and says that "in a system where a cognition, not being of self-luminous nature, does not grasp even itself, the question of its grasping its own validity is a far cry."⁶⁷ All types of cognition are to be accepted as true until and unless they are proved otherwise. Almost all the schools of Mimamsa accept this philosophical thesis and justify it by claiming that we apprehend the truth of a cognition along with our apprehension of the cognition itself without depending upon any extrinsic condition. This, in short, is called the *Svatah pramanya* theory of the Mimamsa system. The origin of this theory can be traced back as far as Sabara.⁶⁸

IV

The entire thesis is presented in the following five chapters.

The Chapter one entitled "Knowledge and Truth" deals with the fundamental concepts and pre-suppositions of knowledge and truth as conceived in the Systems of Indian Philosophy - Epistemological and Ontological. It is just only after discussing these concepts and presuppositions could it be possible to understand the critical appraisal of the entire *Svatah Paratah* controversy.

Second Chapter titled, "The Truth and Error are Extrinsic : Nyaya View" undertakes a detailed discussion of the Nyaya arguments in support of their extrinsic theory of truth and falsity. Knowledge *Projna* is true or false on its own account, i.e. simply because it is produced by certain specific causes (*Jnana Samagri*). The main arguments of the Mimamsaka against the Nyaya theory have been explained followed by the Nyaya replies for these objections.

In Chapter Three, "Truth as Intrinsic and Falsity as Extrinsic : The Mimamsa and the Advaita Views", the Mimamsakas and the Vedantins maintain that all our experiences are intrinsically true, but sometimes they are rendered illusory or erroneous by some extraneous causes. The Mimamsaka and the Advaitin therefore assert that validity of all types of cognitions is produced as well as ascertained by itself, but invalidity is always formed and ascertained by something else. After explaining this position the Nyaya criticism of the self-evidence theory of truth with several arguments is attempted. The Chapter also refers to what may be said in all fairness as satisfactory replies of the Mimamsakas of formidable objections of Nyaya.

Fourth Chapter entitled "Theories of Samkhya and Buddhism", discusses the Buddhistic and the Samkhya positions for some valid reasons. It is interesting to find that Buddhism and samkhya stand in sharp contrast to the Nyaya and the Mimamsa systems as far as the origination and ascertainment of invalidity is concerned. Where as for both the Nyaya and the Mimamsa systems falsity of cognition for its origin and ascertainment does not require certain extraneous cause, other than the causes of the origin of its cognition, for both the Samkhya and the Buddhistic systems invalidity of cognition, for its origin and ascertainment does not require any external cause other than the causes required for the constitution and apprehension of its cognition. That is to say as far as invalidity is concerned the Nyaya and the Mimamsa positions advocate *Paratah pramanya vada* and the Samkhya Buddhistic systems uphold *svatah pramanya vada*. This is certainly a striking point of contrast between them. In sum, while the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsa uphold *paratah pramanya vada*, the Buddhism and the Samkhya advocate *svatah pramanya vada* in respect of the origin (*utpatti*) and ascertainment (*jñapti*) of Error.

Finally, a critical evaluation of the contending theories of Truth and Error in Indian Philosophy is estimated and presented in the last chapter.

CHAPTER I

KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

This chapter is devoted for a discussion of knowledge and truth in Indian Philosophy. It essentially deals with the fundamental concepts and presuppositions of knowledge and truth - Epistemological and Ontological.

KNOWLEDGE :

The problem of knowledge (*jñāna*) has long engaged the attention of thinkers all over the world. What is the nature of knowledge? What are the means of acquiring it? What is the criterion of the truth of knowledge? Briefly, these are some of the issues which comprise the subject matter of the Epistemological queries that lead to the formation of a theory of knowledge. Even a general survey of the views of different scholars in Western Philosophy regarding these issues shows that there are two groups of Epistemologists, viz. the Sceptic and the Dogmatic. According to the former the problem of knowledge does not have any solution but the dogmatists believe that it is capable of being solved. In Indian Philosophy, though different systems have adopted divergent attitudes towards these issues, yet even the materialist Carvakas attempt to analyse knowledge and its means in their own way and thus obviously are of the view that the problem of knowledge is not beyond solution. Therefore, it is clear that the scepticism in this regard has not clouded any school of Indian Philosophy.

As regards the nature of knowledge there is a sharp difference of opinion among different systems of Indian Philosophy. Some systems hold that knowledge is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*). While the others assume that it can be revealed only by some other means of cognition.

Self-luminosity of cognition means that a piece of cognition is cognised by itself. It does not require any other knowledge for its own illumination.¹ It illumines itself and its objects simultaneously. When a man has knowledge of something blue (*nila*), this awareness is caused by knowledge itself. But the term non-self luminosity (*para-prakasatva*) means that a piece of cognition is cognised by some other means of cognition i.e. by perception or by inference.

The self-luminosity of knowledge is accepted by the Buddhists, the Prabhakara Mimamsakas, the Advaita-Vedantins and the Jainas.² Knowledge (*buddhi* or *mahat*) being unconscious, is realized by *Purusa*, according to the Samkhyas. It is perceptible through *anuvyavasaya* (apperception) being unconscious is realized by *Purusa*, according to the Samkhyas. It is perceptible through *anuvyavasaya* as held by the Nyaya-Vaisesikas. But it is merely inferrable through *jnatata* (cognisedness) as accepted by Kumarila. It is to be noted in this connection that each school of Indian Philosophy has recognised the ideas regarding nature of knowledge in accordance with its views on either realism or idealism.

The Samkhyas maintain that the cognition, being evolved from *prakrti*, is of material nature. As such cognition is unconscious by itself³ and is illumined by *Purusa*, which alone is self-conscious.⁴

The Nyaya-Vaisesikas put forward the theory of *anuvyavasaya* when external sense-organs come into contact with an object, This apperception (*vyavasaya*) of the object. This apperception is not self-luminous. Its awareness arises by the apperception (*anuvyavasaya*) through the medium of internal sense organ or the mind (*manas*) which takes the first apprehension as its object.⁵ Thus, according to the *Nyaya-Vaisesika* knowledge is not self-luminous, but is apprehensible only through another piece of cognition, which is called *anuvyavasaya*.

Kumarila expounds a different view. He, showing himself a greater realist than the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, goes a step further. In order to show the pre-dominance of external objects, he asserts that cognition cannot be cognised perceptually, but is merely inferred through its effect. He contends that it cannot apprehend itself while it is busy in apprehending an object. Though it is of illuminating nature, yet it depends upon "something else for its own manifestation. Just as the visual organ can manifest colour, but cannot manifest itself, so a cognition can manifest an object, but not itself. Its power of illumination is exhausted in manifesting an external object".⁶ Then the question arises, what is that something else (*anyat*) which illumines the cognition? That thing is 'manifestedness' or 'cognisedness' (*prakarata* or *jnatata*), which after the manifestation of the object, is produced in that object as its new property.

The process is like this, "when an object comes in contact with the sense, the knowledge of that object is produced in the soul. That knowledge being formless and not self-luminous, cannot be directly perceived, but produces a new quality called 'manifestedness' in the object. It is from this quality the knowledge is inferred".⁷ In this connection we may refer to one sarcastic remark of Jayanta Bhatta against the *jnatata* theory of Kumarila. He says, "fearing whom, alas, have these Vedic scholars (*srotriyah*) developed such a defeatist mentality".⁸

Against this strong realistic attitude of Kumarila, Prabhakara, under the influence of Buddhism, takes a bold step and expounds his famous theory of *triputi-samvit* according to which *samvit* (consciousness) being of self-luminous character, cognises the three factors simultaneously. They are i) it cognises the object, ii) it cognises itself, and iii) it also cognises the knower (the soul), and hence theory is called *triputi-samvit* or tripartite perception.⁹

The Buddhists, they are the Vaibhasikas, the Sautrantikas or the Idealists, are unanimous on this point that

cognition is self-luminous (*svaprakasa*). Even in an early work like the *Milindapongho*, explaining *prajna* to the king. Nagasena says, "self-luminosity is also a character of *prajna*".¹⁰ The Buddhists are so certain about the self-luminosity of knowledge that they assert. "If knowledge does not cognise itself, the cognition of the object is not possible".¹¹ In the *Sloka vartika*, Kumarila explains the same view of Buddhism which follows thus, "so long as the illumination in the form of knowledge (*jnanakhyapra-kasa*) is not comprehended, even the object will not be apprehended, because its apprehension depends upon the cognition, just as the illumination of a jar depends upon the illumination of the lamp".¹² Explaining the same, he further asserts, "even if the objects have been produced, their apprehension sometimes does not occur either due to the absence of luminosity (as in case of peak darkness) or due to the presence of some impediment (like the obstruction of a wall); while in the case of knowledge, there is no impediment (in its illumination) at the time of its origination, nor is it of a non-luminous nature, on account of which it may not be apprehended (i.e. it is self-luminous and hence it is always apprehensible)".¹³ It is further added, cognition is always produced before the apprehension of the object and its consciousness (*samvedanam*) must also occur at the same time (i.e. at the time of its origination) because if it is not cognised at the same time, it cannot be cognised even afterwards".¹⁴

It is thus, evident from this account that according to Buddhism, knowledge is self-luminous nature. It originates before the apprehension of the object and is cognised at the same time.

The Buddhism is totally against the theory of 'non-self luminosity' (*paraprakasatva*) of cognition, maintained by the realists, specially by the Nyaya-Vaisesikas and the Bhatta Mimamsakas. The Buddhism as presented by Kumarila refutes the opponents theories of *anuvyavasaya* (apperception) and *jnatata* (cognisedness) thus: "Cognition does not require the origination of another cognition, because if it is held that the cognition of previous cognition depends

upon the later one there would occur *regressus* and *infininitum*".¹⁵ At another place Kumarila explains the Buddhistic view further : "If it i.e. cognition is cognised by another cognition, there would be regressus and infinitum. But having found that recollection (*smṛti*) occurs about two things - i.e. about the object as well as its cognition, it is assumed that all is apprehended (at one and the same time). Thus, in case of apprehending all by one cognition only, (it can be concluded that) everything is possible by that alone (and no other cognition is required)".¹⁶

What the Buddhism really means to say is : when a person after apprehending an object, say jar, recollects its afterwards, there arises in his mind the recollection of the jar as well as the knowledge of the jar. This two-formed recollection of a cognition (*dvi-rupa-smṛtiḥ*) shows that at the time of the apprehension of the jar, the person has cognised its cognition too; which proves the self-luminous nature of cognition.¹⁷ This idea as mentioned in the *Sloka Vartika* fully corroborates with a verse of *Pramāṇa samuccaya* of Dinnaga.¹⁸ Later on the same idea of two-formed recollection (*dvi-rupa-smṛtiḥ*)¹⁹ santaraksita²⁰ and Kamalasila²¹ in their respective treatises. There is adverseness to the more fundamental problem of knowledge. It is the ontological problem of the status of knowledge as a factor of reality.

With regard to the essential nature of knowledge we may ask : Is knowledge a quality or a relation or an activity? The Sāṃkhya and the Yoga consider knowledge to be the modification of the *buddhi*. *Buddhi* is material nature and the supposition further leads to the conclusion that the knowledge is also material in nature. This, the Naiyāyika contends, is unintelligible. We cannot understand how the self's consciousness, which is immaterial and intangible, can be reflected on any material substratum. We should not speak of any reflection, but rather say that knowledge or consciousness belongs naturally to *buddhi* itself. But this will commit us to the absurd hypothesis of two selves or subjects for any case of knowledge. In truth, however,

there is but one conscious subject for all cognitions in one person.²²

It is generally believed that knowledge is neither a mode nor a substance but a kind of activity or function (*kriya*). The Buddhistic and the Mimamsa systems agree in describing knowledge as an activity, a transitive process. In Western Philosophy the Act-Theory of knowledge has been propounded by Kant,²³ Spencer,²⁴ Bergson,²⁵ Alexander,²⁶ and Bawes Hicks.²⁷ It is therefore, the Behaviorists²⁸ who go to the extreme when they speak of the identity of knowing with the activity of the body. Buddhism is of the view that "knowledge is an existent fact that consists in the act of showing and leading to an object."²⁹ According to Prabhakara, *samrit* and *jnana* are two different things rather than two names of same thing. The Bhattas are the staunch supporters of the view that knowledge is an act of the soul. Parthasarathi emphatically remarks that knowledge is an act of the soul, which produces a result in its object just as the act of cooking produces cookedness of rice. There is, however, some inconsistency in the Bhatta account of this theory. Kumarila upholds it and at the same time states that knowledge is a *dharma* of soul. Similarly, Parthasarathi enumerates knowledge as one of the properties of the soul. It is however, to be observed that whereas the Naiyayikas refer to knowledge as a quality of the soul and use the term '*guna*', the Bhattas mention it through the term '*dharma*'. But they seem to overlook the fact that '*dharma*' is different from '*guna*' in that whereas '*guna*' simply a quality such as readiness is of fire, *dharma*, being a property, is an occasional act. It is like the property of burning fire. Amongst modern European philosophers, Moore and Broad, Slava vehemently refuted the Act-theory of knowledge.³⁰ According to them knowledge is a two-term relation between a knowing mind and a known object. Russell, in his work *Our knowledge of the External world* discards this theory and speaks of knowledge as a relation between a knowing subject and an object known.

In Indian philosophy this theory got an emphatic rebuttal from the Naiyayikas, particularly at the hands of Jayanta. Jayanta criticizes this theory primarily against the Mimamsa stand point and it is he who, for the first time in the history of Indian logic, gives a clear and convincing account of the Nyaya position on this specific issue. He argues that if the Mimamsakas maintain that the soul has a distinct activity which is called *bhavana* and that the '*Karote*' denotes it, then they stand refuted on the ground that no activity of the soul is ever noticed. The soul is definitely an agent but its agency is unique since it does not depend upon its activity, when the equality of '*kartrtva*' inheres in it, it becomes an agent without performing any action. Consciousness and other inner states of the soul are not actions but qualities because they are not creatures of the will.³¹

Further, he argues, if the Mimamsakas cling to this theory on account of their notion that 'to know' is a verb and therefore, it denotes an action which naturally belongs to the soul, then, he asserts, the Mimamsakas should know that there is no hard and fast rule that all verbs denote action. For instance, the verb 'gadi' in the classical list of verbs denotes the position of a face³² Moreover if we analyse the sentence 'I know a jar', we see that jar denotes the object of knowledge. 'I' stands for the soul. What does the verb 'know' convey? the answer is 'quality' and not 'action', since it is super-sensuous ex-hypothesis. Even, if it is held that the result of the action is presented to consciousness, the result itself should be denoted by the verb 'to know'. Therefore, consciousness is not an action. Jayanta quotes Vatsyana in his support and states that he has mentioned '*buddhi*' and '*karma*' separately and there is ample evidence to prove that he also considers them as two distinct entities. So, Jayanta concludes that this theory does not stand the test of reason.

The second theory with regard to the nature of knowledge is that it is a relation between certain entities. According to Meinong, the Austrian realist, and the critical

realists, knowledge of extra mental reality is the three-term relation, viz., of the mind, the object and the content. Moore, however, depicts this relation between a sense datum and a character.⁸⁴ Russell speaks of knowledge as a relation between a knowing subject and the object known.⁸⁵ James is of the view that knowledge is a relation of two modes of the same entity-the knower and the object known. According to him, the relation is a part of pure experience; one of its terms becomes the subject of knowledge and the other becomes the object known.⁸⁶ According to American neo-realists, knowledge is a relation not between a knowing subject and a known object but between two objects.

This theory has been criticized by logicians both in the west and the east. Reid rejects it on the ground that knowledge is not itself a relation, but the apprehension of relations.⁸⁷ In Indian Philosophy, the Bhattas are perhaps the most outspoken critics of this theory.⁸⁸ It is a fact that in the acquisition of knowledge a subject and an object come to be related together, but this relation does not constitute knowledge. In other words, knowledge itself is not a relation.

According to Kumarila, there is nowhere a relation which is not based on some action on the part of some agent. Parthasarathi's analysis echoes the same view. He states that without an occasional cause a subject-object relation cannot arise between the self and the object.⁸⁹ The Naiyayikas reject this theory on the ground that knowledge may be said to arise out of the relation between the soul and the body, but it is not simply a relation between the two. It is rather a quality of the soul. Jayanta naturally endorses Nyaya view.

The third view with regard to knowledge is that it is a quality. Descartes and his followers maintain that thought is the essential attribute of the soul, just as extension is essential attribute of matter. The Nyaya, the Vaisheshika and the Visistadvaita Vedanta are the main systems of Indian

Philosophy that seems to favour the quality theory of knowledge. Gautama refers to knowledge through the term '*buddhi*' and states that the terms *upalabdhi* and '*jnana*' are its synonyms.⁴⁰ He uses these terms in various aphorisms, but we do not come across any serious attempt at defining knowledge in his work. Kanada enlists *buddhi* amongst the qualities.⁴¹ Prasastapada adds one more word in the list of synonyms of *buddhi* as stated by Gautama and calls it *pratyaya*.⁴² Both of them, however, try to define quality (*guna*) in general. Kanada holds that *guna* or quality is an entity inherent in a substance not possessing attributes and not standing as an independent cause in conjunctions or disjunctions. Prasastapada adds one more characteristic of quality and states that it is an entity related to the genus of quality (*gunatva*), abiding in a substance and devoid of quality and action. He also categorises *buddhi* into two types, namely, *vidya* and *avidya*. The expositions of Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara and Vacaspati Misra are merely explanatory and add little to defining the term 'knowledge'.

Jayanta, however, analyses the problem in detail. He considers Gautama's use of the terms '*jnana*' and '*upalabdhi*' as definitive synonyms of '*buddhi*' sufficient for understanding the nature of knowledge.⁴³ He views this problem against the contention of the Samkhyas, who maintain that these three terms represent different concepts, and that knowledge is a mode of *buddhi*. According to the samkhyas, the *Purusa* is immutable and conscious. Pain, pleasure, etc., belong to *buddhi* which is an evolute of *prakrti*. Knowledge is a mode of *buddhi* which transforms itself into the shape of the object that it cognizes. Though the *purusa* is inactive, due to the indiscrimination and intelligence of *buddhi* activising of *purusa* takes place and the phenomenon of cognition arises as a hybrid. The reflection of *buddhi* in the self is assumed to account for the knowledge of *buddhi* modified into the forms of objects by the self.

Jayanta repudiates the Samkhya view vehemently on the ground that all physical qualities are perceived by the

sense organs, that is knowledge is perceived by *manas*. Knowledge is the property of the immaterial substance, i.e., the soul. The soul acquires this property in its bodily setting and that is why *buddhi* is said to be the quality of the soul. He points out that if the Samkhyas themselves hold *buddhi* and *purusa* as two distinct entities, then it is an error to impose the properties of *buddhi* on *purusa* and vice-versa. He arises at the conclusion that the Samkhyas have committed this mistake due to their belief in *Satkaryavada*.⁴⁴ Moreover, the Samkhya view that knowledge is a substantive mode of matter makes knowledge material, whereas the fact is that knowledge is formless and matter never without a form.

In this respect, the Nyaya view stands in sharp opposition to the conception of *jnana* in Samkhya or Vedanta, according to which it is a modification of a substance called *buddhi* or *antahkarana* and *buddhi* or *antahkarana* being a composite substance assumes the shape and the form of the object. Not so in the Nyaya the *jnana* being a *guna* and therefore without part does not assume any form or shape (*akara*). Similarly not being a *kriya*, it does not bring about any change in the object that is, the Bhattas wrongly regard it as doing.

So, like other Naiyayikas, Jayanta is of the view that knowledge is a quality of the soul. It is not the instrument as the Samkhyas hold it to be. Since the instrumentality is ascribed to the mind, Jayanta asserts that *buddhi* is knowledge and not an instrument of knowledge. The later Nyaya-Vaisesika logicians also hold the same view. Annambhatta clearly mentions that *buddhi* is knowledge itself and not an instrument of knowledge.⁴⁵

TRUTH :

Here we may consider the nature of true knowledge (*prama*). It may appear to some that the distinction between valid and non-valid or invalid knowledge is not only unnecessary but incorrect. Knowledge, in its strict sense, means a true belief that carries with an assurance of its

truth. Hence, knowledge is always true. It is a tautology to speak of valid knowledge and a contradiction to speak of 'non valid or invalid knowledge'. The latter is no knowledge at all, since it does not stand for any belief which is true and which gives an assurance of its truth.⁴⁶ When we speak of *prama* as valid knowledge, we do not forget the strict sense of the word 'knowledge'. But the word 'knowledge' has been used in a narrow as well as a wide sense. Hence, in view of the fact that the Nyaya-Vaisesikas use *jnanam* in a very wide sense, that they make a distinction between true and false *jnanam*, and that *prama* implies something more than knowledge in its strict sense. We propose to use the phrase 'valid knowledge' for *prama*. As, however, we have already said the word 'knowledge' may be taken to mean *prama* according to the context.

Different systems of Indian Philosophy have expressed divergent opinions with regard to the nature of *prama*. Professor D.M. Datta seems perfectly right in his observation that '*prama*' is generally defined as a cognition, having the two-fold characteristics of truth and novelty (*abadhitatva* or *yatharthatatva* and *anadhigatatva*) and that as regards the first characteristic of truth all schools of Indian Philosophy are unanimous.⁴⁷

But on the second characteristic, there is a difference of opinion. It is, however, to be seen that even those who hold truth as an essential criterion of knowledge differ amongst themselves regarding the meaning of truth.

THE VAISESIKA VIEW :

Prasastapada in his Bhasya on the Vaisesika Sutras nowhere defines 'true knowledge', but he distinguishes between *vidya* and *avidya*, the former including perception, inference, (*arsa*-the intuitions of the seers) and memory, and the latter doubt, illusion, indefinite cognition (*anuvya-vasaya*) and dream. Sridhara commenting on the Bhasya defines *vidya* as a firm, uncontradicted and definite cognition.⁴⁸ It is plain that *vidya* is true knowledge, *avidya* false knowledge and memory true knowledge. This definition

mentions an additional mark of true knowledge, viz., 'adhyavasaya'. It is meant to exclude *anadhyavasaya* or indefinite cognition such as 'what this may be', which lacks assurance like doubt, but which differs from the latter; in that object regarding which an indefinite cognition arises is not conceived in two or more conflicting ways. It is more like absence of cognition. Sridhara introduces some inconsistency in the Bhasya view by distinguishing 'vidya' from 'pramana'. He says that memory is *vidya* or true cognition, but it is not *pramana* or valid cognition, because it reveals an object as past and as already known.⁴⁹

THE BUDDHISTIC VIEW :

Dharmottara defines 'true knowledge' as the knowledge of a previously unknown thing (*anadhigatavisayam pramanam*).⁵⁰ The knowledge of an already known thing is not valid because the function of knowledge is to prompt activity in relation to a thing that is presented by it and thus to help in securing it, while if a thing has already been secured there is not use in future knowledge of it. Hence, memory is not true knowledge. Similarly, doubt and error too are excluded from true knowledge. Doubt presents objects indefinitely as existing and not existing at the same time. But, there is no object in the world which can exist and not exist simultaneously. Hence, such an object cannot be attained. Error presents an object which does not exist and so one which is incapable of being attained. Again, 'true knowledge' is defined as that which is non-contradicted (*avisamvadaka*). If knowledge shows an object and leads to it, it is uncontradicted. Knowledge is sought for the sake of successful practical activity by people desirous of an objective dealing with objects. Therefore, true knowledge is that alone which presents objects capable of fulfilling our pragmatic needs.⁵¹ According to Buddhism, a knowledge is true if it harmonises with volitional experience. Truth does not consist in its harmony with the real nature of objects, because reality is dynamic, while knowledge represents it as static. If water is perceived and we can go and quench our thirst with it, our perception is true.

otherwise it is false. Thus, volitional satisfaction constitutes truth; it is not merely a test of truth as the Naiyayika holds. Correspondance is a meaningless term for Buddhism, because objects of knowledge are changing from moment to moment, so that correspondence can never be established.

The Samkhya and the Vedanta systems also define true knowledge along the Bhatta line. They recognise 'novelty' as a mark of true knowledge. The definition like the Bhatta one recognises novelty, absence of doubt and truth as the essential marks of true knowledge. Both Samkhya and Bhatta are realistic. But there is one important difference between the two. According to Samkhya, *buddhi* or cognition assumes the form of the object. Thus, the truth of a cognition consists in its being a faithful copy of the object. Valid knowledge has correspondence to its object in the sense in which a true copy has it to its original. But Bhatta is opposed to the copy theory of knowledge. According to him, cognition is formless. Knowledge is judgmental. It arises in the form of such judgments as 'this is a jar', 'this is blue' etc., but not in the form of pictures. When I see a rose, I judge it to be a rose, and my seeing is true because the rose is actually there, not because I have a picture in my mind which faithfully copies the rose.

THE MIMAMSA VIEW :

According to Bhatta Mimamsa, knowledge may be true or false, valid or invalid. Parthasarathi distinguishes between the terms '*Satyatva*' and '*Pramanya*'. Suppose there are two persons, one asserting 'there is indra' these two propositions are contradictory to each other, so as that according to the law of excluded middle, only one of them must be '*Satya*', but as there is no certitude (*nirnayakatva*) as to which of them is true, there can be no *Pramanya* ⁵² Thus, '*satyatva*' is not identical with *Pramanya*. The latter term implies the former, but the former does not imply the latter. We take the term 'truth as a substitute for '*satyatva*' and validity for '*Pramanya*'. But validity does not here stand for formal consistency in which sense it is used in

logic Kumarila defines true knowledge in the following verses :

*Tasmat drdham yadutpannam napi samvadmrcchati
Jnanantarena vijnanam tat pramanam prattyatam.*

“Valid knowledge is a firm or assured cognition of objects, which does not stand in need of confirmation by other cognitions”. Umbeka says that the word ‘*drdha*’ excludes doubt from true knowledge and which is not contradicted by other cognitions, which he reads in the place of ‘*napi samvadmrcchati*’, excludes error or illusion. Sucaritamisra comments that true knowledge is not contradicted by a subsequent knowledge in the form ‘this is not so’ and that it contains some new information (*vijnana adikariprayajnam*) about its subject. True knowledge, therefore is certain, true and informative cognition of something.

Parthasarathi extracts from Sutra 1.1.5 of Purva Mimamsa, the definition of ‘true knowledge as an apprehension of a previously unapprehended object which is devoid of defects in its source and is not contradicted by subsequent experience. Later on, he defines true knowledge as ‘a true cognition which relates to something previously uncognised’.⁵³ This definition is practically the same as the former except that in the former one the source from which discrepancy may creep in knowledge viz., the defects of the sense-organs etc., is mentioned and the possibility of the falsification of a true knowledge in future is precluded. Parthasarathi⁵⁴ mentions three distinctive features of true knowledge, viz , 1) its object is not remembered as having been previously known; 2) it conforms to the real nature of its object; and 3) there is a feeling of conviction regarding its confirmity or agreement with the real object. Thus novelty, freedom from doubt and truth are the three essential marks of true knowledge and if any one of these is absent in a knowledge it ceases to be true.

A knowledge which does not add something to our present stock of information cannot be true. Truth consists in discovering new objects or new features of known objects for thought. True knowledge is an advance on what we

already know. Bhatta considers knowledge in its relation to our practical needs. There is no use in knowing what we already know. Knowledge cannot be separated from the practical value it has for us. The objects of our environment are always changing and the social conditions never continue in the same form. We have to make fresh adjustment to the changing circumstances, and for this purpose knowledge must reveal the changing aspects of things. The practical side of knowledge cannot be neglected when we consider its epistemological worth. Thus, according to Bhatta a true knowledge is essentially useful and hence, it must reveal something new.

Here a theoretical difficulty arises : Should a continuous perception (*dharavahika jnana*) of something be treated as true or not? We have such perceptions very frequently, and what the perception reveals in the subsequent movements does not appear to be different from what it revealed in the first movement. For instance, I have a flower on my table and look at it continuously for some seconds. But I do not find it different in later seconds from what I find it in the first second. The cognitions other than that of the first and the second do not reveal anything new. Should they then be false? Bhatta's answer is that 'newness' marks everyone of these cognitions, because, though the object of all such cognitions is identically the same, it is cognised as existing in a different movement of time in each. The existence of the flower in a subsequent moment cannot be apprehended by its cognition in the preceding movement. If time-movement are symbolised by t_1, t_2, t_3 etc., and the perceived object by 'o', then the object of the first movement cognition is 'ot', that of the second movement cognition is 'ot₁' and so on. Thus, because each of the cognitions reveals a new thing, all are valid.

It may be objected that though there is a difference among the successive movements of time, it cannot be cognised because it is too subtle. The answer is that such statements as 'I have been seeing this thing since morning

till now : I saw the thing just in the preceding movement' and the like become unintelligible, if the difference of time is not perceived. In these we have a direct consciousness of time. Time is not imperceptible as the Vaisesikas hold it is true that time has no shape, but perceptibility has nothing to do with shape. Therefore, continuous perception is not excluded when true knowledge is defined as the cognition of a previously unknown real object.⁵⁵

Salikanatha, a commentator of Prabhakara, criticises Bhatta's definition of true knowledge which as follows :

In a continuous perception the successive cognitions apprehend the same object. So, all the cognitions except the first case are valid. Kumarila says that they are valid as they apprehend at different moments of time. But the difference between two successive moments of time cannot be apprehended, because it is too subtle. Thus, Bhatta's definition is too narrow (*adhyasa*). Again, the word '*drdha*' in that definition is useless. This word is inserted with a view to exclude doubt from true knowledge; but doubt is already excluded when true knowledge is said to be an apprehension of the previously unapprehended. Doubt is not one cognition when some tall object is cognised infinitely as 'a man' or 'a post', the 'tallness' is perceived which revives the memories of 'man' and 'post' in the mind, and the perceiver doubts whether the 'tallness' belongs to a man or a post of perception is true and the element of recollection is invalid, because it is the apprehension of the apprehended. Therefore, Bhatta's definition is redundant. It is redundant in one more respect. The word *arisamvadi* (unerring) is absolutely unnecessary, because all knowledge which is not memory is true. Even illusions are true so far as they are of the nature of experience while the element of memory in them is false.⁵⁶

Prabhakara's definition of true knowledge is the same as that of later Nyaya except that he does not feel the necessity of including the term '*yathartatva*' in the definition. Salikanatha gives the definition of true knowledge in the following manner :

“Valid knowledge is experience, and it is something different from memory which is the name of that cognition which arises solely from the impression left by some previous experience”. In a continuous perception, the later cognitions arising from sense-object intercourse, like the first cognition, are different from memory and hence they are ‘valid’. ‘Recognition’ too is valid, because it is not produced solely from impression. It is an experience aided by impression. Memory is not valid in as much as it depends on a former experience. It does not determine an object independently. Sometimes a past experience reinstates itself and its past character is forgotten and thus it appears to be a new experience instead of recollection. It also is invalid because it depends solely on impression for its birth.⁵⁷

Prabhakara’s definition of true knowledge as ‘*anubhuti*’ is vague for it is difficult to define the term ‘*anubhuti*’. From the verses as quoted earlier it is obvious that *anubhuti* is a cognition other than memory and that is produced sometimes by such causes as the operation of the senses which are different from impressions and sometimes by the co-operation of such causes with impression as in the case of recognition and inference. So far there is no difficulty. But the difficulty arises when Salikanatha differentiates ‘*anubhuti*’ from memory on the ground that the former does not depend on any other cognition while the latter depends on a past cognition. Inference depends on the recollection of a general rule and the perception of some mark, determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyaksa*) too on the indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) perception. Then, are they not ‘*anubhuti*’? If they are not ‘*anubhuti*’ they can never be valid according to the definition of ‘true knowledge’.⁵⁸ Again, there is a practical difficulty also. We are ordinarily aware, when a cognition arises, of its being a memory, if it is memory and thus by the method of exclusion we can easily know whether a cognition is memory or ‘*anubhuti*’. But sometimes when memory is obscured a memory-cognition is taken to be ‘*anubhuti*’ and sometimes an ‘*anubhuti*’ to be a memory-cognition. Now, as there is

no means of knowledge the real native of a cognition except the direct consciousness of an individual, we cannot be confident in these cases as to the correctness of our judgment of validity or invalidity. Prabhakara says that memory is invalid. But he merely says it dogmatically without showing reason why it should be called invalid. After all, it is also a form of knowledge like '*anubhuti*'. Kumarila, on the other hand, points out that memory repeats an old experience and does not add anything new what we already know.⁵⁹ The difference between '*anubhuti*' and memory cannot be other than that the former gives something new while the latter repeats an old experience, and if Prabhakara chooses to appeal to reason rather than be dogmatic, he cannot offer any other ground for the falsity of memory to save its being an apprehension of the apprehended. Hence, he cannot but recognise 'newness' as a condition of truth.⁶⁰

Again, Prabhakara's definition is too wide as it applies to about and illusion also.⁶¹ He says that doubt and illusion are true so far as they are *anubhuti*. But this is wrong. The duty of a philosopher is to examine the grounds of the concepts that are universally held and not to destroy them. So, Prabhakara cannot go against the verdict of common-sense that doubt and illusion are false. He says that doubt and illusion are false, so far as the element of memory is involved in them. But they are not recognised by people to be false on the ground of the memory-element, but on that of their being respectively unassured and false. Therefore, Prabhakara has to accept newness, certitude and truth as the essential characteristics of true knowledge, and thus all his objections against Bhatta's definition fall to ground.

Parthasarathi points out some inconsistencies in Prabhakara's view. According to Prabhakara's definition, a dream cognition, which arises solely from mental impressions, is false, but this is not consistent with his view that a dream-cognition is true so far as the elements of cognition and the cogniser in it are concerned. In all cognitions whatever their status, the self and the cognition are, according to Prabhakara, necessarily known and validity

known and a dream-cognition too is a cognition. If Prabhakara says that a dream-cognition being memory in respect of its object and '*anubhuti*' in respect of its form and the cogniser is partly true and partly false, then recognition too, involving an element of memory and an element of '*anubhuti*', must be called partly true and partly false. But, this is against the universally accepted opinion of the people. Either a cognition is wholly true or wholly false. Practical activities of life cannot be based on partly true and partly false cognitions. Again the illusion of a yellow conch will be wholly true as it does not involve any element of memory and, hence, is purely an '*anubhuti*', but none can accept this.⁶² Prabhakara's definition is not a definition of true knowledge at all. When it is said that all knowledge except memory is true knowledge, Prabhakara must have the generally accepted conception of truth in his mind and after examining all knowledge in the light of that conception he must have arrived at this conclusion.


THE NYAYA VIEW :

Knowledge is generally divided into *prama* and *aprama*. *Aprama* or non-valid knowledge is also knowledge. Nyaya makes no attempt to resolve error and doubt to true knowledge, nor is there any attempt to exclude them from the purview of 'knowledge'. What then is common to true knowledge and false knowledge? Udyotakara answers : "The ability to manifest the general"⁶³ (*Samanyaparicchedakatvam*). Vacaspati explains it thus : Even the erroneous knowledge 'this is silver' manifests the yonder object with its general features like whiteness, shining character etc., while this much is common to both, *prama* has certain characters that distinguish it from *aprama*, and these characters constitute *pramanya*, and therefore, is taken by the Nyaya in the sense of that which distinguishes true knowledge from false, and not in the weak sense of being instrumental to practical behaviour, (*pravrttyoupayikam*) for - as Vacaspati points out - practical behaviour depends upon the mere presentation of the object and does not wait for a true apprehension of it.⁶⁴ Practical behaviour may indeed follow even upon doubt.⁶⁵

There seems to be an unbroken line of speculation in the Nyaya school regarding the nature of *prama*, though with slight variations in emphasis. Vatsyayana defines it as "whatever is knowledge of the object" (*yadhartha-vijnanam sa pramiti*)⁶⁶ but removes the ambiguity later on by speaking of it as "the knowledge of that as that" (*tasminstaditi pratyaya*).⁶⁷ Uddyotakara defines *pramana* as "the cause of knowledge" (*upalabdhihetu*).⁶⁸ Vacaspati tries to make the definition more precise by adding that here what is meant by the word 'prama' is the knowledge that does not deviate from its object and that is other than memory.⁶⁹ Udayana in his *Parisuddhi* also emphasises the character of *anyabhicaritatva*,⁷⁰ though in his *Nyayakusumanjali*, he gives a simpler definition of *prama* as right apprehension and as independent.⁷¹ Jayanta takes it to be such knowledge of the object both do not deviate from the object and is free from doubt.⁷² Sridhara defines it as a definitive awareness that is uncontradicted.⁷³ Vallabha defines it as "the true knowledge" and further defines it as "the knowledge of something as not being what is other than it" (*paranatmatayanubhava*).⁷⁴

Most of these definitions are negative in character, and the negations are intended to exclude error, doubt and memory. For the Samkhya and the Purva Mimamsa, novelty is an essential part of differentia of valid knowledge. Some systematists like the Vaisesikas and the Jainas do not consider novelty as a mark of true knowledge since they include remembrance (*smrti*) into the case of true knowledge. Some schools like the Advaita are indifferent to the controversy. Dharmaraja Adhvaryu defines *Prama* in two ways with and without validity as the mark of valid knowledge. Here, the crux of the problem lies in the acceptance or rejection of validity or remembrance as a means of knowledge. The Mimamsakas and the Samkhyas have accepted novelty as a mark of *Prama* to exclude remembrance from the domain of true knowledge. The Jainas also accept remembrance among the forms of true immediate knowledge. The Advaita Vedanta is indifferent to the problem. The Naiyayikas consider the presentative knowledge

(*Anubhuti*) as a mark of *prama* and exclude remembrance which is not the presentation of an object but a reproduction of previous experience solely caused by the impressions of past experience. The recognition of novelty as an essential factor of valid knowledge further poses the question of the ground for inclusion of the persistent knowledge of the same object (*dharavathika jnana*) into the valid knowledge because the persistent knowledge is considered as a form of valid knowledge by all systematists. The different schools assign different reasons to justify the inclusion of this kind of knowledge into valid knowledge. The Mimamsaka's device of defining *prama* as a true knowledge whose object was not known before and thereby to exclude memory from being called '*prama*' is not acceptable to the Nyayayikas who prefer the less cumbrous way of defining with the help of the notion of independence. Memory has not the ability to manifest its object independently, but always does so through the via media of a prior experience. Vacaspati accepts the validity of the well-known objection that if *anadhigatatva* be admitted as a character of *prama* then in case of a series of knowledge of the same object, the second, third and all succeeding numbers of the series become *aprama*. Udayana raises fresh objections against taking memory as *prama* in his *parisuddhi*. But, it must be noted that the eagerness to exclude memory is rooted more in the traditional refusal to accept it as a *pramana* than in intrinsic defect of memory. Vacaspati almost admits this conventional basis when he says "*Pramana-sabdena tasya-pastatvat... na smrti prama, bokadhinavadharanahi Sabatavthasambandhai*". Udayana, commenting on this passage, seeks to show that memory is not true, i.e., that is *ayathartha*, on the ground that the remembered past is not now. But, in the long run, he is forced to confess that even if it is *yathartha*, it is not independent.⁷⁴ To exclude doubt, Jayanta explicitly includes in his definition the phrase "free from doubt", while Sridhara has to speak of "definitive knowledge". Error is sought to be excluded by such adjectives as "understating" or by the more roundabout device of Vallabha.



What is called for is a positive definition which is yet capable of excluding error and doubt. It goes to Gangesa's credit who has taken up Vatsyayana's simple, account and made it far more precise. '*Pramanya*', he now defines as *Tadvati tatprakarakatva*, a concept which we shall presently analyse. But, before we do that we may mention in brief the reasons why Gangesa rejects some other definitions, new and old in the chapter on '*Pramalakshana*'. The definition of truth, he considers as series of definitions. Truth cannot be defined in terms of novelty as the Mimamsakas try to do, for, this is not what we ordinarily mean by truth, and also because this definition would not apply to the use of a series of true knowledge of the same objects. Truth cannot be defined as the property of being uncontradicted experience as the contradicting knowledge (*badha*) itself is true, though contradictory. Gangesa points the fact that merely from the fact that 'P' is true. He also rejects the definition of truth in terms of coherence (*samvada*), for coherence means nothing other than being mentioned similarly in another knowledge (*jnanantarena tattva ullikhyamanatvam*), and this may be found also in cases of error. It cannot also be defined in terms of successful practice, for such a definition would not apply to cases of true knowledge where due to some reason or the other no practice follows, i.e. to cases of *upeksaprama* where the knowledge simply is passed over does not provoke any practical reason. Further successful practice may at best constitute a test but not a definition of truth. Truth cannot also be defined as the property of being experience of the real (*tattvanubhavadvatvam*), for an unreal is never apprehended, not even in error. Truth cannot also be defined as the property of being an experience whose qualifier is a property which is not the counter-positive of an absence residing in the qualificatum (*visesyanistyantabhavapratyogi-dharmaprakaranubhavadvatvam*), for it does not apply to a true knowledge of conjunction, for the conjunction, being on the general Nyaya view *avyapyavritti* or incomplete occurrence,⁷⁵ may be absent in the qualificatum (and thereby may be the counter positive of an absence residing in the qualificandum). Nor can it be denified as the property of being an experience

whose qualifier is not a property which limits the counterpositiveness of a mutual absence residing in the qualificandum (*Visesyavutiya nyonyabhavapratiyogitavacchedakadharmaprakanubhavatvam*) and that for precisely the same reasons as above. For if a true is one having conjunction with a monkey, it is also one having no conjunction with the monkey (in another part of the tree); so that even a right knowledge, 'this true is one having conjunction with monkey' has a qualifier namely conjunction with monkey whose absence is in the qualificandum. It follows then that there is the tree also a mutual absence (or, difference) whose counter positive is 'one having conjunction with monkey; and the limit or of the counter positiveness is the property of being the said conjunction which is also the qualifier of the true knowledge that the true has the conjunction. Truth cannot also be defined as the property of being an experience which does not have a qualifier non-resident in the qualificandum (*Visesyarttya prakaranubhavatvam*). The definition would not apply to the true knowledge : 'These are a pot and a cloth', and the qualifier 'clothness' is absent in the pot. It is also not the property of being an experience having a qualifier which is in the same locus as *visayata*, for this property also belongs to the error : 'This is a snake' where the qualifier blishness is in the same locus as *visayata*.

We have only given a few of the definitions which Gangesa rejects. The resulting definition is stated in two stages. First comes a simpler form. If X is in Y, then the experience of X in Y is true knowledge (*yatrayadasti tatra tasyanubhavah prama*). One has to add, as the commentators do, that if X is in Y, in the relation R, then the experience of X as being in Y in the relation R is true knowledge. A more formal definition follows : True knowledge is an experience whose qualifier is such that it belongs to the (*Tadvati tatprakarakatvam*).

Let us now see how this definition applies to cases of true knowledge and does not apply to cases of false knowledge. Take the case of a true knowledge. I know a

piece of silver as silver. The knowledge is expressed in the form : 'This is silver'. This knowledge has three qualities : 'thisness', 'silver' and 'Silverness'. Now let us take the qualifier 'silverness' as the value of the variable 'tat'. The knowledge in that case is one which has 'silverness' as its qualifier, it is *rajaṭattvaprakaraṇa*. Now since, ex-hypothesis, the 'this' designates a real silver, we can say that the 'this' possesses silverness (or, is *rajaṭattvavat*). The knowledge, therefore, possesses the property of *rajaṭattvavat* *rajaṭattvaprakaraṇatva*, which is in the same as the truth of this knowledge, 'This is silver'. Consider on the other than a case of error. I mistake a piece of small for silver. I express my knowledge in the judgments, 'This is silver'. This knowledge has also silverness for its qualifier. As regards the qualifiers there is nothing to distinguish right knowledge from error. This distinction then has to be sought for elsewhere, i.e., in the fact that in error the 'silverness' which functions as qualifier does not belong to the qualificandum this. In other words, the 'this' is not *rajaṭattvavat*. This definition then does not apply to a case of error.

Let us take a case of doubt. A doubt by definition is a knowledge with two mutually contradictory qualifiers. Is this a man or not? It is an example of doubt which has amongst others two mutually contradictory qualifiers, 'manhood' and 'absence of manhood'. Both of these cannot belong to thing designated by 'this'. It is then easy to show that the doubt is not *tadyatitatprakaraka*.

It should also be obvious by now that no knowledge is wholly false. Every error, even doubt, contains an element of truth. With the help of Gangesa's definition we are in a position to give sense to this fact. In the ordinary sense of words, 'whole' and 'part', a knowledge is not a whole with parts. But, now we can say that with regard to some one of its qualifiers at least a knowledge must be true. In other words, it is possible in case of every knowledge to give a value to the variable 'tat' such that the knowledge under consideration may be shown to possess

tadvatitatprakarakatva. This is possible, for example, in the above illustrations by choosing 'thisness' which certainly belongs to the 'this'.⁷⁶ In the case of doubt one could show even more than that; if one of the two mutually contradictory qualifiers does not belong to the qualificandum the other one does. Though a false knowledge is thus not false in all respects, a true knowledge must be true in all respects, a true knowledge must be true in all respects, i.e., must have no qualifiers which do not belong to the qualificandum.

We cannot conclude our discussion of the nature of truth without referring to the contributions made by the Advaita Vedanta. In the Advaita Vedanta we are told that what is ultimately real or existent is *Brahman* and that this Ultimate Reality is undifferented unity of no difference either internal or collateral. Quality, diversity, and relation are all meaningless to It. It is identical with Absolute Truth. The Advaita, however, makes concession to empirical consciousness by admitting relative truth, any reality within the empirical or practical universe which of course has no truth in reference to the Ultimate Reality. Within the empirical sphere the Advaita distinguishes the subject and the object, and judgmental knowledge in which the subject and the object and the process from a unity, though psychological distinction amongst these moments is not denied.

Prama or truth to the Advaita consists in knowledge which is *abadhita* or unsublated. The unsublated is not the same thing as 'uncontradicted' as some writers have thought; it means that which does not stand cancelled, and refers directly to objects and indirectly to cognition. He also adds another condition, viz., *anadhigatatva* or the quality of not being previously cognised. But this second condition is not agreed upon by all advocates of the Advaitism and is therefore not made much of. Now the term, uncontradicted cognition, in western sense means that it is not opposed to, but is consilient with other cognitions. The cognition of a thing is true if it is not incompatible with other cognitions of one's own and with cognitions of others.

In other words, non-contradiction in this sense is basic principle of consistency. We must, however, resist the temptation of deriving from it the theory of coherence of Hegel and the neo-Hegilians for the simple reason that in the Advaita non-contradiction there seems to be no suggestion of a systematic whole of experience in which our experiences become re-arranged so as to form what Bradley, for instance, calls a coherent system. When we say this, we do not of course deny the larger experience of *Isvara* which, though having no transcendental reality, contains these cognitions as so many units. In the empirical realm, where truth with the Advaita means *tadhitatva*, it refers not to the fact that the experiences of *Isvara* as so many consilient units, but to the fact that their objects stand only unsublated within the empirical sphere. This seems to amount to thinking that truth is consistency. And must we of course be on our guard against supposing that such consistency as purely formal. The Advaita admits the psychologically real character of the subject and the object, of ideas and facts, and that knowledge to be true must take the form of the object known (*Tadakarakarita*); so this directly points to the fact that the Advaita admits the empirically real basis of knowledge and provides against the charge of logical formalism and subjectivism. The real trouble is that some modern enthusiastic interpreters of the Advaitism have misunderstood import of *abadhita* which distinctly and unmistakably refers to the object (*abadhita visaya*), subject to gradual sublation (*badhat*) and indirectly to cognition as such which is *svatah pramana*. Cognition to be valid, therefore, does not stand in need of consistency or coherence unnecessarily thrust upon it. The accredited Advaitistic doctrine of *svatah pramana* definitely militates against coherence or any other feature that may be introduced into the nature of truth. It is worth-nothing further that the Advaita conception of Absolute Truth is equated with Absolute Reality, which is an undifferentenced unity and never a system of coherence experience as it is to Bradley.

The Advaita Doctrine of *Adhyasa* or Transcendental Super Imposition brings out another important point of distinction between itself and the Western Absolutism in so far as the question of the degrees of truth and reality is concerned. If, the Advaita's Reality is a non-relational unity, the question of difference is shut out altogether and therefore, the question of degree which involves relations and differences has no occasion to arise with reference to it. A pure unity cannot admit of any degree either of truth or of reality. The Doctrine of *Adhyasa* tells us that our empirical world and our experiences of it are but products of illusion, so that neither experience nor its object can have any truth or reality when viewed from the stand point of the Ultimate Truth and Reality. Our experience or any system of experiences has no reality for its object, nor are the different systems of experience representative of different grades of reality in order that we might have more or less wider systems of truth representing higher and higher reality. The entire system of empirical experience is illusory and has no reference either in degree or in entirety to the Ultimate Reality. All that we have is that our systems of empirical experience are more or less false, as they are sublated, one by the other, as we rise from illusory experience to an empirically real experience or from one empirical system until we reach the highest knowledge or intuition which is identical with Reality and which eternally cancels the lower ones. We see then that there is no question of the degrees, either of truth or of reality, from the standpoint of ultimate experience though we can only speak of degrees of unreality and of error.

TRUTH AND FALSITY ARE EXTRINSIC : THE NYAYA VIEW

As in the case of the theories of *Svatah pramanya*, the Nyaya theory of *Paratah pramanya* has two aspects, one concerns the origin of truth and the other its apprehension. In its first aspect the theory holds that the truth of a knowledge is not produced by the same conditions that give rise to the knowledge itself. It is rather produced by some extrinsic circumstances, some additional factors, known as *gunas* or excellences. In its second aspect, the theory holds that the truth of a knowledge is apprehended neither by that very knowledge, nor by the first apprehension of that knowledge, but by a subsequent inference which ensures either upon the confirmatory knowledge or upon the successful termination of the practical behaviour to which the knowledge under consideration leads us.

As already observed, according to the Nyaya, knowledge is the manifestation (*prakasa*) or apprehension of object, which is neither valid nor invalid in itself. No knowledge is true or false on its own account, i.e. simply because it is produced by certain specific causes (*jnana samagri*). Valid knowledge, is the apprehension of the real character of an object. Invalid knowledge is the apprehension of an object as it is not in its real character. Truth is correspondence of knowledge with reality. Error is disagreement of knowledge with reality. Correspondence is truth, and non-correspondence error. Thus, the truth and falsity of knowledge depend respectively on its confirmity and non-confirmity to objects or facts. Truth and falsity, therefore,

are characters that appear to be added to knowledge, which is indifferent to both, but may have either, according to special circumstances.¹ Hence, the conditions of validity or invalidity of knowledge must be different from one other and other than the conditions of knowledge itself. While object-manifestation is produced by certain general conditions, truth and falsehood, which are specific features of object-manifestation, must be produced by some specific features of the general conditions. Nyaya argues that, if knowledge and its validity were produced by the same conditions, then error would be indistinguishable from valid knowledge. Error, too, is a form of knowledge and is produced by the conditions of that knowledge. Hence, error should be as good as valid knowledge. In other words, the validity of knowledge being produced by the conditions of knowledge itself, the question of false knowledge can never arise. On the contrary, if knowledge and its falsity were produced by the same conditions, the possibility of valid knowledge would be out of question. In view of these facts, we are constrained to admit that the validity of knowledge and invalidity of knowledge are due to different special conditions different from one other and other than the causal conditions of knowledge itself.

What then are the special conditions of the validity and invalidity of knowledge? According to the Nyaya, the validity (*pramanya*) of knowledge is produced by some positive excellence (*guna*) in the generating conditions of knowledge; and its invalidity (*apramanya*) by some positive defects in the generating conditions of knowledge. Validity and invalidity of knowledge are extrinsic, and depend upon extraneous conditions (*paratah*). Validity is neither produced by the general conditions of knowledge nor by the mere absence of defects (*dosabhava*), but by some proficiency (*guna*) in its cause. Invalidity is neither produced by the general conditions of knowledge nor by the mere absence of proficiency (*gunabhava*), but by some deficiency (*dosa*) in its cause. Knowledge is not intrinsically valid or invalid, but it acquires validity the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object. This is the positive excellence (*guna*)

which generates the validity of perception. Distance or minuteness of an object, defect of a sense-organ or *manas* and the like are the positive defects (*dosa*) which generate the invalidity of perception. A specific effect has a specific cause.

Validity and invalidity are the specific characters of apprehension, which are due to different specific characters of the general conditions of knowledge, which either promote or vitiate them. They are extrinsic or adventitious characters of knowledge due to extraneous conditions.² Hence, in the opinion of Nyaya, truth and falsehood are not intrinsic or natural but extrinsic or adventitious.

The second argument is in support of the extrinsic apprehension of validity or invalidity (*Pramanya-Pramanya niscaya*). The question is: How is the validity or invalidity of knowledge known? Is the validity or invalidity of knowledge known by the very conditions that produce knowledge or by any conditions other than the conditions of knowledge? As a rule, the ascertainment of truth or falsity, according to the Naiyayikas, depends on some extraneous consideration just as their production depends on some extraneous factors. The Naiyayika argues that, if the validity of knowledge be ascertained by the very conditions of knowledge, there should never be any doubt with regard to the validity of any knowledge. If on the other hand, the ascertainment of invalidity be due to the factors of knowledge itself, there can never happen any wrong action. In other words, if truth be self-evident, all doubt and dispute about knowledge are at an end, and if falsehood be self-evident all illusion and disappointment disappear. In fact, neither validity nor invalidity is known to belong to knowledge, just at the time we have that knowledge. Generally speaking, the validity or invalidity of knowledge is ascertained only sometime after the production of knowledge itself is known.³

What, then, are those external conditions of the ascertainment of validity or invalidity of knowledge? The

Naiyayika answers that validity or invalidity is known by inference. Validity of knowledge is inferred from its capacity to produce successful activity (*Pravrttisamarthya*), and invalidity of knowledge from its incapacity to produce successful activity (*pravrttivisamvada*). Truth leads to successful action, and error to unsuccessful action. Practical efficiency and practical inefficiency are the test of truth and error by which they are known (*Pramanyagraha*). Correspondence is the content of truth, but workability is its criterion. Non-correspondence is the content of error, but unworkability is its criterion.⁴ Vatsyayana says, "an object is known through an instrument of knowledge; its validity is known by its workability". There is neither valid knowledge of an object without a *pramana* nor successful action without valid knowledge of it.⁵ Valid knowledge generated by *pramana* produces successful action from which its validity is inferred.

What is *Pravrttisamarthya* which determines the validity of knowledge? Vatsyayana explains it as the fulfilment of activity promoted by the knowledge of an object. *Pravrtti* means effort or activity; *samarthya* attainment of fruition by activity; *pravrtti samarthya* the knowledge of action ending in fruition or fruitful action.⁶ The validity of knowledge of an object, which was not frequently known before, is known by a fruitful action. But the validity of an object, which was frequently known before, is known from a similar mark even before it produces a successful action.⁷ Action depends upon the knowledge of an object, but not upon the knowledge of its validity. Even doubt about an object gives rise to action. Valid knowledge is in harmony with the real character of its object; and capable of producing a successful action. Invalid knowledge is in disharmony with the real nature of its object and incapable of prompting a successful action.⁸ The doctrine of extrinsic validity of knowledge, as the Nyaya thinks, does not involve infinite regress. The validity of knowledge is determined by the knowledge of successful action, which does not require determination of its validity by another successful action, because it has realised its end, and is not tainted

with a doubt as to its validity or invalidity. When a person has the knowledge of water in a burning desert, he has a doubt as to its existence. But, when he drinks water and quenches his thirst, his knowledge of successful action is undoubted.

The foregoing discussion of the Nyaya theory of *Paratah pramanya* indicates the two most important arguments in support of its contentions. The first is in support of the extrinsic origination of *pramanya* and the second in support of extrinsic apprehension of *pramanya*. The first argument which was explicitly formulated by Udayana states that if *pramanya* originated from the same conditions that give rise to the knowledge qua knowledge, then even an invalid knowledge would come to possess *pramanya* since it too has same originating conditions, and that is plainly absurd. The second argument was also first formulated by Udayana, though made far more precise by Gangesa. It argues that if with the first apprehension of a knowledge we also know it as true, then it would be impossible to have any doubt regarding the truth of that knowledge soon afterwards. It is not our purpose to take sides and to decide if these arguments are tenable or not. It is rather our intention to bring out the exact nature of the controversy. We shall examine the nature of the arguments in the next sections. For the present, we are interested in making the Nyaya contention more precise, and for this purpose it is necessary to bear the two arguments, especially the second one, in mind.

The Nyaya is not contending that when a knowledge comes into being, it is at the beginning neither true nor false. Such a contention would have been plainly absurd. It rather contends that every knowledge is either true or false, right at the beginning. Only its truth or falsity, whichever may be the case, is due to a set of conditions that are different from those other conditions that give rise to the knowledge. In the case of truth, these conditions are called '*gunas*' in the case of falsity *dosas*.

Since according to the second argument the truth of a knowledge is not apprehended *abinitio*, for if it were, there would have been no room for subsequent doubt, it seems to follow that in those cases where no such doubt takes place truth is apprehended *abinitio*. These cases in fact put the Naiyayika to great embarrassment. There are at least three such cases: inference, confirmatory knowledge or *Phalajñana* and knowledge with which one has acquired sufficient familiarity (*abhyasapanna jñana*).

As regards inference, Vacaspati clearly states that it is known right from the beginning as valid, for amongst the originating conditions of inference there is a certainly the universal major premise. There is no room left therefor having any subsequent doubt in the validity of the inference.⁹ Udayana is not so confident and takes up a more halting attitude. He is willing to grant that inference arises by manifesting the suchness of the object.¹⁰ Most reluctantly he concedes that truth is here apprehended *abinitio*. Yet he makes a desperate attempt to reconcile this with the *paratah* theory by suggesting that in such cases both may be true.¹¹ The Navya-Naiyayikas take up a more uncompromising position and deny that the truth of an inference is ever apprehended *abinitio*. For them there is always the possibility of doubt. Under such circumstances one has to review the entire Nyaya theory of inference in order to decide which of these attitudes is more consistent therewith. For the present however one or two features of the theory would help us in assessing the situation.

It is well known that Nyaya does not draw any distinction between the psychological process of inferring and the logical process. The two, in fact, are taken to coincide with each other. An inference *qua* inference is a logically valid inference. There is strictly speaking no fallacious inference. The so called *hetvabhasas* are rather hindrances (*pratibandhakas*) to inference than errors of inference.¹² An inference then as a rule is a valid inference and does not permit any doubt its validity. But at the same time one may very well be in error about the universal major, and

though one makes an inference based upon a certain belief in such a major premise it is likely that on a subsequent occasion one comes to doubt the truth of the major premise and therefore also of the conclusion it has led to. Thus, we find, on the one hand, that in the process of inference one cannot err, yet, on the other hand, one might possibly have started from a false universal major. That one cannot err in the process of inference is a curious doctrine held by the Naiyayika and is due to his added belief that the psychological process never deviates from the logical. But, it may quite well be that this belief is largely based on a linguistic decision not to call the process of thought as "inference", which also does not conform to the logical standard. It seems therefore that if by 'inference' be meant the conclusion arrived at, it is liable to be doubted as soon as one, for any reason, is led to doubt the truth of the universal major. If, however, by 'inference' be meant the process of inferring, it is intrinsically valid on this theory. Vacaspathi's contention contains this much of truth that unlike perception and *śabda*, inference arises out of a sense of certainty, so that the least doubt in the truth of the universal major would be frustrating and would not let the inference take place. An inference, therefore, arises with an apparently unshakable certainty.¹³ If, by *Pramanya* be meant this sense of certainty then certainty is intrinsic to inference. But the real issue is, whether *pramanya* in the sense of *tadvati-tatprakarakatva* is apprehended¹⁴ right from the beginning or not. He might adopt a more halting attitude and say that inference is accompanied by a sense of certainty that comes to be questioned only, if the universal major is for some reason or the other doubted.

Let us now consider the confirmations or the *phalajñana*. Here again an embarrassment similar to the one just mentioned awaits the Naiyayika. For, if the inference through which the truth of the first knowledge comes to be apprehended depends upon confirmation or the *phalajña* (e.g. quenching of the thirst in the case of a perception of water), it may quite well be asked, how are these confirmations themselves to be validated? In reply, Vacaspati

points out that the *phalajñāna* is never questioned by the discerning persons.¹⁵ But why, The answer given is that its familiarity leads us to infer its undeviating character through the mark of *tajjatiyatva* (the property of belonging to that class).¹⁶ Thus, instead of taking them as intrinsically true and as self-validating, Vacaspati includes them in a much wider class of 'familiar' cases whose sheer familiarity rules out any need for further validating them. The entire idea of familiar cases, cases that have become *abhyasadasapanna* and whose truth is immediately inferred - without waiting upon confirmation - through the mark of *tajjatiyatva*, is shrouded in obscurity and Udayana who attempts to throw light on this difficult notion has hardly succeeded in giving a completely satisfactory account.¹⁷ It is obvious that *tajjatiyatva* can serve as a mark of truth only when the knowledge under consideration has become a familiar case. Further, this knowledge is a fresh occurrent. To say that it is a familiar case could then only mean that it is a knowledge the like of which has already been experienced before and has been known to be true. What apparently distinguishes these cases from new knowledge is that in such cases one takes them for granted and entertains no doubt about their truth, whereas a new knowledge demands to be confirmed. But, they are two different notions involved, the notion of 'familiarity' that belong to the same class and the notions that evade logical precision. What is the test of familiarity? How many times must one have similar experiences in order that it may become *abhyasadasapanna*? It is not possible to lay down any general rule. One is unavoidably led to the conclusion that knowledge is called *adhyasadasapanna* in whose case no doubt arises soon afterwards, so that to say that the *abhyasadasapanna* knowledge does not demand validation appears tautological. A further inference based on the mark of *tajjatiyatva* is not called for. One does not infer anything. Only one does not in such case as these doubt. Besides, what does the word '*tat*' in '*tajjatiyatva*' mean? Not certainly the class of true knowledge, for as Udayana points out - that exactly is what is to be proved by the supposed inference. It does not mean the class of knowledge that

give rise to successful practice, for the mark is supposed to operate - if the supposed inference is not to be pointless - prior to confirmation through successful practice. Nor is *tajjatiyatva* any further unanalysable property in such knowledge which we perceptually discern, for no such property is so discerned. Udayana's solution after rejecting these alternatives is as follows: Every knowledge is of some object and the determinations of the object also serve to mark out the knowledge. Thus, a body is characterised by hands and feet, etc. Now, if I have a knowledge of something having hands and feet, etc., and say 'it is a body', my knowledge is thereby included under a familiar class of knowledge; in this sense '*tajjatiyatva*' - *tattadupadhivisis* - *tatattadanubhavatva*.¹⁸ This is a good reflective account of why we take certain knowledge for granted, but it is not corroborated in our unreflective acceptance of a familiar case. Further, if this is the meaning of the mark in the supposed inference it hardly differs from the inferences used to establish the truth even in the unfamiliar case. Gangesa also makes use of the mark of *tajjatiyatva* in the series of examples of the latter sort of inferences and gives the following examples - "This knowledge of the body is true, for it is a knowledge of the body in what possesses hands and feet, etc."¹⁹ This shows that either there is no inference at all in the case of a familiar case or if there is any in the supposed manner the supposed sort of inference also takes place in the case of knowledge that has not yet become quite familiar.

Thus, we find that in none of these aspects of knowledge truth is apprehended - on the Nyaya theory - right from the beginning. In every case, therefore, there is scope for and the necessity of further validation or correction. It has of course to be admitted that the need for validation is the most pressing in the case of non-inferential knowledges that are not confirmations and that are of unfamiliar sort.

There are yet two other cases where the Naiyayika is often led to recognise intrinsic truth. These are the

knowledge of the substantive (*dharmijnana*) and the *anuvyavasaya* of the primary knowledge. In both cases, again as before, one of the motives for recognising some sort of intrinsic truth is to avoid infinite regress. In the former case, there is besides a logical basis which has been examined before. Strictly speaking, this need not lead us to a revision of the *paratah* theory that in all knowledge truth is extrinsic, for the so called *dharmijnana* is not complete unit of knowledge by itself but is always a constituent of a complete knowledge. If, however, it be regarded as a possible complete knowledge expressible in the form 'this' or 'This is this', then its infallibility is merely an analytic consequence of its trivial character.

With regard to *anuvyavasaya* the matter is different and it is not at once clear why it should be regarded as infallible. Both Vacaspati and Udayana emphasise that it is never found to err and hence there is no room for doubt. 'Nor one who does not have a knowledge introspects 'I am knowing'; no one has the introspection 'I am knowing a silver' when in fact he has knowledge of shell.'²⁰ Vardhamana adds, "no one has an introspection of a knowledge when in fact he has a state of feeling". All that this empirical argument proves is that we do not generally err in our introspection and that therefore we do not generally doubt its truth. There is besides little practical reason that could stimulate such a doubt. Vardhamana rightly remarks - and is here closer to the spirit of the Nyaya - that by calling all such knowledge *svatahprama* what is meant is that there is in such cases no initial apprehension of falsity²¹ and hence no initial doubt to start with²²

MIMAMSA OBJECTIONS :

Kumarila criticises the Nyaya-Vaisesika view. If validity and invalidity of knowledge were due to extraneous conditions, then prior to the knowledge of its validity or invalidity, the knowledge would be neutral and devoid of any logical value. But we never experience neutral knowledge, but only valid knowledge or invalid knowledge.²³ If the validity of knowledge depends upon the knowledge of

excellence of its causes, or the knowledge of its agreement with its objects or the knowledge of a fruitful action, then the validity of second knowledge also depends upon some other knowledge and so on to infinity.

The fallacy of infinite regress following as a consequence of the Nyaya theory of extrinsic truth may be shown as follows : It may be argued that if the truth of a knowledge k_1 needs to be verified by another knowledge k_2 , then k_2 can do this job only if itself stands confirmed, and that needs another knowledge k_3 . But this process of validation shall have no end, and we shall need k_4, k_5, \dots ad infinitum. In practice however, the Naiyayika stops short of this, and in doing this he is not consistent. He contends, for example, that the knowledge that there is water over there before me, is confirmed when I go over there and quench my thirst, which confirms the knowledge of water, needs itself to be validated. Or the Mimamsakas may argue that unless the person seeing water were certain about the truth of what he knows he would not take the trouble of walking up the distance in order to quench his thirst. Even if in this case he does not make an attempt, in cases where the appropriate *pravrtti* would need great effort a person not certain of the truth of what he knows would not be persuaded to act. He would certainly not act unhesitatingly. There would be no *niskampapravrtti*. The argument then would be that successful practice cannot confirm the truth of knowledges for the very possibility of unwavering practical behaviour presupposes a prior certainty of the truth of the knowledge which provokes the activity.

To this Mimamsa objection the Naiyayikas' answer is two fold. First, it has been said that the experience of expected objects (*phalajñana*) does not ordinarily require any test of its validity, because there is no doubt about it or because there is the fulfilment of our purpose in it. As for instance, the first perception of water in a mirage requires to be tested because we have doubts about its validity, but that of a man going into water need not be further tested, since it is not infected by any doubt and it fulfills the man's expectations.

The process of conformation would thus come to an end. The Naiyayika, thus, seems to concede that he is not against ascribing some kind of intrinsic validity to the final confirmatory experiences. He might do so in a somewhat weak sense of 'intrinsic', namely in the sense that in this case there is no possibility of error, no occasion for doubt, and hence no need for further conformation. There would be no infinite regress. This I think is a fairly good reply so far as it goes. The Naiyayika is not inconsistent in holding this view for he may, as also pointed out earlier, suitably modify his thesis and restrict it only to those knowledges which provoke activity and which have not yet become familiar. In all other cases he may concede an intrinsic truth in a rather weak sense.

Secondly, the volitional experience of expected objects may, if necessary, be verified by certain special characteristics of it. Thus, the visual perception of water may be validated by the expected factual sensation of it, and the latter may be further confirmed by the experiences of bathing, washing, drinking, etc., which are usually associated with water. It may be argued here that a man has the whole series of experiences even in a dream. Hence, it is at least theoretically possible that the volitional experiences of water as well as those of its usual associates are as invalid as dream experiences. According to the Naiyayikas, this hypothesis is untenable. There is an obvious distinction between dream consciousness and waking experience, while the latter is clear and distinct, the former confused and indistinct. Dreams have not the order and uniformity of our waking experiences. Dream experience is contradicted by waking perceptions. There cannot be any retrospection of dream cognition (*anuvyavasaya*). What is cognised in dream cannot be the object of a later dream cognition as something that was cognised. In dream all things may be seen but none remembered as what has been previously seen. Hence, the waking volitional experiences cannot be reduced to dream.²⁴

The Nyaya Vaisesika is aware of the fact that the Mimamsakas may object to the theory of extrinsic validity of

knowledge on the ground that if the truth of a judgment is determined at a later stage, then either it is open to the charge of mutual dependence (carvakas) or it is futile like placing the cart before the horse.

The Nyaya reply is no mutual dependence, because practical activity with reference to a perceived object takes place in the absence of knowledge of truth. When a man perceives water and approaches it to quench his thirst, it is not necessary that he must have ascertained the truth of his perception before proceeding towards it. What prompts him to act is his spontaneous or instinctive belief in the reality of the object of his perception. Whether his belief is justified or not is a different question which is decided by ascertaining the truth of the perception. The case of our knowledge of objects which is not directly perceived is different. Their practical activity follows from mere doubt, and if it is found successful the corresponding cognition is judged to be true. Our knowledge of such unseen objects God, Heaven etc., cannot be directly verified, yet we can ascertain its truth by the application of such tests as we might have derived from the verification of our knowledge of perceived objects. The ascertainment of our knowledge of perceived objects by successful activity, though unless in itself, has the value of giving us a knowledge which distinguishes truth from falsehood and which we can avail ourselves of in judging the truth of our knowledge of unseen objects.

The subsequent volitional experience of successful activity is an external evidence which proves the truth of our cognitions. But, is the knowledge of successful activity, it may be asked, intrinsically true or does it require verification like the first cognition of an object? If it is intrinsically true, what is its superiority over the first cognition on account of the absence of which the latter is not held to be intrinsically true? If it requires further verification, then the process of verification will never come to an end and consequently no truth of any knowledge will ever be known. The Naiyayika answers that verification is not an endless process, because the knowledge of successful

activity does not stand in need of further verification. All knowledge is as means to some practical end and hence, it needs to be tested in order to attain practical success. The knowledge of the result, on the other hand, is an end in itself, not leading to further result, and hence, there arises no need to test its truth. When practical success has been achieved one feels no doubt about it, and, because doubt is the motive behind the ascertainment of truth, the ascertainment of the truth of volitional experience becomes motiveless. In the case of the first knowledge of water, for instance, people doubt its truth because such a knowledge is observed to arise even in the absence of water as in the illusion of mirage. So its truth is to be examined and it is known from some extraneous evidence, viz., the knowledge of successful activity is never seen to arise in the absence of successful activity, none entertains doubt about it, and consequently there is no motive to examine its truth.

Even when there is a doubt the truth of the experience of successful activity can be ascertained by its harmony (*samvada*) with further experiences of its object. When water is seen we expect that it will quench our thirst and if the expected thing actually happens, i.e., if the cognition leads to a successful action, it is proved to be true and there is no scope for doubting the truth of visual cognition of water. It still there remains some doubt, it can be removed by factual, kinnaesthetic and other experiences. A visual perception of water reveals the form of water in a general way and if we notice the special features of water in it by touching, bathing, washing etc., the first visual perception is verified, because such a series of experiences can never be possible unless the perceived water is real. It is true that we sometimes have a series of experiences in dreams also. But when we have it during waking state we are fully aware that we are not dreaming. In a dream there is no consciousness of the fact that we are dreaming, and so the illusion of volitional satisfaction cannot be avoided in the state. But the state of wakefulness we are perfectly sure that we are perfectly sure that we are waking

and not dreaming and that such a series of experiences cannot arise in the absence of real water. Thus, the truth of the experience of successful activity, when it is confirmed, by other sensory experiences during waking state can never be doubted.

The truth of volitional experience can be tested in still another way by examining its antecedent conditions. If even after a vigorous and careful search we do not find any defect in the conditions, we can safely believe that our volitional experience of successful activity is true. The defect of the antecedent conditions that vitiate our knowledge resulting from them are : rapid movement of objects as in the case of a fire brand in motion, similarly of the objects of knowledge to other objects as in the case of a shell, dimness of light, drowsiness of mind, an acute feeling of hunger, thirst, tiredness, etc., the diseases of the sense organs and so on. If such defects are absent our knowledge of successful activity cannot but be true. It may be asked : why would we not examine the conditions of the first knowledge of an object in this way instead of examining the conditions of subsequent practical experience ? The answer is that we can certainly do so if we choose, but it does not prove the theory of intrinsic truth, nor does it disprove the theory of extrinsic truth. If we ascertain the truth of our first perception of water on the ground of the absence of any vitiating factor in the antecedent conditions, we appeal to an extraneous test, and hence in this case too, truth is known extrinsically. But, ordinarily, people are not interested in the examination of the conditions of their first perceptions. What they are interested in is the attainment of expected results from their first perceptions, and when there is actual attainment of such results the truth of the first perceptions become evident. But, if there is any doubt, the conditions giving rise to subsequent volitional experience are examined by people and not those which give rise to first perceptions. Thus, a knowledge of successful activity resulting from a cognition is the test of truth of that cognition and in the same way a knowledge of disappointment or practical failure (*pravrtti*

visamvada) is the test of falsehood, and both these tests are extraneous to the conditions that give rise to knowledge. Knowledge by itself is neutral, i.e., it is not known to be true or false. If it could be possible there would be no disappointment in practical activities. Truth and falsehood are not self-evident; they are always known through inference.

With regard to the objection raised by the Mimamsakas as to why the Naiyayikas do not verify the condition of the initial judgment instead of scrutinising only the conditions of knowledge of practical efficiency, Jayanta's reply is that even if their suggestion were to be adopted, it would neither support the hypothesis of intrinsic validity nor refute the theory of extrinsic validity.²⁵ People become very much conscious of the fruit of their knowledge, but they are not found to have such eagerness for scrutinising the condition of their judgment. That is why the conditions of the knowledge of practical efficiency are examined. We may compare here the *pravrtti samvada* of the Naiyayikas with the *arthakriyakaritva* of the Buddhism. For the Buddhism, that knowledge is valid which is conducive to fruitful activity. But, the Naiyayikas maintain that truth consists in correspondence (*samvaditva*) and satisfaction, i.e., objective verification and subjective utility. "Correspondence to Reality", as Prof. R.D. Randoe puts it, "is a constitutive character of truth, while satisfaction comes in only when it is to be tested. Correspondence is thus the *ratio essendi* of truth while utility is only *ratio cognoscendi*. Truth may exist even if it is not put to practical use. Practicability is just a means of subsequent verification".²⁶ Moreover, whenever a person has the knowledge of practical efficiency during his waking state he finds that there is perfect correspondence of his knowledge with its object. As he has no previous experience of discord between such an experience and its object, the doubt does not arise in his mind. And when there is no doubt, there is no need of ascertaining the truth of the concerned judgment. It is perhaps Aklanka the Jaina thinker who holds that the truth of the knowledge of an object, which has been repeatedly cognised is self-evident and that the truth of judgment, which

is not repeatedly cognised is extrinsically determined.²⁷ But Jayanta takes pity on him saying that this proud fellow does not mean why he says. Actually repetition gives us an opportunity to ascertain our experience. So the truth of such repeated observations also is determined by the successful movement.²⁸ It is not in any way self-evident. Jayantha further states that verification is not an endless process because the knowledge of successful activity does not stand in need of further verification.²⁹ All knowledge is a means to some practical end and hence it needs to be tested in order to attain practical success. The knowledge of the result, on the other hand, ends in itself, not leading to further result and hence there arises no need to test its truth. There are some cases of knowledge whose truth appears to be self-evident. The knowledge of familiar objects e.g. my house, my body etc., is known as true immediately at the time when it arises and we do not feel the need of verifying it by successful activity. Is, then, such knowledge intrinsically true? The Naiyayika replies that the knowledge of truth in such cases is conditioned by familiarity and that it is not self-evident though it arises quickly. The truth of the knowledge of a new object is ascertained on the ground of practical success to which it leads if it is true. When a new object is cognised repeatedly it becomes familiar and we need not test the truth of its cognition on subsequent occasions in the same way as when it was new. Truth in such cases is known through inference based on familiarity and not on successful activity.

Another objection against the Nyaya view of extrinsic validity is that it involves the fallacy of argumentum ad infinitum (*anavastha*). If the validity of knowledge is to be known from an external source i.e., by means of some other knowledge, then we shall have to prove the validating knowledge on other external grounds and so on ad infinitum. Thus, we are to say that the validity of perception is known by inference, that of inference by comparison (*upamana*), that of the last by testimony, and that of testimony by still other method of knowledge. Hence, the method of

knowledge must be innumerable. It may be said that to said that to prove the validity of knowledge we need not go beyond the four methods, but prove one individual perception or inference by another perception or inference. Even then, we cannot avoid the difficulty of infinite regress. What happens is that within the circle of the four methods of the Nyaya, the process of validation of our knowledge by another will go on for ever. Thus, the perception of water may be known to be valid by inference from successful activity or essential similarity. But, how are we to know the validity of the validating inference? It must be by some other perception or inference, and soon ad infinitum. To avoid this difficulty the Naiyayikas cannot say that while the validity of the primary knowledge is established by the secondary, that of the latter is self-evident, and so requires no verification. If the truth of secondary knowledge be self-evident, there is nothing to prevent the primary knowledge from having self-evident validity. Further, it will involve a surrender of the Naiyayika position that the validity of all knowledge is constituted and ascertained by external conditions. Hence, it seems that on the Nyaya theory of validity, the process of the verification of knowledge will go on an infinite chain of arguments, in which every link will hang on the next, but the last link is never to be found (anadiparampara).³⁰

To this, the Naiyayikas' reply is that the validity of a knowledge must be known by extrinsic conditions whenever it is necessary to know it at all. But, it is not always necessary to ascertain the truth of a knowledge. It becomes necessary when any doubt as to its validity actually arises. Thus, when we have the visual perception of water and have any doubt about its validity, we do, of course, ascertain it by inference from some successful activity, i.e., by touching or drinking the water. But, the validity of the verifying experience requires no further examination or proof. There being no doubt about its validity we do not feel any necessity to prove or ascertain it. Hence, the factual perception of water validates the visual perception of it even when there is no ascertainment of its own validity. When,

however, we have any doubt about validity of the factual perception, we must establish it by other external conditions, such as the corroborating testimony of different persons. Thus, it follows that to know the validity of knowledge by external grounds, it is not necessary to know the validity of those grounds so long as they stand undoubted and uncontradicted (*samasyabhava*). If any one still doubts that the validating ground may itself be valid or not, then we have an unmeaning motiveless doubt which has no place in logic.⁸¹

Lastly, the Nyaya discusses the sceptical contention that there cannot be any valid knowledge. By valid knowledge is meant such knowledge of objects as is due to some method of knowledge (*pramana*). But how is knowledge related to its object in the order of time? Does it precede or succeed or synchronize with the existence of its object (*prameya*)? Knowledge cannot be said to precede its object, since no knowledge appears except as the knowledge of some object. Nor can we say that knowledge succeeds or follows its object to us in so far as it is known. There can be no object which is not the object of some knowledge. Without knowledge there is no object. If a thing can be an object independently of knowledge, there is no need of a method of knowledge for it. Nor again can we say that knowledge and the object of knowledge co-exist in time. If that were so, all objects of the world will be known at the same time, and there can be no desire to increase our knowledge of things. Further, this will contradict the Nyaya view of the serial order of cognitions, from which the existence of *manas* or the internal sense is inferred. Hence, it follows that there can be neither knowledge nor a method of knowledge (*pramana*).⁸²

This is the sceptical objection against the possibility of knowledge as such. It denies the possibility of knowledge on the ground that the reference of knowledge to its object is inexplicable in the order of time. To this we may, of course, say with green that, even if knowledge be taken as an event in time its reference to the object is timeless.

so that the question of the temporal relation between knowledge and its object does not arise. The Naiyayikas, however admit that knowledge refers to its object in the order of time. But they point out that the temporal order between knowledge and its object is indeterminate. It is not the case that knowledge must have a fixed temporal order of priority or posteriority or simultaneity with its object. knowledge arises out of certain causes and refers to some objects. In some cases, knowledge precedes the existence of its object, as when we know something that is to happen in the future. In other cases the object as a physical thing or event may be said to precede our knowledge of it, as when we know that something was or had happened in the past. In still other cases, knowledge and its object may be said to co-exist or to appear simultaneously in time. This is illustrated by the perception of present facts and, still better, by introspective knowledge of mental contents. Hence the Naiyayikas maintain that the time-relation between knowledge and its object cannot be objectively determined as something unalterably fixed like that between cause and effect. It is a variable relation which is to be determined as of this or that kind by actual observation of the instance of knowledge in question. In fact, the something can in different case be called the knowledge of object (*prama*), the object of knowledge (*prameya*) and the operative cause of knowledge (*pramana*), just as the same word may be subject and predicate in different relations and positions. Hence the question of the time-relation between knowledge and the object of knowledge does not necessarily lead to the denial of all knowledge. Further, scepticism, if it is to be consistent, cannot really deny the possibility of knowledge. To deny knowledge is to disbelieve it. But to disbelieve is to know that some thing is not true. Hence, the denial of knowledge must have a positive basis in some kind of knowledge. But, it is a contradiction to deny knowledge by means of knowledge. This is the Naiyayikas *reductio ad absurdum* of scepticism.³³ Kumarila and his followers reject the theory of extrinsic truth and falsehood - If truth or falsehood is not natural to knowledge but super added to it by excellences or deficiencies of the causal conditons, then it would follow that knowledge is characterless (*nishvabhava*) at the time of

its birth. But a knowledge which is neither true nor false is an impossibility. Either true or falsehood must be natural or inherent in knowledge. Again if the ascertainment of truth and falsehood of knowledge is supposed to depend on inference which takes place at a later time, knowledge will lack certitude prior to the application of the test of truth and hence, there will never be any practical activity immediately after knowledge, which is obviously against common experience. No activity is seen to follow from a doubtful knowledge. And if the Naiyayikas maintain that successful activity from a neutral or doubtful knowledge is possible, then he contradicts the very first aphorism of the Nyaya sutra which says that a study of *pramanas* is undertaken because it is only through valid knowledge that the useful is attained and the harmful is shunned.³⁴

The Mimamsakas differ from the Naiyayikas in two respects. First, the former regards the validity of knowledge as intrinsic and the invalidity of knowledge as extrinsic, while the latter the validity and the invalidity of knowledge both as extrinsic. Secondly, the former regards the novelty (*agrahitagrahitra*), correspondence (*arthavyabhicaritva*) and non-contradiction (*abhadhitatva*) as the characteristics of truth, while the latter correspondence as the content of truth, and workability (*pratisamarthyā*) as the test of the knowledge of truth. Thirdly, the former advocates realism, pure and simple, while the latter realism and pragmatism, and regards validity as determined by the knowledge of practical efficiency, and invalidity is determined by knowledge of practical inefficiency.³⁵

In Western Philosophy, the advocate of correspondence theory has been subjected to many criticisms, the most outstanding of which as in the case of Nyaya, is the infinite regress to which he is led to establish correspondence, and which he might have avoided if only he simply had fallen back upon the self-evident character of correspondence. But, committed as he is to his own theory of correspondence, however, hard the task of establishing it may have been, he does not see eye to eye with self-evidence, which he unconsciously assumes. Bradley in his exposition of the theory of coherence has never denied the

importance of self-evidence as revealing the truth of the elements within the system just as he is never tired of admitting some sort of correspondence between ideas and facts in our quest of truth. Bradley in his characteristic way has stated that in the situation of truth which is always a system, self-evidence and correspondence are the necessary incidents which we must transcend to reach a coherent system of experience which is truth. We have already seen, how Descartes has made such of self-evidence as criterion of truth, though fuller understanding of his position by reference to all his works including regulations might suggest that his self-evidence theory of truth logically leads to coherence of some sort. Without further elaborating our arguments for showing the importance of self-evidence as a criterion of truth we may rest contented with simply pointing out that truth is a revelation and not a manufacture, and the fit organ for such revelation is intuition. When we say so, we do not minimise the value of accordance, nor that of the coherence theory, but what we like to point out is that self-evidence is necessary for the apprehension of truth either individual or universal. Apart from what is contributed by the correspondence and coherence theories of truth by way of its analysis and structural synthesis, we think we may not be wrong to assert that for the apprehension of truth as it is, self-evidence is of indispensable value. Even from the point of view of Bradley according to whom the absolute truth is Reality in its ideal form, if realisable at all, it is realisable not by thought which has already committed suicide, but only by intuition.

In Realism in all its phases truth seems to be a case of correspondence between ideas and facts, between the subjective and objective. The facts are the objects, a correspondence to which reduces our ideas to truth, are evidently independent of the ideas and are a multiplicity of entities each of which may have far more qualities and aspects than are revealed in the correspondence. The copy theory of truth tells us nothing definitely about this. It tells us merely that the facts or the objects to which our ideas correspond are copied by the mind not in all their

qualities but only in respect of certain qualities which are called primary. So reality in its entirety does not and cannot reveal itself to truth. The neo-realist and the critical realist both take the object to be capable of innumerable qualities, though when we have knowledge of the object, our mind selects that particular qualities out of the rest in which it is interested and apparently neglects the rest of which also the object is capable. So, truth either in the neo-realist or in the critical realist, account of truth given by the realist in general, is based upon correspondence which, as we have already seen in our account of knowledge and truth, is difficult for the realist to establish. Granting for the sake of arguments that correspondence between idea and object is an established fact, we find that the realist in general gives us a conception of truth in which reality does not stand out revealed in its entirety and that the relation between truth and reality is an external one. But, both the nature and the test of truth from the stand point of hard and fast correspondence crumble to the ground, when it is pointed out that such correspondence is either unnecessary or impossible by the dilemma to which it exposes itself. For, we can ask the advocate of correspondence; is the correspondence between ideas and facts, known or unknown? If it is known, then correspondence is unnecessary to establish for the purposes of nature and test of truth. If it is unknown then it is impossible to establish it, for in so doing the advocate of correspondence will have to bring in another correspondence, and to establish the second correspondence he will have to bring in a third, and so on, and will thus involve himself in an infinitive regress. We see then that correspondence in the traditional sense, which makes out an external relation between ideas and facts, fails to give us not only the nature of truth but also its criterion or test. Correspondence in the sense of accordance as formulated above can serve only as an incident in the nature of truth whose full articulation and test are met with in the theory of coherence.³⁶

TRUTH IS INTRINSIC AND FALSITY IS EXTRINSIC - THE MIMAMSA VIEW

The systems of Purva Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta recognise the intrinsic validity (*Svatah pramanya*) and the extrinsic invalidity (*Paratah apramanya*) of knowledge. The validity of knowledge arises from the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects, and is known by the knowledge itself. It does not arise from any special excellence (*guna*) in the causes of knowledge, and is not by any other subsequent knowledge of fruitful action, or of the absence of a contradicting knowledge. Knowledge is valid in itself, and is not validated by any other knowledge. Intrinsic validity of knowledge consists in its being generated by the complement of causal conditions of the knowledge itself, and not by extraneous conditions besides them. The knowledge of validity also is generated by the same aggregate of causal conditions which make the knowledge known.¹ But the invalidity of knowledge arises from defects in the causal conditions of the knowledge, and is known by the knowledge of them, and the knowledge of a contradicting knowledge.²

Although they all agree that truth of a knowledge originates precisely from those causal conditions which also give rise to the knowledge, the different advocates of the *Svatah pramanya* theory nevertheless differ amongst themselves as to the nature of the apprehension of truth. Even with regard to this latter question they all no doubt agree that a knowledge is as a rule appended together with its truth.³

They differ, however, in the first place, with regard to the nature of knowledge and, secondly, as to the nature of our apprehension of knowledge. Accordingly, we might distinguish between three different forms of the theory - the Prabhakara, the Bhatta and the Vedanta.

THE PRABHAKARA THEORY :

The Prabhakara theory stands alone in thinking that there is no possible error. Prabhakara's view of intrinsicity is that all apprehension is true and knowledge apprehending reality otherwise than it is, is an impossibility. Thus, to the Prabhakara's all cognitive states are necessarily true and thus they close their eyes to the fact of error. Prabhakara says, "it is strange indeed how a cognition can apprehend an object and yet be invalid."⁴ This idea has the support of Kumārila also, who has described the validity of the cognition "as consisting in its being an apprehension."⁵

Cognition is divided into two broad classes, valid and invalid. Under valid cognition are included all those cognitions that bear directly upon their object; and under invalid cognition those that bear upon their object only indirectly. At the outset this classification corresponds to the two broad divisions of *anubhūti* or apprehension and *smṛti* or remembrance. Thus, Prabhakara regards all remembrances as invalid and all apprehension as valid. In the former case he agrees with Nyāya and differs from him in the case of latter.

The starting point of Prabhakara's enquiry is : What is *pramāṇa*? *Pramāṇa* is a very important term in Indian epistemology. It has been used somewhat promiscuously; sometimes in the sense of the means of cognition, the etymology of the word being explained as "*Prameyete jñayate anene*"; while sometimes it is used in the sense of valid cognition itself, with the etymology '*Prameyete yet*'. In the present context, the term *pramāṇa* is used in the latter sense of valid cognition. What then is this valid cognition or *pramā*? Prabhakara's answer is, valid cognition is 'apprehension' and it is something different from

'remembrance'. The latter cannot be valid, in as much as it stands in the need of previous cognition. A memory cognition or remembrance is nothing but a reproduction of some previous experiences, and the causal conditions which produced the previous experience are not necessary for this reproduction. Thus, if the previous experience were an authority, the memory reproduction could only be a copy of such authority. Considerable realization of this sort of difference between memory and direct experience prevented ancient writers from calling memory a *pramana*. Later on Vacaspati Misra makes the right point that relation of word to its meaning is conventionally established through public usage (*lokavyavahara*); and since *pramana* is not used to include memory (*smṛti*) we should not call memory a *pramana*. It should be noted that in the Jaina tradition, memory is accepted as a *pramana*. The Jain philosophers began the discussion of the *pramana* theory at a relatively late date, and they were right in exposing the vulnerability of the position that memory-cognition cannot. When it agrees with fact, cannot be denied that privilege.⁷ It should also be noted that these very philosophers who admitted implicitly that memory can very well be correct when it reproduces a true experience. In any case, a more detailed and critical examination of the controversy over whether or not memory is a *pramana* may give us more insight into the exact meaning of the term *pramana*. The exclusion of remembrance and its definition does not exclude recognition entirely; as this latter does not consist entirely of remembrance, there being an element of direct cognition in it; and to the extent it is valid. Recognition appear as in the form 'This is the same as that', where the factor represented by 'this' is directly perceived and hence to that extent it bears upon its object directly: while Remembrance leans upon its object wholly indirectly, through the agency of impressions left by previous cognitions.⁸

The definition of valid knowledge as *anubhūti* or 'apprehension' presupposed the self-validity of cognition, which must be inherently valid by itself. Valid cognition can be defined as 'apprehension' only if each and every

apprehension is inherently right and valid. This 'self-validity' of cognition forms the very key stone of Mimamsa. The reasons why the Mimamsa lays stress upon this doctrine lies in the fact that if this were not so, then cognitions derived from the Veda would not be valid or reliable, as the reliability of all verbal cognition is dependent upon the variety of of the person using the word and the Mimamsaka does not admit of an another or speaker for the Veda. Hence the Veda could not be reliable. This would strike at the very foundation of the structure of Purva-Mimamsa. Then again, if all cognitions were not inherently valid, whence could we have confidence in our own cognitions? Even when the cognitions may be one which is found subsequently to be not in consonance with reality, the cognition as cognition remains valid. If it were always necessary for the cognition to be in consonance with the object, then it would have to be regarded as having the form of that object, and this is an absurdity. Because, if the cognition had the form of the object it would mean that the two are identical; and in that case, how could one be the apprehender and the other the apprehended. 'Nor is it difficult to distinguish one cognition from another, when they are formless'. Because '*Samveda*' (cognition or knowledge) that a mass has is that there is manifestation of a special factor of man's Dharma or Merit which focusses his active cooperation in connection with a certain object. And eventhough this 'Manifestation' is self-illuminated, that does not render its differentiation impossible, as a cognition is regarded as appertaining to that particular object with regard to which it favours the activity of the cogniser; and as each cognition tends to active cooperation in connection with a distinct object, this would afford all the basis that is necessary for its differentiation from other cognitions. This formlessness too does not imply the absence of all characteristic features. In regard to every entity, it has to be admitted that it possesses that from in which it is actually manifested; no other criterion is possible; and as all cognitions are manifested simply as 'cognition', cognition can be the only character or even form that can belong to it. The form

that is cognised belongs always to the object. Now if all apprehension is valid, whence do we have the distinction of valid and invalid knowledge? Prabhakara says that so far as the element of apprehension is concerned all the so called invalid cognitions are valid, while the element that is invalid is no apprehension at all. All illusion is not a unitary cognition but a composite of two cognitions whose distinction is not apprehended. Illusion is not positive misapprehension but a negative non-apprehension when we fall a victim to illusion and are misguided by it, the error on our part is not an error of commission but an error of omission. The error occurs not because we fail to apprehend and thus we miss some relevant feature of reality.

Prabhakara as a staunch believer in the Mimamsa doctrine of self-validity of knowledge reduces all error and doubt to simply an absence of knowledge. He asserts that all experience is valid. "It is strange indeed how a cognition can apprehend an object and yet be invalid."⁹ Now, if all apprehension is valid, whence do we have the distinction of valid and invalid knowledge? Prabhakara says that so far as the element of apprehension is concerned all the so called invalid cognitions are valid, while the element that is invalid is no apprehension at all. An illusion is not a unitary cognition but a composite of two cognitions whose distinction is not apprehended. Illusion is not positive misapprehension but a negative non-apprehension. When we fall a victim to illusion and are misguided by it, the error on our part is not an error of commission but an error of omission. The error occurs not because we misapprehend reality but because we fail to apprehend and thus we miss some relevant feature of reality.

Prabhakara's theory of illusion is called *akhyativada*, because it interprets illusion as the absence of '*khyati*' or knowledge. Prabhakara like the *Advaita* holds that the object of a cognition is that alone which is manifested by it. In the illusion 'this is silver' what is manifested is the silver; so its object is the silver and not the nacre as the *Vipari-takhyativadin* says. Thus, the theory that it manifests an

object, the nacre, as a different object, the silver, is disapproved by experience. How can a thing appear in the form of another thing? What happens in the illusion of silver is that a piece of nacre is apprehended generically, while its specific features that distinguish it from a piece of silver, are not apprehended due to their suppression, and then the memory image of silver is suggested to the mind by similarity while the character of its being a memory image is forgotten on account of some weakness. Thus the object of recollection, viz., the silver, is not distinguished from the nacre, and consequently the illusion of silver takes place. The silver is represented and the nacre is presented, but they are not discriminated from each other. Hence, the illusion is nothing but an absence of discrimination (*vivekagraha*). This is why Prabhakara's theory is called *Vivekakhyati*. The cause of the non-discrimination is the obscuration of memory (*syutipramoha*). The object of memory belongs to the past; it is always referred to as that in contrast with the object of perception which is referred to as 'this', but when it is stripped of 'that-ness' (*pramuhutatrāka*) the memory becomes obscured, the bile and the other apprehending the substance of the conch without apprehending its whiteness. Then, because a substance and a quality always stand in mutual expectancy (*akanksa*), the two apprehensions cannot remain unrelated, and consequently the manifestation appears as similar to the manifestation of a real yellow conch. In the illusion of the double moon the rays issuing from the two eyes give rise to two different apprehensions of the moon which is one and the illusion persists in spite of the fact that the oneness of the moon is not forgotten. This is not a case of memory-obscuration. Here, as in the 'yellow conch' illusion, there is a non-discrimination between the two apprehensions and not between one apprehension and one memory image as in the nacre-silver illusion. In all these illusions the non-discrimination is caused by defects. Defects simply disturb the normal functioning of a cause; they cannot give rise to a different effect. A defective seed of wheat results either in a deficient growth or in no growth, but it cannot produce a barely plant. Similarly the defect of the senses

produce either an incomplete cognition of the nacre or no cognition, but they cannot produce the cognition of an entirely different. But why should it be called memory when it is not recognised as such? Salikanadha says that the 'silver' is neither perceived nor inferred, because neither there is a contact of the eye with silver nor is there a mark of the presence of silver. Thus, by the method of elimination it is concluded that the silver is remembered. Due to non-discrimination the illusory cognition of silver appears as similar to the cognition of a real silver, and this prompts some practical activity which is similar to that prompted by the real silver. Consequently one goes down to pick up the 'silver' and is disappointed to nearly a piece of nacre. Then it is realised that 'this' is not silver. The part of the illusory experience that is sublated thus by the subsequent volitional experience is the element of memory, the silver, while the presented element 'this' is not sublated. In a dream the memory images of past experience are revived by some unseen agency and they appear like apprehension because the fact that they are recollected is forgotten. In the illusion of a yellow conch, they are really two cognitions, one apprehending the yellowness of the bile residing in the eye without apprehending the substance, viz, the silver, as the *viparitakhyativadin* supposed.

Sucarita Misra criticises Prabhakara's view as follows: Prabhakara says that illusion is not one psychosis but a composite psychosis consisting of a perception and a memory, which in their individual capacity are true. But, then, all illusion cases are to be invalid. Prabhakara's view that error consists in the non-apprehension of difference (*badagraha*) is not supported by Sabara whom he professes to follow. Sabara has declared in the most ambiguous terms that error consists in a positively false cognition and is due to some defects in the source¹¹. He has never mentioned non-apprehension as a cause of error. Moreover, what is this non-apprehension? Prabhakara cannot say that it is the negation of apprehension, because he does not accept the reality of negation. Memory which does not appear as memory cannot be equivalent to non-apprehension

and consequently the cause of illusion, because memory is correct so far as it reveals an object while illusion is not correct but false. Moreover when I remember something and fail to be conscious of the fact that I am remembering it, the mistake lies in the memory and not in the perception of 'this'. The remembered silver is different from the perceived 'this'. How can a mistake pertaining to one thing falsify a perception of a different thing? The failure of memory cannot convert perception of one thing, the nacre, into that of a different thing, the silver. Again, in the illusion 'this is silver', 'this' is perceived and silver, he may, is remembered according to Prabhakara; but why should a man, however, desirous of silver he may be, bend down to pick up 'this'? Unless the man knows 'this' to be silver he cannot be prompted to possess 'this'. If more non-discrimination can prompt him to pick up, he can be prompted to pick up a lump of clay too. The lapse of the memory of silver is supposed to be the cause of non-discrimination; but the lapse of memory remains the same even if there be a lump of clay in the place of the nacre. So he must pick up the lump of clay as he picks up the nacre. If Prabhakara accepts that the nacre is perceived as silver in order to explain the practical activity consequent up on the illusion, then he accepts *viparītakhyatī* - practical activity. If a man can pick up nacre due to its similarity with silver, then he can also milk a 'gavaya', knowing that it is similar to a cow. The sublating consciousness appears in the form 'this is not silver, by which silverness is denied of 'this'. A denial presupposes an affirmation. But if the silver is independently remembered as Prabhakara says, the subsequent denial becomes meaningless. As a matter of fact in 'this is silver' 'this' is identified with 'silver' and it is a positive experience like the experience of real silver.

As regards doubtful cognitions, - "Is this a pillar or a man? What is actually perceived, and what actually enters the consciousness, is only some object endowed with the quality of tallness; and this is quite valid so far. This perception of tallness then reminds the man of a

number of tall things - the pillar, the man, the tree and so forth. Then it is that there comes the doubt as to whether it is this or that particular tall thing. Thus in all doubtful cognitions, there are two remembrances involved - and not only one act of apprehension. Hence, this also leaves the self-validity of cognitions untouched.

THE THEORY OF KUMARILA BHATTA :

Kumarila Bhatta considers that truth is inherent in all cognitions, because if it were not so, it could not be produced by any extraneous condition.¹² Umbeka¹³ distinguishes Kumarila's conception of intrinsicity of truth from the conceptions of the Samkhya, the Prabhakara and the Vedanta and also criticises some wrong interpretations of this view. Prabhakara's view of intrinsicity is that all apprehension is true and knowledge apprehending reality otherwise than it is, is an impossibility, and thus he closes his eyes to the fact of error. Kumarila, on the other hand, recognises error and hence his view of intrinsicity is different from Prabhakara's.

Discussing the problem, in regard to the validity of cognitions, Kumarila asks, is it to be considered whether the validity and invalidity of cognitions are intrinsic or extrinsic.¹⁴ Elucidating Kumarila's view point, Parthasarathi mentions four different views, which are as follows : a) Are validity and invalidity both inherent in the cognition ? or b) Are both these extraneous ? or c) Is invalidity inherent and validity extraneous ? or d) Is validity inherent and invalidity extraneous ? Validity is held to be extraneous when it is held to be due to, and brought about by, the defectless efficiency of the agency that brought about the cognition and similarly invalidity is held to be extraneous when it is held to be due to defects in the agency that brought about the cognition.

Neither Kumarila nor his commentators have mentioned the names of the upholders of these theories, but it is evident from the statements of the later thinkers like Madhvacharya that the four views belong to the Samkhyas, the Naiyayikas, the Buddhists and the Vedavadins (Mimamsakas

and Vedantins) respectively.¹⁵ The first view that both validity and invalidity of cognition¹⁶ has been repudiated by Kumarila on the ground that the two aspects cannot be accepted as intrinsic in one cognition, because they are mutually contradictory.¹⁷ Nor can the second view that both validity and invalidity are extrinsic is acceptable to Kumarila for the reason that in that case, the cognition would prove to be devoid of any character.¹⁸ Whenever a cognition appears, until the cogniser has had time to find out if it has been due to true and efficient causes or to false and defective causes, - the cognition would be regarded as neither valid nor invalid; if it is neither, then it is as good as non-existent. The third view¹⁹ is that by its nature, cognition by itself must be regarded as invalid, its validity alone being due to extraneous circumstances. The argument in support of this view is that invalidity, being negative in character, cannot be due to, and brought about by, any extraneous causes, - while validity, being positive, can be brought about by efficient causes. On the other hand, if cognitions were inherently valid and their invalidity were due to extraneous causes, then even dream-cognition would have to be regarded as valid. Under our view, there can be no validity in dream-cognitions, because there are not efficient causes present which could bring about the validity. Hence, the conclusion is that the validity of cognition is due to the efficiency of the causes, while by themselves cognitions are inherently invalid. The point of this third view is that the validity of valid cognitions also should depend upon the efficiency and consequent reliability of the person who spoke the word - and as, in the case of the Veda, there is no another or speaker according to the Mimamsaka, there could be no reliability and hence the Veda could not be a reliable source of knowledge regarding Duty, Dharma.

It is on this account that the Mimamsaka has insisted upon the fourth view, that all cognitions are inherently valid and it is only invalidity that is imposed upon them from without, when it is found that its source has been defective.²⁰ It is agreed that if validity were wholly non-existent in the cognition it could not be produced therein by anything

else. Under the view that the validity of the cognition is due to the efficiency of its source, to what could the validity of the cognition of this efficiency be due? It would only be due to another cognition of the efficiency of the source of this second cognitions; and so on, there would be an infinite regress. On the other hand, if validity belongs to the cognition by itself, then there would be no need of any other cognitions; specially as any idea of its invalidity could not appear, for the simple reason that there would be no cognition of any defect in source of the initial cognition. The conclusion, therefore, is that the cognition is valid *qua* cognition, and this validity can be set aside only when one causes comes to perceive a defect in its source.²¹ In this view expressed is the fourth alternative, by '*Pramanya*' is meant the power of revealing objects, which is natural to knowledge and by '*apramanya*' the absence of power, which can be produced by causes not possessing this power. Umbeka says that this interpretation of Kumarila's view is wrong. This view makes truth intrinsic on the ground that it cannot be traced to the cause of knowledge, viz. the senses; truth is intrinsic because it is causeless. But this is wrong. We do not find massiveness belonging to a body in the atoms that are the causes of the body; but this does not imply that massiveness is causeless.

Others say that *Pramanya* is the power of producing discernment and this belongs to cognition naturally. Cognitions are momentary and if the said power were not inherent in them it could never be produced. It cannot be produced before a cognition comes into being just as a picture cannot be produced before the canvas on which it is painted comes into being. It cannot be produced simultaneously with the origination of a cognition just as a picture cannot be produced simultaneously with the production of the canvas. It cannot be produced after a cognition is produced, because a cognition, being momentary, cannot stay still the said power is produced. Therefore, the power of producing discernment is not an effect at all but a natural possession of cognitions. This interpretation too is wrong because the opposite power of producing non-discernment

too will be natural on the same ground, which cannot be Kumarila's view.

Umbeka gives his own interpretation as follows : *Pramanya* consists in the property of a *pramana* or means of knowledge, e.g. perception, by virtue of which it reveals an object as it really exists (*arthavisamvaditva*) and it is produced by the same conditions which give rise to a *pramana*. The natural form (*svarupa*) of the causes produces truth in knowledge without depending on such additional factors as merits. We do not find any merits in the sense organs. There is no direct or indirect proof of their existence. They are neither directly perceived nor could be inferred from any signs. The medicines whose application is supposed to produce merits in the sense organs do nothing but expel the blemishes that may vitiate them. Falsehood of knowledge, on the other hand is caused by blemishes or defects which are extraneous to the natural form of sense organs. Defects, though they are invisible, are presumed to explain falsehood.

It may be objected that falsehood cannot be traced solely to the presence of defects in the generating conditions of knowledge, because where there is presence of defects there is absence of excellences too and hence it is not proper to hold only one of them to be responsible for producing falsehood. The reply is that falsehood is not merely negation of truth but positive in character and hence, it must be caused by some positive character actively producing a misapprehension of things and such a positive factor can be no other than a defect.²²

Parthasarathi draws attention to one possible misinterpretation of *Svatahpramanya* and *Paratahpramanya*. *Svatastva* or intrinsicity of truth does not imply that all knowledge is born true, whereas '*Paratastva*' or extrinsicity of falsehood that knowledge born true is made false by such extraneous conditions as the subsequent appearance of a contradicting knowledge etc. Truth and falsehood are produced in true and false knowledge respectively simultaneously with the production of knowledge. They are

properties of knowledge and are present from the very beginning. It is not true to say that truth is born with knowledge and falsehood is added to it subsequently. Falsehood is produced by some vitiating factors, but the vitiating factors are present from the very beginning. While silver is falsely perceived in shell, falsehood characterises the perception from the very movement of its origin, though the consciousness of falsehood does not arise at that time. The true knowledge of shell that arises later on does not produce falsehood in the first perception of it as silver. The falsehood was already there, but it was not known till the appearance of the sublating consciousness.²³ Thus truth is intrinsic in the sense that it is produced by the natural causes of knowledge and falsehood extrinsic in the sense that it is produced by some additional factor vitiating the natural causes.

The next question is, how are truth and falsehood known? Kumarila says: "The truth of knowledge is known through the mere fact of its being of the nature of knowledge and it is set aside by the knowledge of the object as being of a different nature or by the recognition of discrepancies in the source"²⁴ Knowledge is spontaneously known to be true. All knowledge excluding doubt being with it the conviction of its truth. As soon as knowledge of something is born it is believed to be true without standing in need of verification. It is this spontaneous belief in the reality of the object revealed by knowledge that prompts us to act in a particular way with reference to it.

It may be said that if the truth of knowledge is known by itself at the time of its birth and no other knowledge is required for the purpose, then a knowledge which is not known to be true by itself at the time may be rejected as false, and thus, just as we need no external criterion for judging truth, so we need none for judging falsehood, the conclusion being that both truth and falsehood are known intrinsically. This objection implies an intuitive knowledge of truth and falsehood and it is rejected on the ground that not only a true knowledge is known to be true by itself, but

even a false knowledge, e.g. that of silver in shell, is known as true by itself. All cognitions without any discrimination are believed as true by themselves, though some of them may actually be false.²⁵ The illusion of silver in shell is taken to be true at the time of its origin, but the consciousness that it is an illusion appears only subsequently. A false cognition does not advertise its falsehood and hence, at the time it is as good as true cognition. But, when the falsehood of a false cognition is known, it is invariably known through a second cognition. "Even a false cognition by itself points out the reality of its object and it would not cease to do so unless its falsehood were detected by another means."²⁶ A cognition always appears in the form 'this is p'. But the fact that 'this is not p' i.e. the falsehood of a cognition, is not revealed by the same cognition, but by another cognition. Therefore, it is said that the truth of knowledge is self-evident (*svatah*), while its falsehood is evidenced by other means (*paratah*).

Now, what are those other means by which the falsehood of a cognition is detected? They are: 1) a contradicting experience and 2) the knowledge of defects in the causes of a cognition. When a cognition, e.g. of silver, appears, we are confident of the real existence of silver. But, later in the course of further exploratory activity of the senser or when we manipulate the object, the real character of the perceived object as shell is discovered, the first cognition is directly contradicted in the form 'this is not silver', and thus we become aware of the error. Sometimes, as in the cognition of a yellow conch, the defects of the source are of a more or less permanent nature and not as temporary as in the previous case and under such circumstances the real character of the perceived object is not directly known. So long as one is not aware of the defect he rejects that part of the cognition as false which he can reasonably trace to the defect. In the cognition of yellow conch, for instance, he rejects the yellowness as false when he recognises that his eyes are suffering from jaundice, because he knows that the yellowness actually belongs to the bile present in his eyes while the conch in the state of health we see as white.

The Bhatta view is that truth does not depend on any extraneous factor for its revelation and hence, it is self-evident. But, how can this view be reconciled with the other view that a cognition does not reveal itself at the time of its appearance and that if there arises any curiosity it is indirectly known later through another cognition? But, if a cognition depends on another cognition for its knowledge, its truth, which is its property, too must depend on another cognition for its knowledge, and thus the theory of self-evidence falls to the ground. In reply to this, Parthasarathi says that the theory of self-evidence does not mean that a cognition apprehends its truth in the form, 'I am true'. On the contrary, it means that the knowledge of truth depends on the knowledge of the cognition itself, and we need not go beyond the cognition for that purpose. When a cognition arises we are not aware of the cognitive act, but the awareness of the object manifested by the cognition definitely occurs and the belief that the object is really as it is manifested remains implicit until reflective consciousness appears. An explicit consciousness of the truth of a cognition appears subsequently and then it depends on the awareness of the cognition itself rather than on any extraneous consideration. When we judge a cognition it actually such as is revealed to us and not different. The sole means of knowing the existence and nature of an object are its cognition and we have to believe what a cognition reveals to us. When I perceive a yellow object, the consciousness that the object is actually yellow arises from the perception alone, while the consciousness that the object is actually different in case if the perception be false, arises not from the same perception, but from the knowledge of contradiction or that of defects in the eyes.²⁷

Against the Mimamsa view that falsehood is evidenced by other means (*paratah*), it may be said that when the ascertainment of falsehood is made to depend on another cognition there will be infinite regress as on the theory of extrinsicality of truth. The reply is that their dependence is not a cause of infinite regress. Infinite regress occurs when one thing is made to depend on another thing of the

same kind; for example, the truth of one cognition is made to depend on the truth of another cognition. Thus if the falsehood of one cognition were known on the falsehood of another cognition the change of infinite regress might have been true. But, actually, what happens in the present case is simply that the falsehood of a former cognition is revealed subsequently by the knowledge of contradiction or of defects while this subsequent knowledge is self-valid. When falsehood is thus revealed by a true knowledge, there is no need to go on further and hence, there is no infinite regress.²⁸

It may again be asked: How is it that a later knowledge contradicts a previous one and not vice-versa? First, there appears the cognition, 'this is silver' and then, another cognition appears in the form, 'this is not silver'. It is said that the second cognition falsifies the first, but it may equally well be supposed that the first falsifies the second. The reply is that the relation of the contradictor and the contradicted between the two cognitions does not depend on a mere wish. When the first cognition, 'this is silver' appeared, the second 'this is not silver' is non-existent and hence the former can not contradict the latter. But the latter, making its appearance after the former, reveals the object of the former as possessing a contradictory nature and on his account it invalidates the former. The first cognition arises independent entity of the second, but the very birth of the second presupposes the first. The cognition, 'this is not silver' denies truth of the cognition, 'this is silver' by its mere existence and hence, the relation of the contradictor and the contradicted existing between them cannot be reversed.²⁹

It has been shown so far that the falsehood of a cognition is known extrinsically through the subsequent consciousness of contradictor of the presence of defects in the source. But, some times there follows a third cognition which contradicts the second one and in such cases, the truth of the first cognition which was wrongly shown to be mistaken by the second one is restored by the third one. From this it should not be supposed that the truth of a cognition is restored by a third cognition.

first cognition is known extrinsically, because the first cognition determines its object on account of its own birth and hence, it is self-valid. The second cognition of discrepancy contradicts the first only by mistake but when the third one contradicts the second by indicating that there is no real discrepancy, the truth of the first stands unchallenged. The first cognition remains as true as it naturally was. What the third does is just to show that the doubt regarding the first generated by the second is unfounded.

Again, seeing that one cognition is contradicted by a subsequent cognition and this too sometimes by still another cognition it is not reasonable to doubt the truth of the third and so on ad infinitum. When discrepancies really exist they are sure to be known sooner or later.

We cannot suspect them even where there is no reasonable ground for suspicion. Subjective and objective defects which are the causes of falsehood are found to exist only under special circumstances and not everywhere. When the senses and the mind are in a healthy condition, there is ample illumination, we are in a wakeful state and the object is very near, any doubt regarding the truth of the resultant cognition becomes unnecessary. Thus when there is no occasion for suspecting the presence of discrepancies the fear that a cognition may turn out as false is ruled out. Falsehood may be suspected where there is a possibility of discrepancies. It is not proper to doubt the truth of a cognition merely on the ground that it is a cognition like false cognitions. There are cognitions which arise with the conviction that they are perfectly true. Even when doubt arises due to a greater distance of the object or to other circumstance it is easy to dispel the doubt by approaching the object or by some other recognised method, but universal scepticism is quite uncalled for. If in the third cognition discrepancies are not suspected the matter ends then and there; but if we find a reasonable ground to examine, the third decision can be arrived at with the help of a fourth cognition and this is usually enough. When in this way the truth of the first or second cognition is confirmed by the

third or fourth one, it, being natural rests unchallenged, while others are proved to be false.³⁰

The Naiyayikas reject the first of the Mimamsa theory, namely that knowledge is both made valid and known to be valid by its own intrinsic conditions. The validity of knowledge cannot be due to the conditions of knowledge as such. If that were so, there could not be any invalid knowledge, since even invalid knowledge arises from the conditions of knowledge. In fact, a valid cognition is more than a cognition as such. Hence, it must be due to some special character of the general conditions of knowledge just as an invalid cognition is due to some positive factors that vitiate the general conditions of knowledge. The mere absence of vitiating factors cannot account for the positive character of validity. Thus, the validity of perception is due not merely to the absence of vitiating factors like the diseased condition of the sense organ, but to such positive factors as the health condition of the sense organ etc. Similarly, in all other cases the validity of knowledge is due to some special auxiliary conditions in the specific causes of knowledge (*karanaguna*). Such special conditions may not be always perceived, but they may be known from other sources, like inference and testimony. The special efficacy of the sense organs may be known from the medical sciences. Further, if the validity of knowledge be due simply to the absence of vitiating conditions, its invalidity may also be said to be due to the absence of efficacious conditions. As such, we need not say that invalidity is due to external conditions. Again, on the Mimamsa view, all knowledge being intrinsically valid, the distinction between truth and falsehood becomes insignificant. We should not speak of any knowledge as invalid. It cannot be said that when any knowledge turns out to be false, it altogether ceases to be knowledge or cognition. A wrong knowledge is as good a cognition as a true one. So, if cognition per se be true, there cannot be any wrong cognition. But, the fact that there are wrong cognitions, illusions, and hallucinations is an undeniable fact. So, it must be admitted that both validity and invalidity are externally conditioned.³¹ Similarly,

no knowledge is by itself known to be valid i.e. the validity of knowledge is not self-evident.

Vacaspati argues that a knowledge which apprehends an object, does not apprehend itself and its validity. Cognition which is common to valid knowledge and invalid knowledge, cannot apprehend its validity or correspondence with its object.³² Udayana argues that the validity of knowledge of an object which was not frequently known from extraneous conditions because it is doubtful like its invalidity. If it is known for certain, then there is no room for doubt. Doubt cannot arise from the perception of a common quality of a valid knowledge and an invalid knowledge, because then it would never cease. If doubt is due to non-perception of the distinction between valid knowledge and invalid knowledge, then either the validity of knowledge is not apprehended, though the knowledge is apprehended, or the valid knowledge itself is not apprehended. In the first alternative, knowledge does not apprehend its own validity, because knowledge is apprehended, but its validity is not apprehended. In the second alternative, doubt as to the validity of knowledge is not apprehended, because the knowledge itself is not apprehended. Determination of validity of knowledge by itself does not consist in its being quickly followed by successful action, since prompt action does not depend upon knowledge of validity. Desire is the cause of action. The knowledge of the means conducive to good is the cause of desire. It depends upon the memory of its conduciveness to pleasure, which depends upon previous perception due to the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ. The knowledge of validity is not the cause of action. Even if it is so, it does not prove that the validity of knowledge is known by itself. Further the capacity for producing successful action depends upon validity of knowledge or apprehension of its validity but not upon self-validity of knowledge (*svatah pramanya*). A thirsty person does not perceive the power of water to quench thirst before he actually quenches his thirst by drinking water. Successful action is a certain mark (*linga*) which proves the validity of knowledge beyond doubt.³³

Jayanta Bhatta refutes Kumarila's view of intrinsic validity of knowledge. Jayanta asks first, what does the compound word *Svatah pramanya* mean? Does it mean that the truth of a judgment emanates from the judgment itself? Or, does it imply that a judgment reveals its own truth to itself? For instance, in perceptual knowledge such as a blue object is blue, the judgment is true, but the question is whether the perception reveals its own truth or not.

If the perception knows its own truth, then it knows either the validity of the knowledge or that of its results. The answer according to Jayanta is in the negative because perception is here simply a knowing process. And a process cannot grasp its own self. It cannot even reveal the truth of its resulting judgment, since truth is in no way connected with an external sense organ. Even the inner perception is not competent to ascertain the truth of the resulting form. The inner perception is not experienced when the illumination of an object takes place. Thus, the knowledge that 'this is blue' is not experienced to be immediately followed by another judgment that the antecedent is true. Therefore, it is clear that perception fails to grasp the truth of its own judgment. The inference also cannot reveal the truth of the resulting form, since no mark or invariable relation is known to us. Now, if it is argued that the above result leads to the inferential knowledge of the truth knowing process, then the Mimamsakas are to be asked: "Does the mark remain unqualified? Or, is it qualified by the adjective 'true'?" In case the first alternative is accepted, then every result, whether true or untrue, will lead to the inference of the truth of a judgment. And in such a situation there is no possibility of any judgment turning out false. Likewise, the second alternative also is not tenable, because there is no way to find the truth of the result. The Mimamsakas may contend that the very experience of an object may be the source of the illumination of that object. For instance, when a blue thing reveals itself as an awareness of blue, it is itself a piece of knowledge. But, Jayanta refutes this view stating that in such a situation erroneous

cognitions, e.g. of silver in the shell would also come under the purview of valid knowledge since awareness of silver is there.

The Mimamsakas may say that the truth of a judgment depends upon the knowledge of the absence of its contradictory judgment. But, the question is whether this absence of contradictory judgment arises simultaneously with judgment or it arises afterwards. Jayanta rules out the first alternative holding that in such a case we should have never been baffled, whereas the fact is that a number of our judgments are erroneous. This shows that we transact our business even when we are not perfectly certain of our judgment. As regards the contention of the Mimamsakas that even such a judgment is different from doubt as it does not cause an oscillation between the two alternatives, Jayanta points out that as this uncertain judgment does not furnish the knower with a means to determine the true nature of the object, it is tantamount to doubt. Jayanta further states that there are examples where a doubt may assume the form of a judgment. For instance, though the prior judgment that 'this is silver' refers to a single object, yet it is virtually nothing but a doubt. Moreover, it could not have been contradicted after some time if its truth is ascertained. Again, it cannot, in spite of a person to move, if he knows that the judgment is untrue. It can also be proved by deduction, i.e. all movements are preceded by a doubt, this is a movement. Therefore, this movement is also preceded by a doubt. The Mimamsakas may again contend that "whenever the act of consciousness appears in the mind of a knower, the invariable mark of its truth is revealed to him, whereas no such mark is noticed on the appearance of a false judgment". But, Jayanta refutes this view on the ground that the distinct feature of the said mark is not traceable. If it is held by the Mimamsakas that the absence of misapprehension of untruth constitutes its distinction, then Jayanta points out that they should know that such a distinction may also belong to a false judgment (e.g. of the misapprehension of shell as silver).

Jayanta finally makes it clear that what he wants to convey through this discussion is that when a judgment comes into being, it is not ascertained as true. In other words, a judgment does not carry its own truth along with itself. So, he comes to the conclusion that knowledge is not self-evident and that all arguments put forth by the Mimamsakas do not appear to have cut much ice. Jayanta objects to the first alternative on the grounds that the truth of a judgment being an event in time, is an effect. As every effect has a cause different from itself, the truth of a judgment cannot be the effect and its own cause at the same time. The Mimamsakas may contend that the cause of a judgment does not exist apart from the conditions of its existence and that it does not depend upon an extra property. But, Jayanta refutes this argument stating that true judgment is produced by a cause having an extra good quality. What Jayanta wants to prove is that a true judgment is not produced by the bare cause of consciousness. As a false judgment is generated by a consciousness which is accompanied by some defect, so a true judgment is accompanied by some good property. Hence, Jayanta asserts that a cause which is assisted neither by a quality nor by a defect, does not exist. With regard to the contention of the Mimamsakas that the instrument of a true judgment does not depend upon anything else to discharge its own function, Jayanta points out that it is true that the collocation of condition produces its effect without depending upon anything else. But, it does not mean that the collocation is conscious of its own power. It, in fact, depends on some other factor to verify the truth of its efficiency. Jayanta further states that the contention of the Mimamsakas that a judgment does not depend upon outside factors to determine its own truth is wrong, since when the initial judgment arises in our mind we do not definitely know that it is true. It is only after some time that truth, say, of the apprehension of 'Blue' is ascertained. The factor that ascertains the truth of a judgment is the successful movement (*Pravrtticakrtyak*) that follows it. 34

III. THE VIEW OF ADVAITA-VEDANTA

The Advaita-Vedanta also believes in the intrinsic validity (*Svatah pramanya*) and extrinsic invalidity (*Paratah pramanya*) of knowledge. Knowledge is intrinsically valid and it is also known to be valid by its own intrinsic conditions. Cognition is self-revealed. A particular knowledge reveals not only its existence but its truth. The same set of conditions from which knowledge arises also constitutes its validity. Hence, knowledge and its validity are revealed simultaneously. In actual life, we do find that as soon as there is knowledge, it is accepted as valid, and we proceed to act immediately on the basis of that knowledge. It is, therefore, quite reasonable for us to believe that the truth of a knowledge and the knowledge of the truth of that knowledge are revealed to us by the same conditions which produce knowledge. Just as *Jnanatva* is natural to knowledge, in the same way *pramanya*, too, is natural to knowledge. When knowledge is vitiated, it is vitiated simply by conditions, external to itself. When conch-shell is perceived as silver, it is the *suktitva prakaraka avidya* which is causing the illusion. This *suktitva prakara avidya* is an adventitious positive entity (*agantuka bhava karana*).

The Advaita holds that the validity of a cognition is determined by the entire causal complex, and that the complex of conditions that give rise to the cognition determine its validity also.³⁵ No extrinsic factor is necessary to make the cognition valid once it has already arisen. The cognition and its validity are not produced successively by separate set of conditions.³⁶ The reason for this is that it is not possible to determine a uniform and single condition or standard of validity common to all cognitions.³⁷

The cognition cannot have the standard to present an object in all its aspects. For, one may cognise an object in all its parts, yet be mistaken. One may cognise only a few aspects of a thing and yet be correct. The illusion, "the conch is yellow", arises even when the conch is cognised in all its parts. Moreover sense-contact with a multitude of parts of the object cannot be the determinant of validity,

for, this is not possible in the case of colour and the self, for example, which have no parts. Again one may be mistaken even after seeing an object repeatedly; and another may be right even after seeing the object once. In the same way, it is possible that one gets the correct conclusion from the correct premises. Even though the probans or the reason for the conclusion may not be sound, the conclusion itself may prove to be right. Thus, it is found that it is not possible to point to a single uniform condition that accounts for validity in all cognitions. The distinction between the valid and invalid cognition is that the former arises without any defect, while the latter has a defect. Absence of defect is a condition in the validity of a cognition. This does not make the validity extrinsic for the reason that the validity can be said to be extrinsic only when there is dependence on some positive extraneous factor. Here, the absence of a defect is not a positive, but only a negative condition. Because invalid knowledge is caused by defects, it need not be held that valid knowledge is caused by absence of defects. The positive conditions that give rise to a knowledge are enough to ensure its validity. *Dosa-bhava* need not be postulated as an additional cause. Further, the very absence of defects means the validity of knowledge manifesting itself. Again, it means the absence of defects is the cause of valid knowledge; this will lead to infinite regress. The absence of defect, being considered here an operative cause, must have another absence of defect as its causal condition and so on.

To be intrinsically apprehended is to be apprehended without any intruding presence of defect and with all the causal complex that makes for the apprehension of the 'locus' of the validity, viz., the cognition itself or as the *Vedantaparibhasa* puts it, the cognitive psychosis. The perceiver of this psychosis is the witness-cognition (*saksi-jñanam*). In other words the witness-apprehender apprehends both the cognitive psychosis and its validity. To the argument that even invalidity could be apprehended in the same way as validity by apprehending witness, Dharmaraja answers that it is not possible because the extraneous

defect that determines the invalidity, not being brought in by the cognitive psychosis, is not apprehended by the witness.

Invalidity of cognition, therefore, is extrinsic, is determined by defects, and is inferred from the failure of the cognition to lead to successful action. Thus while the Naiyayika says that the validity and invalidity of a cognition are inferred from the results, the Advaita holds that invalidity alone is inferred extrinsically from the results.³⁸ With reference to the objection that if all cognitions are intrinsically valid, there is unintelligibility of the rise of doubt, the Advaita says that doubt arises where there is a defect present and the cognitive psychosis and its validity are not apprehended.³⁹ Here, then, intrinsic nature of the cognition consists in competency to be apprehended whenever there is the apprehender of its own locus.⁴⁰ Or, an alternative explanation will be that validity is not apprehended at all in respect of a cognition whose locus as linked up with the absence of defect is not apprehended because of the presence of a defect.

He who upholds the view that validity is extrinsic in nature objects to the final position of the Advaitism.⁴¹ What is the intrinsic nature of validity? The generation of validity cannot be from itself, for a thing cannot be its own cause. Nor is its generation possible from cognition, since cognition which is a quality (of the self) cannot be the material cause of its validity. Nor is it possible to say that validity is generated from the causal aggregate of cognition. Whether validity be regarded as an undefined attribute (*upadhi*) or as a generality (*jati*), its origination is an impossibility. It is thus: On the assumption that validity is an undefined attribute, what is called validity is the absolute non-existence of the sublation of a cognition which is not a case of memory. And for that no origination is possible, since it is of the nature of absolute non-existence. Even on the assumption that validity is a generality, its generation is unintelligible, since generality, which is eternal, cannot be generated. Nor may it be said that, being dependent on

the cognition generated by the causal aggregate of cognition, is the intrinsic nature of validity; for, in that case there is the contingency of intrinsicity even for invalidity which is equally the product of the causal aggregate of cognition. It may be said that the intrinsic nature of validity consists in its being generated by the causal aggregate of cognition alone, whereas invalidity is generated by the causal aggregate of cognition assisted by defects. But, this statement will not bear the test of reasoning. Whether validity be regarded as the product of the causal aggregate of cognition, which is assisted by the non-existence of defect or the product of the cause of cognition, which is not assisted by defect, there results the contingency of the view that validity is extrinsic in nature. In either case it is impossible to deny that in respect of validity the non-existence of defect is the cause. Nor may it be urged that because the non-existence of defects is or the nature of non-existence. In the first inference, the example is devoid of probandum, since it is not admitted that all cognitiveness is not generated by defects over and above the cause of cognition. Cognitiveness exists even in invalidity which is the product of defects. In the second inference there is inconsistency in respect of certitude, etc. In certitude is certainly other than invalidity and it exists in a sphere which is less than that of cognitiveness; but at the same time, it is not generated by the base cause of cognition. Further, the example is devoid of the probandum, since for him who advocates the extrinsic nature of validity there is not established even of perceptualness that it is generated by the bare cause of cognition. Thus, there is no evidence for validity being intrinsic, it cannot be a cause; for, that is intelligible even as it is intelligible that the non-existence of specific cognition of shell as shell is the cause of a delusion.

Not only is there the impossibility of defining the intrinsicity of validity. There is no evidence for it. Two inferences may be given as evidence for establishing the intrinsic nature of validity. Validity is generated by the bare cause of cognition, since, while being other than invalidity, it is the attribute of cognition alone, like cognitiveness; and it exists in a sphere which is less than that

of cognitiveness, like perceptualness. These two inferences are infected by defects. That validity depends on a cause which is other than the cause of cognition is proved on the ground that it is a product like pot. Thus, in respect of origination validity is not intrinsic.

Nor is validity intrinsic, says the opponent of Advaita, in respect of its cognition. What is called the intrinsic nature of validity? Is it the apprehension of the validity of the cognition of blue from the cognition of blue itself? Or, is it the apprehension of that validity from the bare cause of that cognition? Not the first. Since the cognition of blue cannot be a valid means of knowledge in respect of itself, the perception which manifests blue is capable of doing that because there is sense-contact with blue. But, as for manifesting its own validity, it is incapable, because sense-contact is impossible with itself. Further, does that perception apprehend the validity of cognition alone, or of its fruit also? Not the first. Since cognition is inferred from its fruit, it is not perceptible; and hence its validity is also imperceptible. Not the second. Since the fruit of cognition is self-luminous, it cannot be intelligible to the object of the external senses. Nor does the intrinsic nature of validity consist in the cognition of validity from the bare cause of cognition. If validity be apprehended from the bare cause of cognition, there is the contingency of the apprehension of validity even in the cognition of nacre-silver, it is later on removed through sublation. But in that case, there is the contingency of the extrinsic nature of validity, since the ascertainment of validity is bound up with the non-existence of a sublating cognition.

There is no evidence for validity being intrinsic in respect of its cognition. It is sought to establish the intrinsic nature of validity thus; 1) truth is known of its own accord since its origination is not other-dependent, like cognition, and 2) similarly, validity is known of its own accord, since, while being other than invalidity, it is the attribute of cognition alone, like cognitiveness. In the first of these inferences, the probans is not established for

him who advocates the theory that validity is extrinsic, and there is no example also. In the second inference, there is inconsistency in the case of the attribute of the bare cognition, there is not the character of being apprehended by the bare causal aggregate which apprehends cognition. That validity is extrinsic in respect of cognition is established by Udayana in his *Nyayakusumanjali* through syllogistic reasoning. Validity is extrinsically known, since at the stage non-recognition is doubted, like invalidity.⁴¹ Thus, the doctrine that validity is intrinsic is objected to by those who believe in the extrinsic nature of validity.

As against the objections detailed in the preceding paragraphs, the Advaitism defends its position by defining what it means by the intrinsic nature of validity. While being generated by the cause of cognition, not being generated by anything other than that is the intrinsic nature of validity.⁴² The evidence which establishes the validity of this position is the inference: truth, while being generated by the cause of cognition, is not generated by anything other than that, since it is other than invalidity, like cloth, etc.⁴³ That the absence of defect is not a cause of validity as we have seen; and how the view that validity is extrinsic is defective, we have observed in the refutation of the Naiyayika and the Buddhistic theories. Invalidity, however, is extrinsic, we have said, since it is prompted by defects. Thus, the position of Advaitism is stable and safe, that validity is intrinsic and invalidity extrinsic.

SOME OBSERVATIONS :

The Advaita-Vedanta view of truth as uncontradicted experience logically implies the coherence theory of truth. That some experience is uncontradicted means that it is different from the contradicted. But, to be different from contradicted means to belong to the body of coherent knowledge. We do not and cannot rightly judge an experience to be uncontradicted unless we relate it to other experiences and find that it is congruous with them. A dream experience is wrongly judged by the dreamer to be uncontradicted and true, because he cannot relate it to his

waking experience. It cannot be said that a dream experience is true for the time being and becomes false afterwards. What is once true is always true. A dream experience may sometimes be judged to be true, but it is really false for all time. And its falsity appears from its incoherence with waking experience. Hence, we are to say that an experience is really uncontradicted when it is related to other experiences and is found to be coherent with them.

It may be urged against this view that truth consists in correspondence and is tested by coherence, if knowledge is true when it corresponds with facts, and if the correspondence cannot be directly known, then the truth of every knowledge must be tested by its coherence with others. This, however, means that there can be no end of the process of providing knowledge and, therefore, no final proof of any knowledge. To solve this difficulty we must admit that there is at least one case in which knowledge is, by itself known to be true. We have such a case in self-consciousness. While truth of all other knowledge is to be tested by coherence the truth of self-consciousness is self-evident and requires no extraneous test. The self is a self-manifesting reality. Hence the contents of our mind or the self are manifested by themselves. They are at once existent facts and contents of consciousness. To become conscious of the contents of one's mind is just to make them explicit. What we are here conscious of are not outside or beyond consciousness. The state of knowledge and the object of knowledge being identical, we cannot strictly speak of a correspondence of the one with the other. When we feel pain or know something, or resolve to do anything, we may be conscious of feeling it, or knowing it, or resolving to do it. What we are here conscious of as objects are the objects themselves as they become explicit or conscious of themselves. Similarly, necessary truths and a priori principles like the laws of thought, logical and mathematical truths seem to have self-evident validity. The reason for this is that these truths are or express the forms and contents of

of the nature of our own thought and consciousness, and in knowing them consciousness knows itself, i.e. its own forms. They are at once modes and objects of consciousness. In any judgment or knowledge of them, the content and object of consciousness are the same and directly known to be the same. Such knowledge is, therefore, not only true, but known to be true by itself. Hence we admit that the truth of self-consciousness is self-evident, while all other truths are evidently by external tests like coherence and pragmatic utility or verification.

It is true that in European philosophy, knowledge in its strict sense is always taken to mean true belief. But, truth or validity is not regarded as intrinsic to all knowledge independently of all external conditions. The different tests of truth have only relative value and contribute the conception of truth and its evaluation according to their emphasis on the different conditions that enter into the situation of truth. Since truth retains always a theoretical character, the other theories of truth which all together ignorant seem to us to have little or no value in the consideration of the problem of truth. Since truth is, and never made, it refers to being and never to doing its structure can be explained and analysed by correspondence and coherence. But for the apprehension of truth we have to fall back upon self evidence or intuition.

An examination of Descartes criterion of truth, namely, self-evidence, which is due to its being clear and distinct, will reveal that for clearness and distinctness. he ultimately appeals to the veracity of God. Without entering into the question whether Descartes renders himself open in this connection to the charge of circular reasoning, we may say that the criterion of clearness and distinctness or self-evidence is evidently extrinsic in that it ultimately proceeds from God's veracity and is not an integral part of the epistemic ground of truth itself. God makes truth to be what it is. Ideas and judgments are not ultimately valid by themselves on their own account, but are made so on theological grounds.

This is 'an account of Descartes' criterion of truth' so far as it is gathered from the general trend of methods and meditations and principles of philosophy, and the traditional view that Descartes is an advocate of self-evidence as the criterion of truth seems to be based on his two works. But, if one is curious enough to go through his other work regulations, along with the mentioned works, one will notice that Descartes' full meaning of the ideal of knowledge would make him rather an advocate of the coherence theory of truth to which his self-evidence theory leads him. Adamson, and following him Jachim, as also Norman Kemp Smith, agree in their interpretation of Descartes as an upholder of the theory of coherence rather than that of self-evidence pure and simple. The general trend of argument of these interpreters is that immediate apprehension of the indubitable, an intuition, is the condition precedent to the truth or judgment. Descartes thinks that what we intuit as self-evident is a simple idea or proposition. But, the idea or proposition though simple is not without inner distinction, that is, not without elements or constituent ideas. Such a simple idea or proposition may in fact be expanded into a hypothetical judgment. In which the antecedent necessarily implies the consequent but not vice versa. For instance, Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* may be expanded into the hypothetical judgment, 'itself-consciousness, then existence', but not conversely, that is, if existence then self-consciousness. So $2+2=4$ is another instance of intuition which may be expanded into the hypothetical judgment if 2 be added to 2 there must be 4, but not conversely because if there be 4, it does not follow that it is necessarily a case of addition of $2+2$ for it may also be a case of addition of 3 and 1. Thus, the elements in the content of an 'intuition' are cohered by the immediate necessity which binds consequent to antecedent in a hypothetical judgment of the kind explained.

But, the content as a whole is grasped intuitively, or immediately, as an indubitable self-evident datum. Such self-evident indubitable truths constitute the foundation on which the structure of scientific and philosophical knowledge

is built. They are the principles, from which the whole system of demonstrated and demonstrable truths must be derived".^{4,5} Thus, Joachim thinks that Descartes gives us a system of truths which has rigorous logical coherence from the self-evident datum, so that it forms a net-work or chains of propositions, each of which is grasped by the intellect as the necessary consequent of a link or links intuited as indubitable truths. Joachim of course does not give Descartes the full credit of an advocate of the theory of coherence, but only says that an interpretation of the coherence theory may be put up on Descartes' position as a whole, though Descartes does not go far enough to give us the cardinal principle of coherence which lies in the organisation and not in mere colligation or linking of propositions even if they are intuitively grasped. We can conclude then that although a careful collation of Descartes' writing in his different works may lead one to attribute to him an inchoate conception of the coherence theory of truth, yet one would hesitate to interpret Descartes a full-fledged advocate of the theory of coherence for simple reason that this ideal of knowledge does not mean a really coherent system of truths, but only a system in which different self-evident data stand out as relatively self-dependent truths linked or colligated together but unaltered by their position within the whole.

The theory of coherence perhaps goes farthest into the problem in so far as it strikes the very key note in the universe as a whole, in which facts and ideas and their accordance are never isolated from one another, but are necessary aspects or elements which form themselves into more or less co-ordinated system within the whole. Its importance lies in the fact that it establishes the essential character of the intellectual or logical structure of the human constitution, exposes the inessential or accidental contributions of the psychological and the biological, and points to the metaphysical structure of our constitution. In plain language, for the the problem of truth logical consistency among the elements of experience is certainly necessary, but it cannot stop there and must go beyond and refer to reality as a whole for its comprehensiveness. Self-evidence

or intuition seems to us to play a very valuable part in the situation of truth. When we say so, we do not mean that self-evidence by itself is the best substitute for all other theories of the nature and test of truth, but what we mean is that self-evidence is involved in some form or other, wherever we apprehend and evaluate truth. We are of opinion that truth is and is never made and for the apprehension of truth that is, self-evidence or intuition is the only organ. The truth of presented data, whatever may be other conditions involved in their presentation, is immediately grasped by an act of intuition. The pragmatist, according to whom truth is made by conducive fulfilment, cannot escape the contributions of self-evidence in so far as his very conative activity presupposes intuitive knowledge or correspondence between his idea and the object or fact he effectively deals with. The pragmatist must admit, in spite of himself, some sort of prior correspondence between his ideas and objects upon which he directs his conative activity. Now he cannot account for this incipient correspondence except by an intuitive knowledge of it.

There is however, a traditional objection against the theory of self-evidence that it reduces truth to be something private and personal. It is urged that a truth may be self-evident to one but not so to others. It, however, appears that the objection has arisen from the misunderstanding of the term self-evidence. A truth that is self-evident does not mean evident to a self. It rather means that it contains within itself the conditions of its own validity. So the validity of the self-evident truth is not a private affair but is imbedded in its very elements, it is not made by any cogniser of the truth; in fact, validity is never made by a cognition but is only revealed, as it is there in the object, by immediate knowledge or intuition. If this is kept clear in view that self-evidence theory does not make truth private or personal, we must remember also that what is self-evident is, as Descartes calls it indubitable, what is indubitable cannot be subjective and the indubitable character of truth means that truth has an objective basis. Now this objective basis can be furnished in some case by

accordance and in other case by coherence. We see then that if self-evidence in the sense of immediate knowledge does not constitute but only reveals what is indubitable, the objection of subjectively, as is often laid against it, is altogether misdirected.

Another objection against the self-evidence theory of truth is urged on the ground that the principle of non-contradiction which governs it leads not only to a negative conception of truth but to another conception; the understanding of which helps the understanding of truth. The principle of non-contradiction as applied to truth will mean that 'truth is not truth' and 'truth is not false'. Now we can refute the objection by pointing out that it is purely formal, in the sense that we cling here to the form which the principle of non-contradiction gives us when fully expounded. But, it must be remembered that non-contradiction is to identify only in another form, for a thing which is identical with itself cannot allow its contradictory. The content of the principles of identity and of non-contradiction is identically the same. Hence, when it is urged by the objectionist that the conception of truth governed by the principle of non-contradiction only in its form and not in its content, and very well gives us truth as it is in its positive aspect, and we can thus avoid the negative definition of truth, and the alleged reference to the other term 'false' with negation attached to it, it only brings out the logical implication of the same positive conception of truth. All negation, be it remembered, presupposes affirmation. We see then that the foregone objection is only a formal one and does not stand, when the principle of non-contradiction is understood in the light of the principle of identity which has identically the same content as the principle of non-contradiction.

CHAPTER IV

SYSTEMS OF SANKHYA AND BUDDHISM ON PRAMANYAVADA

We have so far undertaken an exhaustive account of the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsa-Vedanta positions—the principal contestants of the *Pramanyavada* in Indian Philosophy. The present Chapter is meant for a critical consideration of the Buddhistic and the Sankhya stand points visa-vis the problem of *pramanya*. It is interesting to find that Buddhism and Sankhya stand in sharp contrast to the Nyaya and Mimamsa systems as far as the origination and ascertainment of invalidity is concerned. Whereas for both the Nyaya and Mimamsa systems falsity of cognition for its origin and ascertainment does require certain extraneous cause, other than the causes of the origin of its cognition, for both the Sankhya and Buddhistic systems invalidity of cognition, for its origin and ascertainment does not require any external cause other than the causees required for the constitution and apprehension of its cognition. That is to say as far as invalidity is concerned the Nyaya and Mimamsa positions advocate *Paratah pramanyavada* and the Sankhya Buddhistic systems uphold *Svatah pramanyavada*. This is certainly a striking point of contrast between them. In sum, while the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Mimamsa uphold *Paratah pramanyavada*, the Buddhism and the Sankhya advocate *Svatah pramanyavada*, in respect of the origin (*utpatti*) and ascertainment (*jnapati*) of Error.

Coming to the crux of the problem, namely, as to how the truth or validity of knowledge originates and is

ascertained to be so, it is interesting to find that the partners in the theory of intrinsic invalidity of knowledge beg to differ from each other and join hands with the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsakas. The Buddhism advocates the extrinsic theory of validity and the Sankhya is consistent with its avowed theory of *Satkaryavada* to toe the line of Mimamsaka theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge. It may therefore be seen that the Buddhism and Sankhya are merely reflecting the attitudes of the Nyaya and Mimamsaka positions in the production and ascertainment of all valid cognition. They may be treated more or less as mini partners in the *Paratah - Svatah pramanya* controversy of production and apprehension of valid knowledge so hotly contested and debated by the Naiyayikas and Mimamsa philosophers.

It is in view of these interesting facts, a discussion of the Buddhistic and Sankhya positions of *Pramanyavada* gains considerable importance. It remains to be seen in course of this Chapter whether the Buddhistic and Sankhya arguments on the extrinsic validity of knowledge, have anything to add to armours of the extrinsic and to the intrinsic theories of validity of Nyaya and Mimamsa schools respectively. Another point of great curiosity is to look into the aspect of the problem whether any real opposition in the *Paratah - Svatah* controversy of *Pramanyavada* could be drawn between Naiyayikas and Sankhya for whom both truth and error are together either extrinsic alone or intrinsic alone both in respect of origin and ascertainment or between any two or more systems which adopt different and independent criteria for truth and falsity in respect of their origin and apprehension. In the discussion of the tests of truth in Western Philosophy, no distinction is made between truth and error and the question of the origin and ascertainment is for all the theoretical purposes is only with regard to truth. But in Indian Philosophy, a clear cut distinction is made between truth and error and the question of origin and ascertainment is equally applicable to truth and falsity. It is accidental whether any particular system applies the same

test both to truth and falsity (as Nyaya and Sankhya) or different tests to truth and falsity (as Mimamsa and Buddhism). All this is only one side of the issue. Another equally interesting point of investigation would be to ascertain whether any two systems agreeing in respect of truth would afford to differ in respect of falsity. This is best illustrated in the case of the Nyaya and Buddhistic systems in respect of the extrinsic theory of validity and the Mimamsa and the Sankhya systems in respect of the intrinsic theory of validity.

THE SANKHYA THEORY :

To the Sankhya is attributed the doctrine that all true cognitions are true by themselves (*Svatha pramanya*) and all false cognitions are by themselves invalid (*Svatah pramanya*). A knowledge is both made true or false and known to be true or false by the conditions of the knowledge itself. Validity and invalidity cannot be produced in any knowledge extraneously, but must belong to *ab initio*. The one is as much intrinsic or internally conditioned as the other, hence, knowledge is valid or invalid on its own account and as such, it must be self-evident.

The view of the Sankhyas - that both truth and error are intrinsic - is based on their theory of cause which is known as the *Satkaryavada* or the doctrine that the effect is pre-existent in the cause. There is no production of anything *de novo*. What is called causation is the manifestation of what is in a latent condition. The effect exists potentially in the cause; and the causal operation (*karakavyapara*) makes patent what is latent in the cause. It renders that manifest (*avirbhuta*) which was previously is an unmanifested state (*tirohita*). This is how the Sankhyas think;¹ that which is itself non-existent, like the horn of a hare, cannot be accomplished.² In the view that an effect is generated *de novo*, it is not possible to restrict the capacity to originate a particular effect to a particular cause. What restriction is there that a pot is produced out of clay alone and not out of water, since the non-existence of pot is common both clay and in water? Thus in the view that the effect

is non-existent in the cause, it is impossible to determine the material cause of any product. Moreover, of the three kinds of causes, the instrumental or efficient cause (*nirvartakarana*), the material cause (*upadana or samavayi karan*) and the non-inherent cause (*asamavayi karan*), it is difficult to say which is the material cause. If it be said that where the effect exists there the material cause is to be found, then it amounts to the relinquishment of *asatkaryavada*. The Sankhya also admits that the effect exists in subtle form in the cause. It may be objected that if the effect is pre-existent in the cause, there results futility of causal operation. But it is not so. The causal operation has the fruit of manifesting what is unmanifested in the cause. The effects, though existent in their causes, are unmanifest prior to the operation of the causal correlate. Hence the operation of the causal correlates is fruitful and not futile. If the causal operation be for the sake of manifesting what is unmanifest, what is the significance, it may be asked, of such statements as : The cause produces the effect. 'The product originates from the cause' etc. If there be no difference, it may be urged, between the manifesting of a hot by a lamp and the origination of a pot by the potter? Manifestation, reply the sankhyas, is of two kinds. When, in respect of an object whose form is not obstructed but whose cognition by a person is obstructed, there is the removal of the obstruction, then we have an instance of the first kind of manifestation. For a pot enshrouded in darkness there is no obstruction in respect of its shape. The removal of darkness manifests the pot; but it does not give it shape. The second variety of manifestation is the removal of the obstacle which obstructs the form of the object from manifesting itself. In clay the form of pot is obstructed by the form which is natural to clay. The removal of the form of clay which obstructs the form of pot from manifesting itself is what is popularly known as the production or the organisation of pot. A change in the collocation of atoms in the cause is what is regarded as production of the effect. Nothing new is added to the cause in order to produce an effect. The same atoms that constituted the cause appear

in the effect in a different arrangement. The pot is not different from clay except in respect of its shape. Hence origination or production is only a mode of manifestation.⁴ Therefore, an effect already exists in its material cause and that which does not exist can never be accomplished. Thus truth and error are inherent in knowledge. They cannot be brought about by any extraneous means. Truth and error depend on the same causes, which produce knowledge and not any additional factor. For e.g, merit or demerit, they are revealed by knowledge itself. We need not go beyond knowledge for the ascertainment of its truth and falsehood.⁵ If validity or invalidity does not exist intrinsically in the cognition, it can never be produced or ascertained by any extraneous means as no body is able to get smell from fire or oil from sand ⁶

The position of Sankhya is unique among orthodox systems because it has not only asserted the self-validity of knowledge but also held that invalidity is intrinsic in knowledge. Both validity and invalidity are inherent in knowledge in regard to origination. Both *jnana* and *ajnana* are inherent in *buddhi*. *Ajnana* is not negation of knowledge but it is confused knowledge due to non-discrimination between two different things. The confusion in perception, is due to improper suppression of *tamoguna* which is an ingredient of knowledge. *Sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* which are necessary for generation of knowledge, are also the factors which generate validity and invalidity by means of proper and improper suppression of *tamoguna* by the *sattva-guna*.

When the conch shell is truly revealed in knowledge, there is *sadvastuvrtti* in the intellect, which is the *pramana* and the illumination of this *vrtti* by consciousness of the soul is the *prama*. *Pramanya* of this *prama* is not generated by any adventitious positive entity. In the case of valid knowledge, there is the arousal of *sat indriya* and *sat buddhi vrtti* due to excessive flow of *tamoguna*. Hence, the knowledge (i.e. revelation of *vrtti*) is valid. The supposition of *suktitva prakaraka avidya* is not necessary to explain

the Sankhya position. This is because in the opinion of the Sankhya it is the excessive flow of *tamoguna* of the *buddhi* that functions as a *jnana* or *avidya* in producing invalidity in knowledge. So, the generating condition of invalidity is inherent in the conditions which are causing knowledge (*jnana karana samagri*). Here, one may rise an objection by saying that the excess of *tamoguna*, being the cause of invalidity, cannot be inherent in the generating conditions of knowledge; because the excess flow means that there is something more than the knowledge producing conditions. Hence, this excess flow of *tamoguna* is something outside the generating conditions of knowledge. *Apramanya* should, therefore, be regarded as *paratah*. This objection, too cannot stand. If the excess flow of *tamas*, is to be regarded as a condition external to the generating conditions of knowledge, then the excess flow of *sattvaguna*, needed for producing validity in knowledge; may also be regarded as external to the knowledge producing conditions. In that case both validity and invalidity are to be regarded as *para-tah* in regard to their origination in knowledge.

In the case of invalid knowledge, like the knowledge of silver in conch shell, the *vrtti* of this (*Idam vrtti*) is *pratyaksa vrtti* and this is also *Sadvastu vrtti*. The *vrtti* in the form of silver (*rajatakara vrtti*) however, originates due to combined operation of *rajatavasana* and non-discrimination (*vivekagraha*) between 'conch shell' and 'silver'. Here, two *vrttis* are generated simultaneously; but as there is the reflection of the same consciousness through two *vrttis*, there is the generating of one cognition in the form. 'This is silver'. Here, the defects are *rajatavasana* and non-discrimination between the conch shell and the silver. These are positive but not adventitious. These are the effects of excess flow of *tamoguna*. The Sankhya school has admitted *tadatmya* between the cause and the effect, *dharma* and *dharmi* (quality and possessor of quality). So, *vivekagraha* and the desire for the object (which is not present on the occasion) are non-different from the *tamoguna* of knowledge which is a disposition of *buddhi*. The result is that

all the factors necessary for generating invalidity in knowledge are also inherent in the generating conditions of knowledge. *Suktitva prakaraka avidya* of the Advaita Vedanta and contact with a small number of parts of the object of perception, defective, *linga paramarsa*, untrustworthiness etc., are all conditions external to knowledge producing conditions. Hence in the opinion of in the same way *pramanya*, too, is natural to knowledge, when Advaita Vedanta and the Nyaya, invalidity in knowledge is externally caused. According to Sankhya, however, both *rajatavasana* and *vivekagraha* are inherent in knowledge. Hence, invalidity is *svatah* in regard to its origin

Regarding the second question (i.e. how validity or invalidity is known) we can say that the natural tendency of man is to accept any and every kind of knowledge as valid as soon as it arises. Hence, in the case of valid knowledge, there is no extra factor (other than factors needed for the generation of knowledge and its validity) to make its validity known to the knower. The intrinsic conditions which produce a valid cognition, also produce the knowledge of the validity of the cognition. These intrinsic conditions are : 1. *Indriya vrtti* due to *karana vyapara*, 2. *Buddhi vrtti*, 3. No confused perception of *sadasat vrtti* as one, due to excess flow of *sattvaguna*.

When these factors operate, valid *vrtti* or valid knowledge is produced and is also immediately known as valid. It is because the validity is known immediately by the same set of conditions that the cognizer proceeds to act as soon as a particular cognition arises in his mind.

Regarding the knowledge of invalidity, however we cannot say that the factors which are responsible for the generation of the knowledge and its invalidity are also the factors which make its invalidity known to the cognizer. In the case of invalid knowledge the intrinsic conditions which produce knowledge and its invalidity are as follows : 1. *Indriyavrtti* due to operation of *karanas*, 2. *Buddhivrtti* of an unreal object along with a real one due to the awakening of a desire for the unreal object, 3. *Vivekagraha* of the real and the unreal.

Both *vivekagraha* and the desire for the unreal object are the effects of the *tamoguna* resulting from the improper overpowering of *tamoguna* by the *sattvaguna*. As such these two factors are non-different from the *tamoguna* which is in excess. Knowledge is always produced when the *tamoguna* of the *buddhi* is overpowered by the *sattvaguna*. In fact, *adhyavasaya* or knowledge stands for the proper suppression of *tamas* brought about by the operation of the *karanas*. If the suppression of *tamas* is done in a proper manner, there is excess flow of *sattva* and the consequent arousal of knowledge and its validity. If the suppression is not done properly, then there is the excess of *tamoguna* and the consequent origination of invalidity in knowledge. We have already seen that excess cannot be regarded as external to knowledge producing conditions, because in that case both validity and invalidity will become *paratah*.

THE BUDDHISTIC THEORY :

TRUTH IS EXTRINSIC AND FALSITY INTRINSIC :

The Buddhism generally accepts that a valid cognition and its means are one and the same. That is, it does not distinguish between the process of cognition and the result (*phala*) of cognition. This view holds particularly true of the Vijñānavādins, according to whom the object is only the form (*ākāra*) which our consciousness assumes and there is no object independent of our consciousness. The Vaibhāsikas say that the form which our consciousness assumes is the same as that of the object, which has, however, an existence of own and the validity (*pramāṇya*) of our consciousness lies in this identity, which becomes the validifying instrument of cognition and which is at the same time not different from cognition. In the sense, that the form of cognition are not different, the process and result are identical. For the Sautrāntikas, according to whom the form of the object and the form which consciousness assumes are similar, but not identical, cognition (*pramā*) and its result (*phala*) are identical, for the form of cognition itself. The Mādhyamikas do not have any objection to accept the Vijñānavāda position at empirical level.

Regarding the problem whether cognition is valid by itself or is made valid by something else, the view of the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhasikas are not available. But, all the schools maintain that truth is known through action, as every object is meant to serve some purpose and we can know whether or not it serves that purpose through activity. The world is created for activity (*karma*) by ethical property (*samskara*) generated by activity. So, the truth of our cognition, so far empirical reality goes, can be known finally through activity. This is common, as mentioned already, to all the Indian schools except Carvakas.

The Madhyamika and the Vijñānavāda contributed their answers to the question whether cognition is valid by itself, by saying that all cognitions by itself is false (*svataḥapramāṇyam*). According to the Madhyamika, neither consciousness nor the object is real, but it is only an appearance. Yet, in this world we experience them. They are, therefore, false; and our cognitions presenting objects are invalid by themselves. According to the Vijñānavāda, although our consciousness is real, the object it presents is false, cognitions, therefore, are essentially invalid. Indeed, the Vijñānavādins do not hold that consciousness that knows itself only, but not an object, is invalid, such a consciousness ultimate *Vijñāna*.

But, if all cognitions are false, why do we say some of our cognitions are false and the others true? Why and how do we draw the distinction between truth and falsity? The answer is that those cognitions that lead to expected results in action. *Arthakriyakarīs* are true and those that do not are false. This distinction between truth and falsity is only an empirical distinction not the one made from the absolute point of view. The world of becoming and action consists of Being and Non-Being. The nature of being is to serve the expected purpose,⁷ and of Non-Being to fail to serve that purpose.⁸ This view belongs to Vijñānavāda and is acceptable to the Madhyamika also. The principle of non-contradiction (*arisaṃvādita*) is reduced by the Buddhism to the pragmatic criterion (*arthakriyakarita*), which

is regarded as the criterion and definition of Being (*sat*) itself. Since cognitions which are originally false by themselves, are made valid by their purposeful serving of our cognitions valid. Thus cognitions are true because of something other than themselves (*Paratah pramanyam*)

According to the Buddhism to whom all knowledge is invalid by its very nature, the validity of knowledge consists in its capacity to produce successful action. Hence, prior to any successful activity every knowledge is to be treated as invalid. We cannot say that validity belongs to knowledge, simply because it has come to be, or has appeared. In that case, error will have to be regarded as valid knowledge, because error too appears as a form of knowledge. That knowledge which has been produced does not necessarily mean that there is in it a true cognition of the object, since that knowledge is liable to contradiction. Hence, we are to say that from the point of view of genesis of falsehood it is natural and truth is adventitious. Falsehood is nothing but an absence or negation of truth. Falsehood is a non-entity, and just has a hare's horn, which is a non-entity, cannot be produced by anything, so falsehood too cannot be produced by anything. The Mimamsaka view that falsehood is generated by the defects of the cause of knowledge is wrong, because that which is a non-entity cannot have a cause for its origin. A non-entity has no origin and hence it is causeless. Therefore, falsehood is present in knowledge from the very beginning, while truth, being a positive entity like a jar, is produced in knowledge extraneously by a cause, viz., the presence of merits in the source, just as a jar is produced by such causes as the clay, the potter etc. By merit or excellence is meant the purity of the sense-organs and other sources of knowledge. When the three *dhatus* residing in sense-organs are in a state of equilibrium the sense-organs are said to be pure and then they generate truth in the knowledge derived from them. If truth were natural to knowledge, who could deny the truth of dream - cognitions? So, it is falsehood that is natural and it is not generated by defects. Even when

falsehood is seen to follow from defects of the source, as when the cognition of a yellow conch is seen to arise from jaundice, it is not actually the defects that cause falsehood. What happens in such cases is that defects being present, merits disappear; consequently, truth cannot be produced and thus falsehood which is inherent persists in cognition. Defects or demerits include those belonging to the cogniser, e.g. jaundice and those belonging to objects, e.g. minuteness, distance etc. Excellences or merits are : the healthiness of sense-organs, reliability of a person, nearness of an object and so on. Defects are not active in producing falsehood. Their function is merely to remove merits. Merits alone are the direct cause of truth, and in their absence - which is seen in two ways, viz., when demerits are present, and when either the substratum of merits is absent, as in the case of the Vedas which are supposed by the Mimamsaka to be authorless, or it is not functioning as in the case of dreams, when sense-organs stop their operations - there is no production of truth. It is an error on the part of the Mimamsakas to suppose that falsehood is caused by demerits. The fact is that demerits merely remove merits. A further proof of the fact that falsehood is not produced by demerits is found in the case of non-cognition. The Mimamsaka cities positive and negative concomitance between demerits and falsehood as the proof of the former being the cause of the latter. But this is wrong, because this concomitance, though true in the case of illusion and doubt, fails in the case of non-cognition, which is accepted as false and at the same time as not depending on demerits. But, solely on the absence of the cause of cognition. Therefore, the right conclusion that is forced upon is that falsehood is uncaused and natural, while truth is caused and adventitious.⁹

The Naiyayika rejects the Buddhistic view of intrinsic invalidity on the ground that it cannot account for unsuccessful practical activity (*Pravṛttivisaṃvāda*). If the invalidity of knowledge be self-evident, why should a man run after the false, knowing that it is truth of knowledge consists in its capacity to produce successful action? Hence, prior

to any successful activity every knowledge is to be treated as false. We cannot say that truth belongs to knowledge simply because it has come to be, or has appeared. It is a matter of common experience that the knowledge of an object arises some times when the object is not actually present and sometimes when it is actually present. The knowledge of silver, for instance, arises when there is actually silver and sometimes when there is no silver. But some other object like silver such as a piece of nacre. Therefore, it is precarious to say that silver is actually present simply on the ground that its knowledge has been produced. Hence, the truth of knowledge cannot be ascertained by the knowledge itself. Truth can be ascertained only when it is seen that knowledge leads to successful activity. Successful activity is the result of true knowledge and the truth of the latter is inferred from the former. When a jar is cognised, the cognition by itself does not give the assurance that the jar is actually present. But, later on when we approach the object and find that we can fetch water in it or cook food, when it is ascertained that the cognition was truly of a jar. Again, even when there is no knowledge of practical success truth can also be ascertained by the subsequent knowledge that the cause of knowledge possesses excellence, or by knowing that the knowledge agrees with another, knowledge of the same object. So, the truth of knowledge is determined by some other knowledge and not by the same knowledge because knowledge by itself is always doubtful, on which account falsehood is inherent in it. All cognitions lack certitude at the time of their origin. Absence of truth is their inherent characteristic.

From a sceptical or rather critical stand-point, the Buddhism takes all knowledge as intrinsically false and treats truth as an extrinsic character which knowledge comes to have by way of connotive verification (*pravrtti-samarthya*). According to it, the truth of knowledge is constituted by successful activity. Hence it follows that prior to successful activity knowledge is not-true. When any knowledge leads to successful activity, we know that

it is not not-true, i.e. it is true. So the Buddhism gives a negative definition of truth as what is not false (*avisamvadakam*) and concludes that falsity is intrinsic and truth extrinsic to knowledge.¹⁰

The Buddhistic theory coincides partly with the Nyaya in respect of extrinsic nature of truth. But, even here, there is a fundamental difference between the Nyaya and the Buddhistic theory of extrinsic validity. We may compare here the *pravrttisamvada* of the Naiyayika with the *arthakriyakaritva* of the Buddhism. For the Buddhism that knowledge is valid, which is conducive to fruitful activity. But, the Naiyayika maintains that truth consists in correspondence (*samvaditva*) and satisfaction, i.e. objective verification and subjective utility. "Correspondence to Reality" as Prof. R D. Ranade puts it, "is a constitutive character of truth, while satisfaction comes in only when it is to be tested". Correspondence is thus the ratio essendi of truth while utility is only ratio cognoscendi. Truth may exist even if it is not put to practical use. Practicality is just a means of subsequent verification. Moreover, whenever a person has the knowledge of practical efficiency during his waking state he finds that there is perfect correspondence of his knowledge with its object. As he has previous experience of discord between such as experience and its object, the doubt does not arise in his mind. And when there is no doubt, there is no need of ascertaining of the truth of the concerned judgment. It is perhaps the Jaina thinker Akalanika who holds that the truth of the knowledge of an object, which has been repeatedly cognised is self-evident and that the truth of a judgment which is not repeatedly cognised is extrinsically determined. But, Jayanta takes pity on him saying that this proud fellow does not mean what he says. Actually repetition gives us an opportunity to ascertain our experience. So, the truth of such repeated observations also is determined by the successful movement. It is not in any way self-evident. Jayanta further states that verification is not an endless process because the knowledge of successful activity does not stand in need of further verification. All knowledge is a means to some practical

end and hence, it needs to be tested in order to attain practical success. The knowledge of the result, on the other hand, ends in itself, not leading to further result and hence, there arises no need to test its truth.

The Naiyayika rejects the Buddhistic view of intrinsic invalidity on the ground that it cannot account for unsuccessful practical activity (*pravrttisamvada*). If the invalidity of knowledge be self-evident, why should a man run after the false, knowing that it is false. Hence, there cannot be any practical reaction in connection with illusion. Again, if the invalidity of knowledge be due to its defect in the conditions of knowledge and be known through contradiction, it cannot be held that it is intrinsically conditioned and self-evident. That invalidity is due to certain extra-conditions (*karanadosa*) must be admitted. Invalidity is not merely the absence of validity, but a positive character of such forms of knowledge as doubt and error. Hence, it must be due to some positive conditions other than the causes of knowledge. As such invalidity is not intrinsic to knowledge.¹¹ Criticising the Buddhistic view Parthasarathi says that falsehood is not merely an absence of truth. The Buddhistic view that falsehood is a non-entity and hence, not produced by any cause is based on a wrong conception of falsehood. Falsehood is not prior negation of certitude as the Buddhism seems to hold. It is true that prior negation of something is uncaused and the view that falsehood is uncaused might have been true of falsehood were merely prior negation of certitude. In the case of an illusion, e.g. that of silver in shell, which is a form of false knowledge the perceiver is as confident of the presence of silver as in the case of real silver - false knowledge is positive in character. It represents something as a different thing due to certain vitiating factors, and this is known from positive and negative concomitance. The knowledge which is doubtful in its very origin also is known to arise from certain defects. As for non-cognition, it is obviously due to the absence of causes which give rise to cognition. But,

true in the case of illusion and doubt. Therefore, falsehood is not uncaused and natural, but is caused by defects or vitiating conditions.

The school of Purva Mimamsa rejects the Buddhistic theory of extrinsic truth. The Buddhism says that truth is caused by excellence and where there are no excellences there is no truth. But, if it were true, there could be no iota of truth in the cognition of a white conch as yellow or in that of a shell as silver, which is produced by the visual sense devoid of excellences in the cognition of a yellow conch the element of conchiness is true, though yellowness is false. In the illusion of silver in shell too the cognition is true in respect of such general features as brightness, a triangular shape etc. The elements of truth in the aforesaid cognitions are evidently caused not by excellences, for there are no excellences, but by merely the conditions of knowledge. Moreover, it is purity of the sense-organs etc., that is meant when the Buddhism talks of excellences. But, if this be so, then excellences become equivalent to absence of blemishes; and the Mimamsaka is not opposed to this view, because it does not interfere with the truth of the Veda. The Veda has no author and to the question of the presence of blemishes in its source does not arise. In fact truth is not caused by the presence of excellences or the absence of blemishes in the generating conditions of knowledge, but it is natural or intrinsic to knowledge - whenever excellences are seen in the cause of knowledge they are not directly operative in producing truth. They merely serve as a means of removing blemishes. The presence of blemishes interferes in the production of true knowledge. But, when they are expelled by the presence of excellences they cannot offer any interferences. Excellences are not directly the cause of truth.¹² Thus, when it is not established that truth depends on the excellences or soundness of the source of knowledge, the inference of truth, from excellences has no justification.

Buddhism may say that knowledge is not true to be positively false at the movement of its origin but that

so long as its truth is not ascertained we remain in doubt about its real character and as doubt is a form of invalid knowledge all knowledge must be invalid intrinsically. But this scepticism is quite unfounded and logically it can never be terminated. To say that the knowledge of the truth depends on the knowledge of soundness of its source is beset with difficulties which know no end. If the truth of a cognition is not self-established the truth of the cognition of the soundness of its source is equally non-established by itself. To ascertain the truth of the former we have to ascertain the truth of the latter which again is to be ascertained extraneously in the same way and so on without coming to any end of the process. Thus, scepticism about the first cognition will never be removed ¹³

As the knowledge of the soundness of generating conditions cannot establish the truth of a cognition, so the knowledge of successful activity too is incompetent for that purpose. If the cognition of a jar is supposed to be unable to establish its own truth on the ground that such a cognition is seen to arise even in the absence of a jar, then the cognition of successful activity too is unable to establish its own truth on the ground that such a cognition is seen to arise even in the absence of a jar, then the cognition of successful activity too is unable to establish its own truth on the same ground, i.e. on the ground that too is seen to arise even when actually where there is no successful activity, as in dreams. Consequently, when the knowledge of successful activity itself is not ascertained to be true, how can it prove the truth of the knowledge of jar? And, even if it be granted that the knowledge of successful activity is truly itself, how can it prove the truth of the knowledge of a jar? The knowledge of jar is as different from the knowledge of successful activity as from the knowledge of cloth. 'This is jar' and 'I bring water in a jar' assert quite different things.¹⁴ So how can the latter prove that the former is true? Let this question be left for some time later and let us take up the first again. It will be said that though the knowledge of successful activity does not by itself certify truth, the feeling of pleasure or satisfaction that accom-

pleasure is never known to arise in the absence of pleasure; therefore, the knowledge of pleasure is self-evident. If a knowledge, e.g. of a jar, is true, the activity to which it leads must be successful and if an activity is successful it must result in a feeling of pleasure. If the knowledge of pleasure cannot deceive us it proves the truth of the knowledge of successful activity which in turn proves the truth of the knowledge that prompted activity. The contention of the Buddhism too is wrong. It is true that the knowledge of pleasure can arise only when pleasure is actually felt and not otherwise and hence, it is self-valid. But, from the knowledge of pleasure the truth of the knowledge in question cannot be determined, because in dreams, hypnosis etc., it is seen that pleasure may arise from purely imaginary object.

The same reasoning holds in case if coherence with some other knowledge is supposed to be the test of truth. The other knowledge with which agreement of a certain knowledge is sought may be either of the same kind or of a different kind; it may be homogeneous (*sajatiya*) or heterogeneous (*vijatiya*). The subsequent visual cognitions of a jar, for instance, arising in the same person or in different persons are all homogeneous with its present visual cognition, while its factual cognition, inferential cognition and the cognition derived from a reliable person are all heterogeneous to its present visual cognition. Now, whatever the knowledge with which agreement is sought may be, the difficulty of infinite regress cannot be avoided by the upholder of the extrinsicality of truth, because none of the subsequent cognitions the same thing can be supposed to be intrinsically true. When the subsequent cognitions are homogeneous with the first one, they do not differ from the first, hence, one possessing no superiority over others, all must be equally true, false or doubtful. Again, heterogeneous cognitions of a thing reveal different aspects of it and consequently these cannot be verified by its auditory, factual and other heterogeneous cognitions, because they reveal respectively the colour, sound touch etc., of the jar, which being different cannot corroborate one another. The

qualities perceived by the different sense-organs are absolutely different so there cannot be any agreement among the heterogeneous perceptions of the something. If agreement with a heterogeneous cognition is the sole test of truth, then my visual perception of a jar which reveals its colour cannot but be false because the auditory and other perceptions cannot apprehend its colour.¹⁵

Thus, if knowledge is not known to be true intrinsically no extraneous evidence can prove it. Moreover, the intrinsicity of truth is proved by the very reasoning of the upholder of extrinsicity. It is held that successful activity is the result of true knowledge and the truth of knowledge, though by itself, undermined is inferred from the knowledge of successful activity, as a cause is inferred from its effect. But, such an inference cannot be reliable unless the invariable concomitance between true knowledge and successful activity has been observed repeatedly.¹⁶ We infer the presence of fire from the perception of smoke at a distance on the ground that we have observed smoke and fire together in the past in a large number of instances and have never observed a contrary instance. Accordingly, one who infers correctly the truth of a knowledge from successful activity must somehow have known the truth of knowledge independently of the knowledge of successful activity repeatedly on many occasions, which implies that the truth of knowledge is self-evident.¹⁷

A CRITICAL ESTIMATE

After having given the main views of the nature and test of truth we now undertake to evaluate these views. It appears to us that these different views have arisen from the different angles of vision from which the problem of truth has been looked at. In our analysis of the different views we have noticed that they depend upon assumption which the advocates of different views have made. Assumptions are indeed necessary for philosophical procedure itself, but there are assumptions and assumptions. The problem of truth being the essential problem of philosophy, we must proceed on such an assumption as would help us to explain more satisfactorily than others the condition that are involved in the evaluation of truth as such. The different conceptions of truth and of its tests such as *Svatah pramanya* and *Paratah pramanya*, and mutual differences and quarrels amongst them, have been due to laying over emphasis on one more of certain conditions to the neglect of the others. The human constitution is a complex, composed of psychological as well as rational structure. When truth presents itself to the human mind, not only do these different structures of the human mind, come into play, but also it is faced with reality which does not fail to influence the mind's evaluation of truth.

A judgment is an assertion about some thing which claims to be true but may be false. To judge something is to consider it to be such and such are not to be such and such. A judgment may thus be affirmative or negative. It may either affirm or deny that a thing is such-and-such.

But in each case it claims to be true. It proceeds on the understanding that what is affirmed or denied in the judgment is true, or that it is the real fact. Whereas in knowledge there is no such claim to be true, there is no occasion for truth and error. Doubt as a mental state is neither true nor false, because one who is in doubt does not claim that his doubt gives him the truth of the matter he doubts. Rather, he is in doubt as to what the truth of matter may be. Now a judgment, being a definite assertion that a thing is or not such-and-such, no doubt claims to be true; but it may be true as well as false. Now the questions we are to consider here are : What makes one judgment true and another false ? What do we mean by the truth and falsehood of judgment ? How again, can we certain that one judgment is true and another false or erroneous ? It will be seen that with regard to truth and error there are two main questions, namely, how truth and error are constituted, and how they are known or tested. The first question relates to the nature of truth and error and the second to the tests or criteria of truth and error.

There are four main theories of truth and error which bear on this two questions. According to Sankhya, truth and error both are intrinsic. According to Nyaya, both of them are extrinsic caused by the merits and demerits of sources of cognition. According to Buddhists, error is intrinsic and truth is extrinsic. According to Purva Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta, truth is intrinsic error is extrinsic.

I

The Sankhya system accepts intrinsic or *Svatah* theory in respect of both truth and error. According to the Sankhya, both truth and falsity are internal characters of different cases of knowledge. If one knowledge is true and another false, that is so because of their own internal conditions and without reference to any external tests like correspondence, coherence, etc. Truth is latent in some cognitions and error in others, from the very first moment of their occurrence, and these are immediately apprehended

by us at that moment. A true cognition is true and known to be true by itself, and it can never be made false, just as colours like white and black are perceived by themselves and one cannot be changed into the other. Thus the Sankhya holds that both truth and falsehood are internally conditioned and immediately known. This is the theory of *Pramanya* and *Apramanya*, i.e., intrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge. As already remarked the Sankhya theory of *Svatah pramanya* and *Svatah apramanya* is based upon his fundamental ontological theory of *Satkaryavada*, viz., the identity between cause and effect. Effect means manifestation of what was, unrollment of what was enrolled. The *karya* is nothing but the rearrangement of the *karana* which already pre-exist in it. Truth or falsity of knowledge as a *karya* therefore must depend upon the very same conditions that operate in its same manifestation. It is for this reason that Sankhya advocates that not only is the truth of knowledge self-originated but also its falsity.

The Mimamsa and the Advaita Vedanta, however take truth as intrinsic to all knowledge (*Svatah pramanya*), and error as an abnormal phenomenon due to certain external and vitiating factors in the conditions of some cognitions (*Paratah apramanya*). Knowledge is the manifestation of an object, and so it cannot be, unless it manifests its object truly. Any cognition is true so far as it reveals its object; and it is immediately known to be true so far as it is uncontradicted (*abadhita*). The absence of contradiction, however, is not positive but a negative condition of truth. Knowledge is both made true and known to be true by its own internal conditions while truth is intrinsic and organic to knowledge, falsity or error is accidental and externally conditioned. Thus the falsity of some cognitions is due to some defects in the conditions out of which they arise. It is only when certain defects vitiate its natural conditions that a cognition fails in its purpose, namely, the attainment of truth. A visual perception becomes false when its normal conditions are vitiated by disease of the eye, want of light, etc. Just as a cognition is made false by certain external conditions, so it is known to be false from such and such

external conditions as the experience of contradiction and the knowledge of vitiating conditions. The falsity of the perception of silver in the mother-of-pearl is detected by us when it is contradicted by the subsequent experience of the system-shell. Thus error or falsity is externally conditioned, and indirectly known by us, but truth is conditioned internally as known by us intuitively.

The motive which led the Mimamsa system to adopt *Svatah pramanyavada* is to see a theoretical justification for its belief in the divine authorship. He believes that the Veda is external and uncreated. He could not base the validity of such Vedic assertions as one desirous heaven should sacrifice on such extrinsic grounds as the omniscience of God, as is done by the Naiyayika, because the hypothesis that there exists a God could not be supported by reason. The supposition that there exists a God is absolutely unverifiable through the available empirical means and to be the base the validity of the Veda on such a shaky foundation would have been detrimental to the religious feelings of the orthodox Hindus like Mimamsakas under such circumstances the safer course was to prove self validity in the case of our common beliefs in the object of sense and then to extend and generalise it to cover the case of Vedic knowledge.

Another object against the intrinsic theory of truth is urged on the ground that the principle of non-contradiction which governs it lead not only to a negative conception of truth but also involves reference to another conception, the understanding of which helps the understanding of truth. The principle of non-contradiction as applied to truth will mean that 'truth is not not-truth' and 'truth is not false'. Now we can refute the objection by pointing out that it is purely formal, in the sense that we cling here to the form which the principle of non-contradiction gives us when fully expounded. But it must be remembered that non-contradiction is identity only in another form, for a thing which is identical with itself cannot allow its contradictory. The

is identically the same. Hence when it is urged by the objection that the conception of truth governed by the principle of non-contradiction is only negative, we can turn the table against him and say that principle of identity which represents the positive aspect is different from the principle of non-contradiction only in its form, and not in its content, and very well gives us truth as it is in its positive aspect, and we can thus avoid the negative definition of truth and the alleged reference to the other term 'false' with negation attached to it, only brings out the logical implication of the same positive conception of truth. All negation, be it remembered presupposes affirmation. We see then that the above mentioned objection is only a formal one and does not stand, when the principle of non-contradiction is understood in the light of the principle of identity which has identically the same content as the principle of non-contradiction.

II

The Nyaya account of *Paratah Pramanyavada* combines the correspondence, the coherence, and the Pragmatist theories, though with certain modifications. According to Nyaya, the truth of knowledge consists in correspondence with objective facts, while coherence and practical utility are the test of truth in such cases in which we require a test. It defines the truth of all knowledge as a correspondence of relation (*Tadvatitatprakaraka*). To know a thing is judge it as showing such and such a character. This knowledge of the thing will be true if the thing has really such and such a character, if not, i.e., will be false. The Nyaya view of correspondence is thus different from the new realistic idea of structural correspondence or identity of contents. That knowledge corresponds to some object does not, for the Naiyayikas, mean that the contents of the object bodily enter into consciousness and become its contents. When for example, I know a table, as a physical existent does not figure in my consciousness. This means only that I judge something as having the attribute

of "tableness" which really belongs to it. There is a subjective cognition of a physical object. The one correspondence to the other, because it determines the object as it is, and does not itself become what it is. If it so become the object itself, there would be nothing left on the subjective side that might correspond to the physical object.

While truth consists in correspondence, the criterion of truth for the Nyaya, coherence and pragmatism in broad sense? The Nyaya, though, right so far as validity is sometimes proved on extrinsic grounds, is wrong when it asserts that validity is proved invariably on extrinsic evidence. Therefore, truth rests ultimately on intrinsic evidence cannot be itself be the supreme test of truth, i.e., the ultimate motive of certitude. Coherence and pragmatic success which are extraneous tests of truth presuppose a knowledge of truth on intrinsic evidence some where and the Mimamsa is quite correct in pointing out this fact. My perception of water through vision is said to be known as true if it coheres with my later experiences it through touch, taste and other senses. But the different senses reveal different aspects of water and their reports are different which cannot be said to point to the same fact; viz., water, unless on many former occasions water has been experienced through different senses and the different sense-experiences have been known to be intrinsically true. Let a, b, c, d, etc., be the different sense experiences of water. At present I am having the experience of a and subsequently I have the experience b, c, d, etc. But how can b, c, d, etc. confirm a otherwise than on the ground of their intrinsic truth? The truth of a is known through b, c, d, etc., because we already have had all of them together and have known each of them to be independently true. The pragmatic test of successful activity is nothing but verifying an experience by aesthetic and emotional experiences. When I believe my visual perception of water to be true when I quench my thirst with it, the satisfaction of an organic need gives me an additional emotional experience. But why should this emotional experience prove that what I perceive is really water. There

two experiences, a visual and an emotional one, have been connected in my mind in the past when I had them together and knew them as independently and intrinsically true. Truth is ultimately based on intrinsic evidence. Otherwise the Naiyayika cannot avoid infinite regress. The Naiyayika tries to save this position by asserting that we have no motive to examine the truth of our experiences of practical results (*Phalajnana*). But this is merely accepting the theory of self evidence in the case of the said experiences. We have no motive to examine the truth of our experience of success or failure of our practical activities because we are confident of its truth and there is no scope for doubt, which implies that truth is self-evident in that case.

Another extrinsic test of truth is the knowledge of merits in the source from which a cognition emanates and the ground from which this test derives its legitimacy is the belief that truth is produced by merits and falsehood by demerits of the generating conditions of knowledge. But this involves reasoning in a circle. When the sense-organs are the cause of knowledge, we can never be aware of their merits or demerits independently of the knowledge which arises from them. What is the standard by which merits and demerits are judged in sense-organs. It is only when a perception is found to be true or false on other grounds that merits or demerits are presumed in the corresponding sense-organ. Our knowledge of merits and demerits of the senses is primarily based on the knowledge of truth and error and even when we know them they are not a sure guidance to the knowledge of truth and falsehood because, firstly, we are never sure that they are known exhaustively and, secondly, a perception may be true in spite of some defect in the sense-organ. For instance the disease called jaundice is known to be responsible for the illusion of yellowness, but from the knowledge of its presence it cannot be inferred that the perceived yellowness of an object is definitely false and the object is really white, because it may really be yellow. It is true that a white object is seen as yellow through a jaundiced eye but a yellow object also is seen as yellow through it. In the case when the knowledge

whose truth is to be examined is derived from inference, truth and falsehood surely depend on the soundness and defective character respectively of the reasoning process and we can be sure of the truth of the conclusion if there are no logical fallacies in the process, but when did we know what constitutes soundness and what constitutes fallaciousness? This is primarily known after an independent knowledge of the truth and falsehood of inferences. In the case of knowledge derived from other persons a correct knowledge of things and a faithful statement of what one knows constitute merit, but the merit cannot be ascertained unless the truth of the knowledge is ascertained first. Even when we know a person as possessing the desired qualifications on the ground of our past dealing with him. It is very difficult to ascertain if he knows a particular thing correctly and thus the truth of human assertions cannot be proved through a knowledge of merits. Knowledge of merits has hardly been offered as a test of truth by modern epistemologists. It may be granted that merits produce truth and demerits produces falsehood, but the Nyaya view that in this way truth and falsehood, are extrinsic to knowledge is misleading. This view gives the impression that knowledge is first produced as neutral by its causes and subsequently the merits or demerits of the causes add the property of truth or falsehood to it. But this is wrong. The causes and their merits or demerits are simultaneously operative in the production of knowledge. Knowledge is not product of successive additions of the individual contributions of different elements. Similarly the Mimamsa view that falsehood is extraneously produced in knowledge by demerits also is misleading, though Parthasarathi emphatically says that knowledge is true or false from the very origin and that truth and falsehood are not its super-added properties.

The Indian theories of truth start from perception and end in an attempt to explain the validity of knowledge based on authority in the light of the criteria derived from perception. But the Indian philosophers excluding the Buddhists hardly question the truth of our perceptions as much

perceive things exactly as they are? In modern philosophy Locke questioned the reality of the secondary qualities of objects, viz. colour, taste etc., He concluded that primary sense qualities, viz. extension, motion, etc. actually belong to objects, but secondary qualities are relative to our sensibility. Kant said that the thing-in-itself even remains unknown and what we perceive and attribute to things are effect of things in themselves upon our minds. Perhaps due to an inadequate knowledge of physiology. Indian philosophers were not troubled by these problems. They seem to accept uncritically what the sense-organs report about the world around us and it is probably right. Our sense-cognitions are the product of an intercourse between the nervous system and the external world. We have an instinctive belief in the reality of things as they are revealed as they actually are. A mirror reflects images of objects which we find to be more or less exact copies of them. A gramophone reproduces a voice quite faithfully so why should we doubt that our organism too can faithfully apprehend objects. Perhaps there take place two types of processes in our organism when it is stimulated by external objects. The sense-organs convey the influences produced by external objects to a form of energy and transmit it to the central nervous system in which takes place the reverse process of restoring the original form to this energy. Our perception of objects is undoubtedly relative to our sensibility which is tinged by the peculiarities of the medium through which objects are received but the central nervous system in the process of restoration counteracts and eliminates these peculiarities distorting influences. Our organism has been evolved under the pressure of environmental influences and it may reasonably be supposed that it is adapted to reveal objects as they are, we observe instances of adaption in nature everywhere. Males of a species are adapted to the requirements of the females and vice-versa. Our organs are adapted to the peculiarities of the environment. There is no reason why we should not accept that our senses are adapted to reveal objects correctly. Our doubts regarding the truth of our perceptions are useless because perception is the only source of first-hand information about the external world.

We are helpless and have to accept things as revealed by perception. Hence our perceptions are intrinsically true. The Nyaya view that their truth is extrinsic is wrong because there is no test extraneous to perception which is available and is more primary and reliable. The sense-organs are naturally adapted to reveal things in their real form and in this sense the power of producing truth is inherent in them. Falsehood is non-inherent in the sense that it is caused by the distorting influences of the medium which remain uncorrected due to certain defects of the central nervous system. Thus falsehood can be attributed to the agency of abnormal conditions when the perceptual apparatus is not functioning normally it can be known from the discord among the reports of different sense-organs or among those of different persons or among those of the same person at different times. If many persons perceive the same thing, if we perceive the same thing at different times, if the reports of different senses agree, we have no reason to doubt the normal functioning of a particular sense-organ. Experience teaches us that within certain limits and under certain conditions our perceptions are quite reliable. Beyond these limits our senses may error, but in such cases errors may be detected by different tests, suggested by the Naiyayika and the Buddhist, viz. non-coherence, practical disappointment, etc. If an erroneous perception were never contradicted by subsequent experiences of a person or of other persons, we could never be aware of its erroneousness. There is no superior and more primary faculty of knowing the real nature of objects than sense-perception and consequently what it reveals must be taken to be real. Intellect or the faculty of reasoning is no doubt superior, but it acquires this superiority owing to its power of comparing, analysing and synthesising sense-data which are the result of a direct contact of sense-organs with reality. Thus in the sphere of perceptual knowledge the Mimamsa theory alone is correct. When knowledge is derived from a combined operation of the sense-organs and inference or from inference or from verbal testimony, the mere appearance or if it is not a proof of its truth. If at night I perceive a light high up in the sky and judge that it is light of star, my judgment

goes beyond what is given by perception. So far as the perception of light is concerned, there is no scope for doubt but the judgment that it belongs to a star may turn out to be false, because the light may really belong to an aeroplane. Our judgments based on inference can have a fairly high degree of certitude if the grounds on which they rest are found sufficiently convincing. But their truth is ultimately proved if they are verified by perception. Similarly the truth of a human assertions I proved by their correspondence with perception. When the objects of knowledge are not directly open to perception or when they are imperceptible, truth can be tested by coherence. In science theories are generally tested through experimentation. In astronomy the implications of a theory are calculated and compared with observations. In history evidences are collected from different sources and compared among themselves. But what we gain from these different tests is only relatively high or low degree of certainty. Absolute certainty is humanly unattainable. Epistemology cannot provide any hard and fast rule for the discovery of truth. We do have recourse to external evidence for ascertaining truth in the above cases and so far the Nyaya theory of *paratah pramanya* is correct. But the Mimamsa theory of *svatah pramanya* is not thus falsified. It is a fact that the mere appearance of knowledge is not the proof of its truth and this fact is recognised as much by the latter theory as by the former. The difference lies in their respective attitudes towards knowledge. The Naiyayika first adopts the attitude of neutrality and then delivers his judgment according to available evidence. The Mimamsa first assumes the truth of knowledge and is ready to give due consideration to any evidence that may subsequently crop up and go against it, he is prepared to revise his judgment in the light of fresh evidence. The Naiyayika is like a judge who sees every man appearing in his court with an unprejudiced eye and the Mimamsa is like one who believes that every man is innocent until his crime is proved. But the attitude of the Buddhist is just the opposite of the Mimamsa attitude. He is like a judge who takes every man to be a criminal until the proof of his innocence is available.

There is no exact parallel to the *Svatah pramanyavada* in Western philosophy. It is true that in modern European philosophy, knowledge in the strict sense, is always taken to mean true belief. But truth or validity is not regarded as intrinsic to all knowledge independently of all external conditions. It is in the writings of Professor L.A. Reid, a modern realist whose's no allegiance to the current schools of realism, that we find some approach to the view that truth is organic to knowledge. But even Reid makes it conditional on knowledge efficiently fulfilling its function, namely, the apprehension of reality as it is. He thinks that truth is nothing else but knowledge doing its job. Thus he says, "Truth is indeed, simply, ... the quality of knowledge perfectly fulfilling its function". Again he observes, "if knowledge were not transitive, if we were not in direct contact, joined with reality, then all our tests, coherence, correspondence, and the rest, would be worthless". Here truth is admitted to be a natural function of knowledge but not as inherent and self-evident in all knowledge. In the theory of intuitionism, we find a close approach to the view of self-evident validity. To the question "How do we know that a belief is true or valid". Intuitionism has a simple answer to give namely, that we know it immediately to be such. As Hobhouse puts the matter, "Intuitionism has royal way of cutting this, and indeed most other knots, for it has but to appeal to a perceived necessity, to a clear idea, to the inconceivability of the opposite, all of which may be known by simply attending to our own judgment, and its task is done".

The Buddhist adopt the pragmatists theory of truth and reality. For pragmatism, truth is both constituted and known by practical utility. The truth of knowledge consists in its capacity to produce practical useful consequences, so also, the method of ascertaining truth is just to follow the practical consequences of a belief and see if they have any practical value. From this we can see that the Buddhists adopt the pragmatic theory of truth and reality. For them, practical efficiency is the test of both truth and reality. The real is what possesses practical efficiency (*artha kriya*) and

the true is the useful and so practically efficient (*artha kriya samarthyā*). But the pragmatic conception of truth is embarrassed by serious difficulties. Here we may note that to reduce the true to the useful is to make it almost meaningless. It is by no means the case that truth is only a matter of practical utility. The atomic and electron theories of matter make very little differences in our practical life. Similarly, the different theories of truth involved no great difference in their practical consequences. But in the absence of any other test than that of practical utility we cannot say which one is true and which is false. Further, there are certain beliefs which are admittedly to wrong, but which are otherwise useful for certain purposes of life. But no one would claim any truth for a wrong belief on account of its practical utility. Hence the Buddhist and the pragmatist theories of truth cannot be accepted as sound and satisfactory.

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to be rather far fetched
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The compound *Indriyagunaseya* has been interpreted
differently by Univeka and Parthasaradhi Misra. The
above exposition follows the former. The latter inter-
pretes it as *indriyadigata gunah*, i.e. merits of the
sense-organs.
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46. Ibid., 1.1.2, Ka. 43.
47. Ibid, 1.1.2, Ka. 38 C.
48. Ibid., 1.1.2, Ka. 39 Cd.
49. Ibid, 1.1.2, Ka. 44 ab.
50. It is to be noted that Kumarila has used the term
Samgati instead of *Samvada* for corroborative cogni-
tion.

51. Ibid., 1.1.2, Ka. 73, 74, Nyaya Ratnamala there on.
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55. Tattva Sangraha, a Ka 2835.
56. Tattva Sangraha Panjika, P. 910.
57. Ibid., P. 910.
58. Tattva Sangraha, Ka 3018-19 and Tattva Sangraha
59. Tattva Sangraha, Ka 2958 and others.
60. Nyaya Manjari, I, P. 147.
61. Sarva Darsana Sangraha, 557.
62. Sloka Varttika, 1.1.2, Ka, 47 & 53, Sastradipika, P.20.
63. Vedanta Paribhasa, P. 109 and P. 112.
64. The name of the opponent is not mentioned by Kumārila, but from the commentaries, it is evident that the opponent is none else than the Buddhist.
65. Sabara Bhasya on Mimamsa Sutra, 1.1.2.
66. Ibid.
67. Nyaya Varttika Tatparyatika.
68. Sabara Bhasya on Mimamsa Sutra, 1.1.5.

CHAPTER I

1. Cf. Tatva Sangraha, ka, 2011.
2. Cf. Nyayavatara, as cited in Purvamimamsa, P. 3.
3. Samkhyatattvakaumudi on Samkhya Karika, P. 5.
4. Cf. Samkhya Karika, 20 ab.
5. Nyaya Bhasya, 1.1.4
6. Sloka Varttika, Sunya, ka 184-87.
7. Shastri, D.N., Critic of Indian Realism, P. 474.
8. Nyaya Manjari, P. 16, Prakarana Pancika, P. 171.
9. Nyaya Siddhi on Prakarana Pancika, P. 176.
10. Milinda Panho, 2, 23.
11. Tattva Sangraha, Ka. 20, 73.
12. Slokavarttika, Sunya Ka, 22.
13. Ibid, 23, 24.
14. Ibid., 25.
15. Ibid., 27.
16. Ibid., 187 & 188.
17. Cf. Nyaya Ratnakara, P. 321.
18. Pramana Samucchaya, Ka. 12 ab.
19. Pramana Varttika, Pratyaksa, ka. 513-514 ab.
20. Tattva Sangraha Kas, 2022-24.
21. Tattva Sangraha, Panjika on above karikas P. 688-81.
22. Nyaya Bhasya, Nyaya Varttika tat prayatika.
Nyaya Sutra Vartti and Nyaya Manjari, Nyaya Sutra,
1.1.15.
See also Nyaya Sutra 3, 2, 1. ff.
23. Kant's Critic of Pure Reason.
24. The Principle of Psychology, Vol. II Chapter XXVI.
25. Creative Evolution, P. 18.
26. Space, Time and Deity, Volume I, PP-11-12.
27. Critical Realism, P. 26.
28. Watson Behaviourism Lecture.
29. The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, P. 14.
30. Reid is of the view that knowledge is an act of Mind.
31. Nyaya Manjari, P. 19.
32. Ibid., 1.16.
33. Ibid., 1.19.
34. The Analysis of Mind, P. 225.

5. Our Knowledge of the External World.
6. Essays in Radical Empiricism.
7. Knowledge and Truth, P. 26.
8. Sloka Varttika, P. 60.
9. Sastra Dipika, P. 56.
10. Nyaya Sutra, 1.1.15.
11. Vaisisika Sutras.
12. Vedanta Paribhasa, P. 136.
13. Nyaya Manjari, 11-58.
14. Sankhya Karika, P. 10.
15. Tarka Sangraha, P. 21.
16. Cf. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, P. 217.
17. Nyaya Kandali of Sridhara, P. 172.
18. Nyaya Kandali of Sridhara, P. 168.
19. Ibid.
20. Nyayabindutika of Dharmottara, P. 3. (St. Petersburg).
21. Ibid., P. 3.
22. Nyayaratnakara of Parthasarathi on Slokavarttika, 2.178.
23. Sastra Dipika of Parthasarathi, P. 45.
24. Nyayaratnamala of Parthasarathi, P. 35.
25. Sastra Dipika of Parthasarathi, PP. 45-46.
26. Kasika of Sucarita Misra on Sloka Varttika, 5.11.
27. Prakarana Pancika of Salikanatha, PP. 40-42.
28. Ibid., P. 42.
29. Ibid.
30. Sastra Dipika, P. 45.
31. Sloka Varttika of Kumarila, P. 5.11.
32. Manameyodaya of Narayana, P. 6.
33. Sastra Dipika of Parthasarathi, P. 45.
34. Nyaya Darsana, P. 8.
35. Nyaya Lilavati, P. 766.
36. Kanthabhura on Nyaya Lilavati, P. 766.
37. Satyatvam na Jnanajatih (Nyaya Lilavati, P. 766).
38. Udayana's Parisuddhi, PP. 158-9.
39. Nyaya Darsana, P. 24.
40. Vatsyayana Bhasya on Nyaya Sutra, 2.1.36.
41. Ibid., P. 16, 4, Nyaya Darsana, P. 16.

70. Parisuddhi, P. 46.
71. Nyaya Kusumanjali Karika, 4/1, 4/5.
72. Nyaya Manjari, P. 12.
73. Nyaya Kandali, P. 172.
74. Nyaya Lilavati, PP. 737-738.
75. Nyaya Darsana, P. 16 and Parisuddhi, PP. 161-166.
76. Ingalls, Loc. cit., PP. 73-74.
77. This is the logical significance of Nyaya dictum that all knowledge is unerring with regard to the substantive (dharminabhrantam), The Nyaya doctrine referred to above that every knowledge is in some respect at least true must be sharply distinguished from the other degrees of truth and falsity as stated by such thinkers as F. H. Bradley.

CHAPTER II

1. Nyaya Manjari, P. 169.
2. Keith, A.B., Buddhist Philosophy, 131.
Siddhanta Muktaivali of Viswanatha, PP. 443-444.
Nyaya Kusumanjali by Udayana, ii, PP. 1-2, 5-6.
Nyaya Manjari of Jayantha Bhatta, P. 171.
3. Tattva Cintamani, I, PP. 184.
Nyaya Manjari, PP. 160, 169 f.
4. Nyaya Manjari, P. 174.
5. Nyaya Bindutika, 1.1. Nyaya Varttika tatparyatika,
i 1.1., P. 18.
6. Samiha Pravrtti, Nyaya Bhasa, i.1.1.
Nyaya Manjari, P. 172.
7. Nyaya Varttika tatparyatika of Vacaspati Misra,
i.1.1., P. 8.
8. Ibid.
9. Vacaspati, Nyaya Darsana, P. 9.
10. Parisuddhi, P. 113.
11. Udayana, Parisuddhi, P. 120, It is thus explained by Vardhamana in his Prakasa on it.
12. Thus the hetvabhasas are defined in Siddhanta Muktaivali as those which by being known oppose inference.

13. Vacaspati says, "hitasyabhicaralinga samultamniskampamu padyata jnanam".
14. Muktavali on Karika, No. 133.
15. Ibid., P. 9.
16. Ibid.
17. Parisuddhi, PP. 102 ff.
18. Ibid., P. 105.
19. Pramanyavada, P. 50.
20. Parisuddhi, P. 117.
21. Parisuddhi Prakasa, P. 118.
22. Nyaya Manjari, PP. 156-7.
23. Sloka varttika, ii, P. 35-36.
24. Nyaya Manjari, P. 172.
25. Cf. Jayanta's Nyaya Manjari, PP. 338-40.
26. Cf. Reid, L.A., Knowledge and Truth, PP. 185, 199, 204.
27. Jayanta's Nyaya Manjari, P. 341-43.
28. Ibid.,
29. Ibid., P. 349.
30. Tattva Cintamani, I. PP. 276-77. Nyaya Manjari, PP. 162.
31. Nyaya Manjari, P. 173., Tattva Cintamani, I, PP. 277-79. 282 f.
32. Nyaya Bhasya, 2.1. 8-11.
33. Ibid., 2.1. 12. 16.
34. Kasika of Sucarita Misra, Nyaya Ratnakara of Parthasarathi on Slokavarttika 2, 35-36.
35. Ibid.
36. The Nature of Truth, Chapter I.

CHAPTER III

1. S.D.S. PP. 234-35 - Slokavarttika, ii. 44, 47.
2. Slokavarttika, ii 53, 54.
3. Ibid.
4. Brhati, P. 24
5. Slokavarttika, Sj. 2-53.
6. Nyayavarttikatat, P. 21.
7. Hemachandra, Pramanamimamsa, 33-34.
8. Pra-panchika, P. 42.

9. Nilitattvaribhava of Citananda (Trivendrum).
10. Slokavartika, 5.19.
11. Ibid.
12. Slokavartika, 47.
13. Tatparyatika of Umbeka, PP. 48-55.
14. Slokavartika, 1.1.2, 33 cd.
15. Sarva Darsana, Sangraha, P. 557.
16. Slokavartika, 1.12, Karika 34 ab.
17. Slokavartikatatparyatika, P. 43.
18. Slokavartika, 1.1.2, Ka. 35.
19. Nyaya Manjari, V.1, P. 147.
20. Ibid., 1.1., P. 147.
21. Slokavartika Sutra, 2, 53.
22. Nyaya Ratnamala, P. 38.
23. Nyaya Ratnamala, P. 31.
24. Slokavartika of Kumarila, 2.53.
25. Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi P. 34.
26. Slokavartika, 2.85 of Kumarila.
27. Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi, P. 33.
28. Ibid., P. 57.
29. Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi on Slokavartika, 2.57.
30. Ibid., 2.58-61.
31. Nyaya Manjari, PP. 170-71, Sidhanta Muktavali, 131-36.
32. Nyayavartika, 1.1, P. 3.
33. Nyaya Kusumanjali, ii. PP. 7-8, 13.
34. Nyaya Manjari, i 155-60.
35. Citsukhi, P. 122.
36. Vedanta Paribasha, P. 109.
37. Ibid.
38. Vedanta Paribasha, P. 112.
39. Ibid., 111.
40. Ibid.
41. Cf. Tattva Pradipika, P. 122.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Descartes, The Method, Meditation. P. 19.
45. Joachim, The Nature of Truth, P. 71.

CHAPTER IV

1. Sucarita Misra's Pasika Comentary on the Mimamsa Sloka varttika, Part I, P. 80.
2. Ibid., P. 89, Conndana Sutra, Sl. 47.
3. Das Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.I, P.257.
4. The Advaitin also subscribes to this view of causation See Ista Siddhi, P. 187.
5. K.K. on Slokavartika or Kumarila, 2-34.
6. Sloka vartika Vyakhya Tatparyatika, P. 43.
7. Prajnakara Gupta, Pramanavartikabhasya, PP. 50-53, 116-18 and 165-69.
8. P. gha. For this reason, the Vijnanavadins reject the reality of space, time, God, atman, etc., as they serve no purposeful activity. We should not forget that generally Being is not ultimate for Buddhism.
9. Slokavartika of Kumarila, 2, 38-45.
10. Nyayabindutika, P. 31.
11. Nyayamanjari.
12. Nyayaratnakara of Parthasarathi, PP. 47-48.
13. Sastradipika of Parthasarathi, P. 2.
14. Nyayaratnamala of Parthasarathi, P. 37.
15. Slokavarthika of Kumarila PP. 7-8.
16. Ibid.
17. Nyayabindutika, P. 4.

ERRATA

Page No.	Line	For	Read
1	4	seek	seek to
7	15	make	made
9	11	indecision comes	indecisiom intellect comes
9	12	that affords is greatest satisfaction	that affords greatest sotisfaction
10	9	stend in a	stand in
11	3	consifitute	constitute
12	14	t through	though
13	23	read	red
14	34	descartes in	Descartes is
15	22	origin	original
17	12	intrinsic are	intrinsic or validity
21	27	andinfinitem	ad infinitum
22	27	the Buddhism	Buddhism
26	27	as in the a	as in a
32	28	appreception	is apperception
33	35	hence theory	hence the theory
48	9	new what	new to what
50	16	object both	object that both
55	8	a true...respects	delete
70	14	trutth	truth
71	40	that sure	delete
73	11	suggestion	suggestions
75	1	to said that	delete
76	38	with green	delete
79	9	such of	delete
80	20	poited	poised

XI

81	25	apprened	apprehended
118	22	hatly	heatly
122	5	whica	which
124	19	absenco	absence
129	23	blemishes in in	blemishes in
136	7	intitively	intuitively
133	7	consits	consists
188	19	experiencee	experiences of
139	11	becuuce	because
141	22	produced	produced from
142	22	error	err
133	5	faily	fairly
144	7	whoes	who has
145	12	to	delete

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